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After the euro crisis, politicization patterns led the institutions of the European Union to gradually redirect the bloc's socioeconomic governance away from austerity. It is less clear whether the erosion of austerity was mirrored in national economic discourses. To fill this gap, this article provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of parliamentary budget debates in four country cases: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal, from 2014 to 2020. The results show contrasting patterns of "fiscal discipline" frame resilience in national economic discourse in ways consistent with intergovernmental bargaining around the pandemic recovery agenda. Moreover, shared preoccupations relating to investment in the economy, social inequality, and climate change emerge as major threads shaping budget making. These findings suggest an increasingly integrated multi‐level system of economic governance and call for further investigation into the links between ideas shaping EU economic governance and economic discourses in member states. Related Articles: Pi Ferrer, Laia, and Pertti Alasuutari. 2019. "The Spread and Domestication of the Term 'Austerity:' Evidence from the Portuguese and Spanish Parliaments." Politics & Policy 47(6): 1039–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12331. Zamponi, Lorenzo, and Lorenzo Bosi. 2016. "Which Crisis? European Crisis and National Contexts in Public Discourse." Politics & Policy 44(3): 400–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12156. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article extends the debate on finance versus institutions and measurement of property rights institutions (PRI). We assess the relationships between various components of PRI and private investment, notably: political, economic, and institutional governances. Comparative concurrent relationships of financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity, and size are also investigated. The findings provide support for the quality of institutions as a better positive correlate of private investment than financial intermediary development. The interaction of finance and governance is not significant in potentially promoting private investment, perhaps due to substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996‐2010. Policy measures are discussed for reducing financial deposits, increasing financial activity, and hence, improving financial efficiency. Related Articles: Aideyan, Osaore. 2016. "Political and Institutional Prerequisites for Monetary Union: Assessing Progress in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)." Politics & Policy 44 (6): 1192‐1212. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12183 Asongu, Simplice A., and Joseph Nnanna. 2019. "Foreign aid, Instability, and Governance in Africa." Politics & Policy 47 (4): 807‐848. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12320 Scarlato, Margherita, and Giorgio d'Agostino. 2019. "The Political Dimension of Cash Transfers in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Comparative Perspective." Politics & Policy 47 (6): 1125‐1155. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12332 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in 53 African countries for the period 1996‐2010. An autoregressive endogeneity‐robust generalized method of moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors, and bilateral aid. Principal component analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice and accountability and political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption control), and general governance (political, economic, and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications are discussed. Related Articles: Beal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. "Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077 Fails, Matthew D. 2014. "Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078 Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. "State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation." Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]