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Abstract: A major target of criticism for ethnomethodology has been cognitivism. In its broadest sense this term refers to any account of human behaviour that treats psychological features of agents – including beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations – as factors explaining their behaviour. While much criticism of cognitivism has been directed at neuroscientists and philosophical materialists, the range of targets has been wider than this, even including sociologists such as Herbert Blumer and symbolic interactionists. In this article I outline this criticism of Blumer and assess it. My conclusion is that, despite some misreading, his work does fall into the broad category of cognitivism. However, I question the grounds for the ethnomethodological critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognised that academic freedom is currently under threat. But there is also considerable dispute about the meaning of the term. In this paper I examine two recent and important accounts of the nature of academic freedom that seek to distinguish it clearly from free speech. Such a distinction is, in my view, essential. The aim of the paper is to clarify and resolve differences between these two accounts, and thereby to develop further the conceptualisation of academic freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the arguments that have been put forward about the implications of children's rights for the ethics of research involving children. It begins by exploring the concept of rights, and the different kinds of right that have been identified in the philosophical literature. From this, the discussion moves to the nature and legitimacy of children's rights. Finally, the implications of the debates about children's rights are examined for research ethics. It is argued that these implications are more limited and problematic than is generally recognised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a response to a recent article dealing with the concept of value-free sociology by Donald Black. It argues that while a defence of Weber's position on the role of values in sociological research is necessary and important, what is offered by Black is counter-productive in important respects. This is because it encourages some of the misunderstandings that it is aimed at remedying and, even more importantly, offers a simplistic discussion of what are complex issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the first half of the twentieth century, there has been considerable discussion of the viability and value of analytic induction (AI) as a conceptualisation of social scientific method; one which challenges the correlational approach to causal analysis characteristic of much quantitative work. However, less attention has been given to the philosophical sources on which Znaniecki, Lindesmith, and other exponents of AI relied. This paper explores some of these, and focuses in particular upon the use made of Lewin's distinction between Aristotelian and Galileian forms of science. The status of AI is ambiguous in relation to this; and it is a distinction that raises some fundamental issues more generally about the methodology of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Furlong and Oancea's influential framework for assessing the products of applied and practice-based educational inquiry raises some important issues about the criteria by which research should be judged. They begin by outlining the current significance of the issue, and some of the uncertainties surrounding the definition of applied and practice-based inquiry. They then present four sets of criteria by which such research can be assessed, covering, in shorthand terms, epistemic, technical, practical and economic dimensions. The issue of assessment criteria has recently been highlighted by public criticism of the quality of educational research, by attempts to incorporate qualitative work into systematic reviews, as well as by the continuing disputes generated by major methodological divisions among qualitative researchers. In this article, several aspects of the framework offered by Furlong and Oancea are examined. To start with, there is a discussion of the mode of argument they employ, and of how they define 'applied and practice-based educational research'. It is argued that explicit justification is not presented for some key, and controversial, elements of the argument. One of these is the idea that a new social contract is required between educational researchers and the funders and non-academic users of their work. The nature of the proposed contract is examined, through a discussion of to whom educational researchers should be accountable, how, and for what. It is argued that the typology of research offered by Furlong and Oancea is inadequate, and an alternative is proposed. The ways that the authors formulate the four sets of criteria by which research should be judged are also examined in some detail. It is suggested that there are potentially serious conflicts amongst these criteria, and that by no means all of them are appropriate standards in terms of which educational researchers, of any kind, should be held accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the concept of linguistic ethnography (LE). In this context, the author mentioned about a broad range of work, sharing family resemblances and reflecting features of the particular niche in which it has developed. The subsequent articles explore various issues and relationships relevant to LE.

In a previous article, Phil Hodkinson argued that there are currently attempts to impose a methodological orthodoxy on educational research, one that is empiricist in character and privileges quantitative method. While agreeing with much of what he says, I take issue with key elements of his argument. I suggest that he presents too rosy a picture of the existing state of educational research, question his apparent advocacy of a laissez-faire approach to its governance, and argue that he underplays the significant role that methodological rules can play in shaping the practice of research in desirable ways. I suggest that his approach is likely to reinforce paradigmatic fragmentation in the research community, and that this weakens any attempt to resist the internal and external pressures that currently threaten to damage or destroy educational research in the UK, and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper comments on an article by Lauder, Brown, and Halsey, that deals on a political arithmetic to make sociology useful. These are some of the significant issues raised in the article: 1) relationship between social science and policymaking; 2) association between quantitative and qualitative approaches in social science, and; 3) need for policy research to draw on many disciplines. However, while raising important questions, there are some major uncertainties surrounding the authors' argument. They announce that they are to advance the position that sociology needs to develop an approach to research which focuses on fundamental social problems. But what they are proposing is not really new, since much sociological research has been concerned with fundamental social problems.

Concern with the dissemination of research findings has increased in recent years, in the wake of critiques of research for failing to have an impact on policy-making and practice. The most direct way in which research findings can be disseminated to a wide audience is via the mass media. However, coverage of social and educational research in the media is very limited. Furthermore, when it is covered researchers often complain that their work has been distorted. This article examines some of the media coverage of an Office for Standards in Education commissioned review of research on the education of ethnic minority children, published in 1996. Analysis of this media coverage is used as a basis for addressing questions about what is involved in media representation of research, how it should be evaluated, and what meaning can be given to the concept of distortion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The production of 'systematic' reviews of research findings has recently come to be treated as a priority in the field of education, and other areas too. Such reviews are believed to play an important role in making evidence from research available in a usable form to policy-makers and practitioners. This article examines the assumptions about research, and about the task of reviewing, which are built into the concept of systematic review. In addition, attention is given to the likely consequences of the priority now being given to this type of review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responds to the criticisms by David Hargreaves of educational research. Failings of educational research in relation to teaching; Recommendations for the role of teachers in educational research; Discussion of educational research as non-cumulative; Comparison of educational research with medicine.

Presents a report by education professionals and officials in Great Britain as a case showing the misuse of the findings of educational research. Analysis of the report titled, `Curriculum Organisation and Practice in Primary Schools: A Discussion Document'; Selective and over-interpretation of evidence; Relationship between the findings of research and educational practice.

Provides a methodological assessment of work on imbalances in classroom participation between girls and boys. Rationale for the research focus; Empirical contributions on information about differential male-female participation rates; Percentage of turns at talk and words spoken by girls and boys.

This paper explores some fundamental methodological issues, in particular about the standards by which research should be judged, that are raised by 'anti-racist' criticism of recent work by Peter Foster on teacher racism in British schools. The nature of the debate surrounding this work is examined, and it is suggested that it derives from fundamental disagreements about the character and purpose of sociological research. Arising from this, the implications of social scientists abandoning a foundationalist epistemology are considered. It is argued that this does not necessarily, and should not, lead us to adopt extreme epistemological alternatives, such as relativism, standpoint theory, or instrumentalism. Instead, a less radical non-foundationalism is defended, and its implications for the dispute between Foster and his critics explored. It is also suggested that while the ethical and political criticisms made of Foster's work imply an activist conception of research, even from an 'anti-racist' point of view relinquishing the relative autonomy of research from practical politics is unwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the claims of Stephen Ball and Peter Woods in their ethnographic studies of option choice schemes. Woods' and Ball's central concern was with the amount of choice pupils had in selecting fourth- and fifth-year courses. They claim that there is an inconsistency between the amount of choice officially offered and the amount of choice pupils were actually given. This is an important issue in itself, but it has heightened significance for these authors because of the consequences that they believe pupil choice could have for the differentiation of pupils within schools. And such differentiation is considered to be important because of its assumed consequences for occupational placement and the reproduction of the social class structure. Alongside with the role of schools in the reproduction of social inequality, there is another theme in these two studies, the importance of giving attention to micro as well as macro special processes. The accounts of option choice that they provide are in each case part of ethnographic studies of particular schools. The authors emphasize the importance of investigating processes of social interaction within the school, rather than treating the schools as black boxes and only studying their inputs and outputs.

Replies to the comment made by Barry Troyna on the alleged adoption of `methodological purism' in educational research by Roger Gomm, Peter Foster and the author. Absolute proof demanded by the methodological purist; Judgement of claims based on plausibility in relation to knowledge and credibility in relation to judgments; Initial assumption of researchers that critics are behaving reasonably.