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Established at the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has, potentially, considerable influence over decisions on the provision of loans to Eurozone member state governments and on the recapitalization of banks. Legally and organizationally, the ESM is an international financial institution and thus its accountability can be compared to that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions. However, the ESM's governance structure and decision‐making procedures show that it is deeply embedded in the Eurozone governance architecture, resulting in a dual institutional embeddedness. Focusing on vertical and horizontal accountability combined with a learning perspective on accountability, this article presents an assessment of the accountability mechanisms applicable to the idiosyncratic ESM and how these mechanisms work in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states' success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states' scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an assessment of the impact of changes to social security in Ireland during both the Celtic Tiger and crisis periods, comparing change in social security rates relative to prices and to median equivalized net income. It is argued that, contrary to some commentary, there was progress in terms of social welfare generosity during the Celtic Tiger years, despite Ireland adopting a low-tax economic model. However, in the latter years of the Celtic Tiger period, this progress was increasingly leveraged against precarious property-related taxes. Following the collapse of the housing bubble, the bank guarantee and the bailout, there has been substantial retrenchment of social security, both in terms of cuts to some of the primary social welfare payments, tightening of scheme rules as well as more direct cuts to less visible schemes. The article provides an assessment of these changes, ending on a cautionary note in arguing that the prospects for the future do not augur well given Ireland's continued commitment to a low-tax economic model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]