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Climate‐induced resettlement programs are happening right now in places around the world where populations face high risks from climatic impacts. Burgeoning literatures are considering the ethical implications of climate change more broadly, and the ethics of migration, but the nexus between the two issues has not been given enough attention by moral and political theorists, especially with respect to climate‐induced community resettlement. Here, we sketch the key nodes in a debate we think should take place, which will be made even more urgent in the coming decades as climate change impacts on communities least resilient to it. This article is categorized under: Climate, Nature, and Ethics > Climate Change and Global Justice [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the tolerance of climate change denial or misrepresentation of climate change's scientific realities such as its anthropogenic causes and its impact. Topics discussed include the qualification of climate denial as contestation of climate science theories, the disguise of fossil fuel industry's harmful externalities, and the threat of climate denial to human security. It also mentioned the climate denial propaganda by conservative research institutes.

The article focuses on the precautionary principles of climate change (CC). It argues on precautionary principle as an approach that should be considered by policy-makers on CC matters. It applies Clive Spash's typology of uncertainty to determine probabilities of weak and strong uncertainty of CC catastrophe (CCC), which can guide policy-makers in conducting standard risk assessment through its costs and impact. It also states an elaborate explanation of both the strong Precautionary Principle (SPP) and the weak PP (WPP) to address CCC. Arguments regarding the problems on the principles are also presented.

Introduces a series of articles on workfare and work ethic.

This paper mounts a Rawlsian argument for unconditional basic income on the grounds that it maximins the distribution of income and wealth understood as a social basis of self-respect. The most important objection to this argument available to Rawlsians is that basic income violates the demands of reciprocity, where reciprocity in any scheme of distribution is a requirement of justice. The second half of the paper addresses this objection. It is argued there that even if the objection can be made successfully by Rawlsians (and this is not clear), it is not sufficient to divest them of a commitment to basic income, given some practical considerations about the implementation of alternatives to basic income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]