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Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a set‐theoretic approach that enables accounting for causal complexity, incorporating features of qualitative and quantitative methods. Pioneered in sociology, it is increasingly used in comparative research to explain social phenomena in various disciplines. Despite its growing adoption, and because of its eclectic nature, some methodological themes have proven elusive. Its philosophy of science is one such issue. Philosophical pragmatism, which focuses on action, rather than the mind as rationalism or things as empiricism, is proposed to fill this void. Moving beyond the positivist‐interpretivist dichotomy, this paper argues that pragmatism's philosophical wagers support QCA's assumptions and practice. Moreover, pragmatism's implications in terms of practical consequences, provisionality of insights, plurality of method, and public participation provide fertile soil on which QCA‐based inquiry can sow, producing pragmatic comparative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document provides information about the Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology. It includes details about the executive committee and assessors, former presidents, and the committees involved in the 17th International Congress. The program structure of the congress is also outlined, with various themes and topics covered. The document concludes with the minutes of the General Assembly, including confirmation of the agenda, reports by the president and secretary general, and a memorial for past council members who have passed away. The text provides an overview of the activities and relationships of the Division of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science and Technology (DLMPST) from 2020 to 2023. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interactions were conducted virtually, including meetings of the Executive Committee and the Council. The DLMPST has been actively engaging with its members through initiatives such as the Small conference grant scheme and involving members in council elections. The DLMPST is also involved in various international organizations, including the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (IUHPST), the International Science Council (ISC), and the Conseil International de Philosophie et des Sciences Humaines (CIPSH). Additionally, the DLMPST has participated in projects related to gender equality in science and the promotion of scientific data preservation and open access. The text provides an overview of the activities and decisions made by the Division of Logic, Method [Extracted from the article]

The flow distribution is of significance to the fuel cell performance and durability, which has been studied from a theoretical and practical level in this work. The transverse‐flow‐control‐based mechanism behind flow distribution processes is revealed. The core lies in the reasonable generation and distribution of transverse flow, which are the prerequisite and co‐requisite for flow homogeneity. For the dual purpose, a novel design of combined‐mesh‐type distribution zone is proposed incorporating central horizontal meshes and lateral vertical meshes. The design philosophy and methodology are clarified. Under these guidelines, the novel distributor design is applied to different flow field plate geometries including the shorter distribution zone, higher expansion ratio, and scaled‐up fuel cell. Through organized and detailed simulations, two key geometrical parameters (porosities of central and lateral meshes) are quantified and the superior effect on flow distribution is validated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stefán Snævarr is an accomplished and prolific philosopher with a central interest in the philosophy of art (especially literature) in a broad sense. "The greatest strength of both works of philosophy and literature consists of the proliferation of possibilities, and neither philosophy nor literature seems to make clear-cut progress" (93). Snævarr is right, in my view, to suggest that here, in this way of doing philosophy, there is a considerable overlap with literature. [Extracted from the article]

In my inaugural editorial back in 2016, I first outlined my views on the strengths of I system dynamics i method and SDR and then the main challenges that SDR was facing. Finally, perhaps the top strength of SDR is its very mission, as stated in its recently updated Aims and Scope: "... I to communicate to a wide audience advances in the application and methods/tools of the system dynamics approach. In its broadest sense, the system dynamics approach encompasses model-based analysis of dynamic problems with a systems approach, focusing on endogenous, structural sources of the dynamics of interest i . [Extracted from the article]

The Chair of the programme committee together with the representatives of the Executive Committee, the Local Organising Committee, and the Joint Commission formed the I Core Team i of the programme committee. The committee proposed opening JC membership to additional people in order to give the JC the opportunity to develop more activities: this proposal was implemented by the two Councils in 2018. The Division introduced commissions in the 2011 Assembly in Nancy and added two new commissions in the 2015 Assembly in Helsinki. It did not have a funding system for its commissions; this was introduced at the beginning of the budget year 2017 based on the model of the commission funding system of DHST. [Extracted from the article]

"Thing" in the titular question of this paper should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, the paper propounds the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist, and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cyber‐physical systems (CPS) present a unique modeling challenge due to their numerous heterogeneous components, complex physical interactions, and disjoint communication networks. Modeling CPS to aid security analysis further adds to these challenges, because securing CPS requires not only understanding of the system architecture, but also the system's role within its broader expected service. This is due to the infeasibility of completely securing every single component, network, and part within a CPS. As such it is necessary to be cognizant of the system's expected service, or mission, so that the effects of an exploit can be mitigated and the system can perform its mission at least in a partially degraded manner—in other words, a mission‐aware approach to security. As such, a security analysis methodology based on this philosophy is greatly aided by the creation of a model that combines system architecture information, its admissible behaviors, and its mission context. This paper presents a technique for creating such a model using the Systems Modeling Language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years a new discussion on the nature of philosophical expertise has emerged: whether philosophers possess a special kind of expertise, what such expertise would entail, how to measure it, and related concerns. The aim of the present article is to clarify certain related points across these debates in the hope of paving a clearer path forward, by addressing the following. (1) The expertise defense, which seems central to many discussions on methodology and expertise, has been misconstrued at times. (2) Questions of expertise and methodology could be separated more clearly. (3) The study of expertise may be important in its own right; however, there may be good reasons to give priority to methodological concerns. (4) Finally, when viewed in light of methodological concerns, a new project emerges when engaging with recent contributions to the expertise debate. The present article attempts a brief outline of this project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Substantivism is a general philosophical methodology advocating a substantive approach to philosophical theorizing. In this article, I present an overview of this methodology with a special emphasis on the field of truth. I begin with a framework for understanding what is at stake in the substantivist-deflationist debate and describe the substantivist critique of deflationism. I then proceed to discuss contemporary substantivism as a positive methodology, present examples of recent substantivist theories of truth, delineate several principles of philosophical substantivism, and connect it to contemporary thought about the nature and methods of philosophy. Due to limitations of space, I am unable to discuss all the forms contemporary substantivism has taken. But I try to give a clear sense of the central principles, challenges, and promise of this methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to orthodox views of philosophical methodology, when philosophers appeal to intuitions, they treat them as evidence for their contents. Call this 'descriptive evidentialism.' Descriptive evidentialism is assumed both by those who defend the epistemic status of intuitions and by those, including many experimental philosophers, who criticize it. This article shows, however, that the idea that philosophers treat intuitions as evidence struggles to account for the way philosophers treat intuitions in a variety of philosophical contexts. In particular, it cannot account for philosophers' treatment of a priori intuitions, for nonpropositional uses of intuition, and for philosophers' failure to use intuition to exclude the counterintuitive. The article concludes that alternatives to descriptive evidentialism (some of which are sketched) must be developed, and that much of the recent debate between traditionalists and skeptics from, for example, experimental philosophy is probably based on a false presupposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by 'free will', a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In , most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. , though, suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses are performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios, and that their abstract scenarios reveal the folk theory of free will for what it actually is-incompatibilist. Here, we argue that the results of two new studies suggest just the opposite. Most participants only give apparent incompatibilist judgments when they mistakenly interpret determinism to imply that agents' mental states are bypassed in the causal chains that lead to their behavior. Determinism does not entail bypassing, so these responses do not reflect genuine incompatibilist intuitions. When participants understand what determinism does mean, the vast majority take it to be compatible with free will. Further results indicate that most people's concepts of choice and the ability to do otherwise do not commit them to incompatibilism, either, putting pressure on incompatibilist arguments that rely on transfer principles, such as the Consequence Argument. We discuss the implications of these findings for philosophical debates about free will, and suggest that incompatibilism appears to be either false, or else a thesis about something other than what most people mean by 'free will'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, both pro and con. The article argues, first, that the broader view is the only plausible one; discussions of experimental philosophy should recognize that the narrow view is a caricature of experimental philosophy as it is currently done. It then shows both how objections to experimental philosophy are transformed and how positive recommendations can be provided by adopting a broad conception of experimental philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the inheritance of theories in philosophy. Particular attention is given to French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Jean-François Lyotard, who the author states break this trend through introducing new concepts of approaching historical texts that attempt to avoid philosophical tradition. Interpretations of German philosopher Immanuel Kant's work "Critique of Judgment" by both Deleuze and Lyotard are discussed as modernized versions of Kantian views of aesthetics.

The article discusses the notion of cultural phenomenology as the study of everyday life. Topics include the views of cultural theorist Maurice Blanchot on the significance of everyday life for philosophy, the views of philosopher Martin Heidegger on consciousness and the everyday, and the views of theorist Theodor Adorno on the scope of philosophy. The views of philosopher Henri Lefebvre are noted.