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Group members tend to be biased in their evaluation of the information discussed. The present study aimed to disentangle the effects of preference consistency, social validation, and ownership on information evaluation in a single experimental design. Participants first received information about a personnel selection task. After having made a decision, they read a transcript of a fictitious discussion. In the transcript, preference consistency, social validation, and ownership of information were orthogonally manipulated as within-subjects factors. As hypothesized, preference consistency, social validation, and ownership all increased the perceived quality of information. Furthermore, participants intended to discuss a larger proportion of their preference-consistent information than of their preference-inconsistent information. This discussion bias was significantly associated with the evaluation bias favoring preference-consistent information. These results provide the first empirical demonstration that the evaluation of information in groups is characterized by three distinct biases and that biased evaluation of information may contribute to biased discussion of information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entrapment occurs if people persist with losing courses of action. In two experiments, we show how elaborating social feedback (i.e., premature praise or forewarning regarding the chosen course of action) can have paradoxical effects on entrapment. The participants acted as head of a translation department and had to choose one out of four possible translation strategies for their employees. After choosing, they read four arguments (presumably written by former participants) which were either all in favor of the strategy chosen, all against it, or mixed. Half of the participants only read these arguments, whereas the other half elaborated on them by providing written comments (Experiment 1). The results showed that elaborating on other persons' arguments led to stronger entrapment, independently of whether the arguments were positive or negative. This pattern was due to biased argument processing: Whereas confirming thoughts were generated for positive arguments, negative arguments were refuted. Experiment 2 confirmed that this biased argument processing caused subsequent entrapment. These results indicate that elaborating any type of argument can lead to heightened entrapment and, hence, forewarning can backfire. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency to persist with or even intensify losing courses of action. In this study, we examined whether authentic and contrived dissent reduces escalation in group decision making. Participants first individually indicated their preference on how to allocate money between two alternatives. Based on these individual preferences, homogeneous and heterogeneous three-person groups were formed. In addition, group discussion was either structured by assigning one group member to play the role of a devil's advocate or was not structured. Results revealed that escalation tendencies over multiple decisions were reduced in heterogeneous groups that used the devil's advocacy procedure. The rationality of this behavior is discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biased assimilation is the tendency to evaluate belief-consistent information more positively than belief-inconsistent information. Previous research has demonstrated that biased assimilation is due to an inconsistency between an argument and the recipient's position toward this argument. The present research revealed that an inconsistency between a source's position (independently of the argument) and the recipient's position is also responsible for biased assimilation. In two studies, participants evaluated arguments stated by a politician. Party affiliation of the politician was correctly labeled, incorrectly labeled, or not labeled. The politicians' arguments were evaluated more favorably by their respective voters when party affiliation was correctly labeled. This biased evaluation diminished when party affiliation was not labeled and even slightly reversed when party affiliation was incorrectly labeled. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being fed up with something is a prevalent and fundamental human experience. Although the relevance of mental satiation, that is, the process of becoming fed up with an action, is highly acknowledged in organizational psychology, almost no empirical research has examined this concept. In this article, we take a social cognitive neuroscience approach to mental satiation. By building on and extending the classic work of Lewin and Karsten, we propose a new model of mental satiation that focuses on the cognitive, motivational, and neural processes underlying mental satiation. Our model starts with the assumption that repeated performance of an action undermines one's need for competence and hence leads to a loss of intrinsic motivation. We then distinguish between two phases of the satiation process: The first phase is characterized by a loss of intrinsic motivation to perform the action. The second phase starts when the intrinsic motivation has vanished and volitional control is required to continue the action. We predict that the loss of intrinsic motivation in the first phase of the satiation process is correlated with a decrease in activity in brain regions associated with positive hedonic experience, such as the nucleus accumbens, the ventral pallidum, and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. In contrast, the growing aversion toward the action during the second phase of the satiation process is predicted to be correlated with an increase in activity in brain regions associated with unpleasant affect and volitional control, such as the amygdala, the anterior insula, and the anterior cingulate cortex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In research on selective exposure to information, people have been found to predominantly seek information supporting rather than conflicting with their opinion. In most of these studies, participants were allowed to search for as many pieces of information as they liked. However, in many situations, the amount of information that people can search for is restricted. We report four experiments addressing this issue. Experiment 1 suggests that objective limits regarding the maximum number of pieces of information the participants could search for increases the preference for selecting supporting over conflicting information. In Experiment 2, just giving participants a cue about information scarcity induces the same effect, even in the absence of any objective restrictions. Finally, Experiment 3 and 4 clarify the underlying psychological process by showing that information limits increase selective exposure to information because information search is guided by the expected information quality, which is basically biased towards supporting information, and information limits act to reinforce this tendency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People in Germany overwhelmingly believe that the Euro introduction caused an overall price increase, however, no such increase actually took place. To investigate whether this disparity could be based on biased perceptions of the average price trend, four studies were conducted. Participants received two menus from a restaurant (one ‘old’ menu with German Mark (DM) prices and one ‘new’ menu with Euro prices) and were asked to estimate the price trend (in per cent). In all of these studies, price trend judgements were biased towards rising prices. If the prices had in fact been raised, the magnitude of this price increase was overestimated. If the prices had remained stable, significant price increases were perceived. And if the prices had fallen, they were perceived as having remained stable. The bias was systematically related to participants' expectations concerning price increases. A ‘selective outcome correction’ hypothesis proved to best fit the data: incorrect calculation outcomes that are in line with one's expectations are overlooked, whereas incorrect inconsistent outcomes are detected and corrected. The results imply that expectations can influence judgements even when clear disconfirming evidence is available that can be compared with an objective standard, thus leaving no room for interpretation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In five studies we show that the introduction of the Euro influences price estimations and the perception of salaries among people in Germany. People confronted with wages given in Euros compared to the German Mark (DM) showed a reduced willingness to face long distances to get to work when accepting a job offer. When asked to price various consumer goods appropriately, they estimated higher prices if they used the ‘Euro’ currency compared to price estimations made in DM. This phenomenon only occurred with regard to the Euro, but not in comparison with other currencies (cf. the British Pound and Austrian Schilling). The differing price estimations between the Euro and the German Mark were not influenced by participants' attitude towards the Euro. Moreover, it turned out that they depended on how the judgement context was framed. Only if participants expected to make price estimations for shops in their home country, Germany, did the familiar nominal DM figures serve as an anchor heightening the estimated prices in Euro. The same effect disappeared if participants were instructed to make their price estimations for shops in a foreign country (Ireland). Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research in group decision making has found that in situations of a hidden profile (i.e. the best choice alternative is hidden from individual members as they consider their pre-discussion information), unshared information is disproportionately neglected and sub-optimal group choices are highly likely. In an experimental study, three-person groups decided which of three candidates to select for a professorial appointment. We hypothesised that minority dissent in pre-discussion preferences improves the consideration of unshared information in groups and increases the discovery rate of hidden profiles. As predicted, consideration of unshared information increased with minority dissent. The expectation of an improvement of group decision quality was partially supported. In diversity groups (i.e. each member prefers a different alternative) consideration of unshared information and group decision quality was significantly higher than in simple minority groups. Results are discussed in the light of theories of minority influence. The benefits of using the hidden profile paradigm with minority and diversity groups for theory development in the area of group decision making are highlighted. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]