Search

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Taking advantage of China's send‐down movement as a natural experiment, we investigate how experiencing a political movement during adolescence affects political participation decades later. Using data from the China Family Panel Survey and the regression discontinuity design, we find that the send‐down experience significantly reduces individuals' political participation, measured by their participation in community committee elections, time spent on community service activities and how much they care about public news. Further analysis suggests that the send‐down experience negatively affects political participation through poorer mental health and less trust in local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We identify the effect of trade liberalization on corporate income tax avoidance in a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, taking advantage of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We find that firms engage in more tax avoidance in industries with larger tariff reductions. Further analysis shows that firms with a lack of cash or a high demand for cash before WTO entry tend to engage in more tax avoidance after WTO entry. Our study also provides evidence that manipulating costs is one way that firms avoid corporate income tax. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of propensity-score matched overseas and domestically listed firms, we examine whether the effect of corporate governance reform ( CGR) in 2001 in China varies among firms with different ownership structures. The positive effect of the CGR is weaker for firms with more state-owned shares, and product market competition increases the effect of the CGR on such firms. These findings suggest that government regulations on corporate governance and market competition can serve as complementary solutions to agency problems that arise from state ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]