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Background: The annual reappearance of respiratory viruses has been recognized for decades. COVID‐19 mitigation measures taken during the pandemic were targeted at respiratory transmission and broadly impacted the burden of acute respiratory illnesses (ARIs). Methods: We used the longitudinal Household Influenza Vaccine Evaluation (HIVE) cohort in southeast Michigan to characterize the circulation of respiratory viruses from March 1, 2020, to June 30, 2021, using RT‐PCR of respiratory specimens collected at illness onset. Participants were surveyed twice during the study period, and SARS‐CoV‐2 antibodies were measured in serum by electrochemiluminescence immunoassay. Incidence rates of ARI reports and virus detections were compared between the study period and a preceding pre‐pandemic period of similar duration. Results: Overall, 437 participants reported a total of 772 ARIs; 42.6% had respiratory viruses detected. Rhinoviruses were the most frequent virus, but seasonal coronaviruses, excluding SARS‐CoV‐2, were also common. Illness reports and percent positivity were lowest from May to August 2020, when mitigation measures were most stringent. Seropositivity for SARS‐CoV‐2 was 5.3% in summer 2020 and increased to 11.3% in spring 2021. The incidence rate of total reported ARIs for the study period was 50% lower (95% CI: 0.5, 0.6; p < 0.001) than the incidence rate from a pre‐pandemic comparison period (March 1, 2016, to June 30, 2017). Conclusions: The burden of ARI in the HIVE cohort during the COVID‐19 pandemic fluctuated, with declines occurring concurrently with the widespread use of public health measures. Rhinovirus and seasonal coronaviruses continued to circulate even when influenza and SARS‐CoV‐2 circulation was low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: To describe the development and implementation of learning health system (LHS) infrastructure for a pediatric specialty care health system to support LHS research in pediatric rehabilitation settings. Methods: An existing pediatric common data model (eg, PEDSnet) of standardized medical terminologies for research was expanded and leveraged for this stud, and applied to SHOnet, a clinical research data resource consisting of deidentified data extracted from the electronic health record (EHR) from the Shriners Hospitals for Children speacialty pediatric health care system. We mapped EHR data for laboratory, procedures, drugs, and conditions to standardized vocabularies including ICD‐10, CPT, RxNorm, and LOINC to the common data model using an established extraction‐transformation‐loading process. Rigorous quality checks were conducted to ensure a high degree of data conformance, completeness, and plausibility. SHOnet data elements from all sources are de‐identified and the server is managed by the SHC Information Systems Department. SHOnet data are refreshed monthly and data elements are continually expanded based on new research endeavors. Interventions: Not applicable. Results: The Shriners Health Outcomes Network (SHOnet) includes data for over 10 000 distinct observational data elements based on over two million patient encounters between 2011 and present. Conclusion: The systematic process to develop SHOnet is replicable and flexible for other pediatric rehabilitation research settings interested in building out their LHS capabilities. Challenges and facilitators may arise for building such LHS infrastructure for rehabilitation in areas of (a) data capture, curation, query, and governance, (b) generating knowledge from data, and (c) dissemination and implementation of new institutional knowledge. Further research studies are needed to evaluate these data resources for scalable system‐learning endeavors. SHOnet is an exemplar of an LHS for rehabilitation and specialty care settings. The success of an LHS is dependent on engagement of multiple stakeholders, shared governance, effective knowledge translation, and deep commitment to long‐term strategies for engaging clinicians, administration, and families in leveraging knowledge to improve clinical outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The spread of misinformation, including "fake news," propaganda, and conspiracy theories, represents a serious threat to society, as it has the potential to alter beliefs, behavior, and policy. Research is beginning to disentangle how and why misinformation is spread and identify processes that contribute to this social problem. We propose an integrative model to understand the social, political, and cognitive psychology risk factors that underlie the spread of misinformation and highlight strategies that might be effective in mitigating this problem. However, the spread of misinformation is a rapidly growing and evolving problem; thus scholars need to identify and test novel solutions, and work with policy makers to evaluate and deploy these solutions. Hence, we provide a roadmap for future research to identify where scholars should invest their energy in order to have the greatest overall impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability of parties to not only reflect, but actually shape, citizens' preferences on policy issues has been long debated, as it corresponds to a fundamental prediction of classic party identification theory. While most research draws on data from the United States or studies of low‐salience issues, we exploit the unique opportunity presented by the 2013 Italian election, with the four major parties of a clear multiparty setting holding distinct positions on crucial issues of the campaign. Based on an experimental design, we test the impact of party cues on citizens' preferences on high‐salience issues. The results are surprising: Despite a party system in flux (with relevant new parties) and a weakening of traditional party identities, we find large, significant partisan‐cueing effects in all the three experimental issues, and for voters of all the major Italian parties—both old and new, governmental and opposition, ideologically clear or ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Macro‐level studies have consistently found a connection between economic crises and support for far‐right parties. However, research on the micro foundations for this electoral support has generally found little or no correlation between an individual's economic environment and far‐right voting. We test one possible explanation for this seeming paradox, namely, that determinants of far‐right identification differ across time and particularly in times of crisis. Methods: Utilizing traditional representative data from Eurobarometer surveys in a manner that strips away confounding issues generally found in the extant literature, we directly test whether individuals concerned about their personal economic situation, or that of their country, are more likely to identify with far‐right ideological beliefs during economic crises. Results: Ultimately, we find little evidence to support the claim that the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and its aftermath shifted the determinants of support for far‐right ideology, though prospective pocketbook concerns do increase the likelihood of identifying with the far right. Conclusions: We discuss the implications of these findings and offer additional avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research using self‐report questionnaires administered to ordinary citizens demonstrates that value priorities differ as a function of one's political ideology, but it is unclear whether this conclusion applies to political elites, who are presumably seeking to appeal to very broad constituencies. We used quantitative methods of textual analysis to investigate value‐laden language in a collection of 577,555 messages sent from the public Twitter accounts of over 400 members of the U.S. Congress between 2012 and 2014. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we observed that Republican and conservative legislators stressed values of tradition, conformity, and national security (as well as self‐direction), whereas Democratic and liberal legislators stressed values of benevolence, universalism, hedonism, and social/economic security (as well as achievement). Implications for the large‐scale observational study of political psychology are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What factors enable and motivate citizens to form partisan identities? Popular accounts, as well as several major theoretical approaches, attribute a central role for policy and ideological concerns in shaping the partisan orientations of voters. Information about the policy aims of parties should therefore, on average, make it easier for an individual to find a party that best fits her views, especially if she had previously been less familiar with the parties. The evidence for this is mixed, however. Plenty of studies find a robust correlation between policy views and partisanship. Yet there is mounting evidence that citizens look to parties to decide where to stand on policy issues, suggesting that partisan identification precedes policy preferences. We bring new evidence to bear by investigating directly the impact of substantive policy information on the partisan identities of ordinary citizens. To do this, we carry out a pair of original experiments across six countries, five of which are relatively young or unstable party systems. One experiment informs citizens about the policy goals of the major parties; we find little to no evidence that such information affects levels of partisanship. The other experiment tests the impact of inviting citizens to evaluate and compare their own position to the positions of the major parties, a more direct test of the sort of reasoning posited in some theoretical accounts. We find that this reflective task in fact depresses levels of partisanship, perhaps especially among those who knew less about politics and parties from the outset. This suggests that thinking about policy differences and proximities pushes citizens away from partisan attachments they form in the ordinary course of life, perhaps because such thinking generates fresh doubts or focuses attention on facets of partisan choice that matter less in typical processes of preference formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often claimed that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are profoundly shaping political participation, especially when it comes to protest behavior. Whether or not this is the case, the analysis of "Big Data" generated by social media usage offers unprecedented opportunities to observe complex, dynamic effects associated with large-scale collective action and social movements. In this article, we summarize evidence from studies of protest movements in the United States, Spain, Turkey, and Ukraine demonstrating that: (1) Social media platforms facilitate the exchange of information that is vital to the coordination of protest activities, such as news about transportation, turnout, police presence, violence, medical services, and legal support; (2) in addition, social media platforms facilitate the exchange of emotional and motivational contents in support of and opposition to protest activity, including messages emphasizing anger, social identification, group efficacy, and concerns about fairness, justice, and deprivation as well as explicitly ideological themes; and (3) structural characteristics of online social networks, which may differ as a function of political ideology, have important implications for information exposure and the success or failure of organizational efforts. Next, we issue a brief call for future research on a topic that is understudied but fundamental to appreciating the role of social media in facilitating political participation, namely friendship. In closing, we liken the situation confronted by researchers who are harvesting vast quantities of social media data to that of systems biologists in the early days of genome sequencing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the question of whether Russia's greatly weakened political parties might continue to exert an influence on public opinion in twenty-first century Russia. To do so, we carried out a series of survey-based experiments in Moscow in the spring of 2006. We present evidence showing that partisan cues increase support for public policy proposals and make it more likely that respondents will adopt a position on an issue that mirrors their party's preferred position (“opinion taking”), as well as increase the likelihood that respondents will adopt a position on a given issue at all (“opinion giving”). We also present evidence that party cues can sway the opinions of nonpartisans, though such influence may be limited to cases when the position of a party constitutes an unusually informative or credible signal. The findings should be of interest to those concerned with Russia's post-communist political development, those interested more broadly in the effects of partisan cues on political behavior, as well as to scholars trying to characterize the nature of “competitive authoritarian” regimes. Consideramos la cuestión de si partidos políticos fuertemente debilitados, como es el caso de los partidos rusos, podrían continuar influyendo la opinión pública en la Rusia del siglo XXI. Para responder esto llevamos a cabo una serie de investigaciones basadas en encuestas realizadas en Moscú en la primavera de 2006. Presentamos evidencia que demuestra que las pautas partidistas incrementan el apoyo del público a sus propuestas de políticas y hacen más probable que un encuestado conozca la preferencia del partido e incluso la llegue a asumir como suya (“tomando opinión”), así como que incremente la posibilidad de que ellos adopten una determinada posición sobre un determinado tópico (“dando opinión”). También presentamos evidencia que las pautas del partido pueden producir cambios de opinión, aunque dicha influencia puede estar limitada a casos donde la posición del partido constituye una señal inusualmente informativa o creíble. Los resultados serán de interés para aquellos preocupados por el desarrollo político de Rusia post-comunista, aquellos interesados más ampliamente en los efectos de las pautas partidistas en el comportamiento político, así como para los académicos que buscan precisar las características de los regímenes “autoritarios competitivos.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a model of citizen support for membership to the European Union designed explicity for post-communist countries in Eastern Europe. Guarantee to the continuation of economic reforms undertaken since the end of communism; 'Winners' who have benefited from the political and economic transition; Contrast with the attitudes of 'losers,' who oppose the free market.

Argues that partisanship develops over time and that evidence of partisanship in early stages may be found in basic behavioral and attitudinal indicators. Alternative approach to studying the emergence of mass partisanship in new democracies; Expectations for the emergence of partisanship; Use of panel survey data from Russia's early elections to distinguish nascent partisans.