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In this essay, I argue that 'poetics'—defined as 'poet‐criticism', a practitioner's firsthand reflection on poetic composition (poiēsis) and verse technique (technē)—makes possible for philosophical theology something that has heretofore been overlooked. I contend that Martin Heidegger's rendition of the poetic 'afflatus', which travesties technē variously as an eidetic, violent, and inauthentic aspect of poiēsis, has exerted an outsized influence on contemporary theology's engagements with poetry. The upshot is a tendentious dualism between poiēsis and creatio, through which the interdisciplinary movement known as 'theopoetics' currently deconstructs the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. I show that the quietism of theopoetics is merely the reverse face of Heidegger's residual voluntarism. The neglected late essays of the poet‐critic Geoffrey Hill demonstrate that mastery in verse technique, far from conforming to Heidegger's caricature, entails an erotically motivated co‐operation between the poet and their medium. Hill's poetics is shown to be consonant with the metaphysics of creation and theological anthropology expressed in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa. I ultimately defend the continued relevance of the analogy between human poiēsis and creatio ex nihilo by appealing to Cusanus's exposition of technē as partaking in the triune co‐inherence of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the business ethical problems arising from noncompliance of competitors wherein the business that adhere to regulation does no feel the need to comply with market regulation. Topics include the pressure from economic competition encourages firms to act unethically, and types of noncompliance behavior. According to the author firms need to involve in meta-voluntarism wherein business bring others into compliance.

Abstract: If the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, then it appears that miracles are metaphysically impossible. Yet Locke accepts both essentialism, which takes the laws to be metaphysically necessary, and the possibility of miracles. I argue that the apparent conflict here can be resolved if the laws are by themselves insufficient for guaranteeing the outcome of a particular event. This suggests that, on Locke's view, the laws of nature entail how an object would behave absent divine intervention. While other views of laws also make miracles counterfactually dependent on God's will, I show how this view is consistent with the essentialist commitment to the view that the laws are metaphysically necessary. Further, I argue that Locke's view is a relatively attractive version of essentialism, in part, because it allows for the possibility of miracles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two most important concepts in Duns Scotus's (1265/6-1308) theology of the Atonement are satisfaction and merit. Just what these amount to and how they function in his theory are heavily conditioned by two more general commitments: Scotus's voluntarism, which includes the claim that nearly all of God's relations with the created order are contingent; and his formulation of the Franciscan Thesis, which holds that fixing the sin problem is not the primary purpose of God's Incarnation in Christ and that if Adam hadn't sinned God would have become incarnate anyway. In this essay I will discuss the theoretical background of Scotus's atonement theology-his voluntarism and his version of the Franciscan Thesis-before moving on to discuss his understanding of merit and satisfaction, how these are related, and how they relate to the theoretical background. I will engage some important recent scholarly attempts to position Scotus's Atonement theology as not quite as anti-Anselmian as history has characterized it, arguing that one of these attributes to Scotus an understanding of merit which cannot be Scotus's in fact, since it entails a restriction on divine freedom that Scotus certainly would reject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radical constructivists appeal to self-legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self-legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self-legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self-legislation more firmly to the selfdisciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self-legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self-legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self-legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bas van Fraassen's anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen's empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens's epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author discusses the use and occurrence of ought in the English literature. He mentions that that every occurrence of ought, expresses a concept that operates on a proposition. He also presents the related philosophy proposed by American philosopher Harry Frankfurt as per which an agent can be morally responsible and even blamed for certain actions. He also focuses on doxastic voluntarism.

The 17th century author François Poulain de la Barre was both an important contributor to the history of feminist thought and a thoroughgoing Cartesian. Poulain borrows from many of Descartes's doctrines, including his dualism, distrust of epistemic authority, accounts of imagination, and passion, and at least some aspects of his doxastic voluntarism; here, I examine how he uses a Cartesian notion of prejudice for an anti‐essentializing philosophy of women's education and the formation of the tastes, talents, and interests of individuals. "Prejudice" remains Descartes's notion of an entrenched, yet self‐imposed doxastic commitment, but also takes on the sense of social‐political group bias, founded on custom, transmitted through education, serving interests, and forming social expectations. Poulain also expands on the Cartesian notion and themes by emphasizing widespread yet unjustified social opinions in favor of the status quo in both epistemic practices and epistemic authorities, while considering how biased beliefs about sexual difference and gender identity can be internalized even by those who suffer most from them. At the same time, he shows how powerful Cartesian concepts can be for feminist methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]