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This study investigated whether political endorsements from in‐ versus out‐group political elites would influence likelihood of COVID‐19 vaccination. In March 2021, we ran an experiment with Democrats and Republicans in the United States to examine whether they would be more likely to get vaccinated following endorsements by former Presidents Obama or Trump. Participants reported greater likelihood of getting vaccinated if the vaccine was endorsed by an elite from their own rather than the opposing party. This effect was driven by Trump, who increased vaccination likelihood among Republicans but decreased it among Democrats. We also investigated the mechanisms underlying this persuasion effect and found that perceived bias and liking were plausible mediators, whereas perceived trustworthiness and expertise were not. This study highlights the potential of having endorsements from both Democrat and Republican political elites to increase support for health behaviors in a politically charged climate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effectance motivation-an urge for certainty and a feeling of being able to know, predict, and control one's environment-was initially proposed as the mechanism underlying attitude similarity effects on attraction. However, this motivation was discarded as an explanation when positive affect was identified. The presence of alternative mechanisms did not deny a role for the validation of attitudes in attraction. Therefore, we investigated the validation of one's views by those of peers as an additional mediator and its relation with two previously known mediators of positive affect and trust. As hypothesized, validation mediated attitude similarity effects when measured alone (Experiment 1) and within sequential mediation patterns involving positive affect (Experiment 2A) and trust (Experiments 2B and 2C). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychological researchers have examined a broad array of biases and shortcomings of social perceivers. Less attention has been paid to how people react when they become concerned about the possibility of bias and attempt to correct or overcome the potential for bias. An early approach was to think of bias correction as 'subtracting' information or reactions that are identified as coming from the biasing factor instead of the target. An alternative approach is to conceptualize bias correction as guided by social perceivers' naïve theories or perceptions of the bias at work. The subtraction theories were designed to deal with the assimilative biases typical of early priming experiments, but theory-based corrections can readily deal with either assimilative or contrastive biases. We describe both types of correction theories, with a focus on the empirical support for theory-based correction (and especially for the Flexible Correction Model). We also identify future directions for research on theory-based correction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Dhar and Gorlin (2013) proposed a dual-process perspective on choice. We applaud the effort to generate such a model, and we support the effort to integrate potentially disparate literatures under a general theoretical approach. In an attempt to further that goal of integration, we discuss similarities and differences between the proposed approach and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, 1977; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1986) — one of the earliest models of evaluative judgment to propose different mechanisms and consequences of judgments formulated at different levels of motivation and ability to process available information. In addition, because many choice settings involve familiar options that have been previously evaluated, we discuss potential implications of the literature on influences of attitudes on behavior (which can often be framed as involving a choice to act or not or to act in one way rather than another). In each case, we believe that these previous social psychological literatures provide insights that could enhance and extend the proposed model. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

When communicators are perceived as likely to bring proposed outcomes to fruition, they have source efficacy. Although perceptions of source efficacy are common in persuasion settings, this construct has received little direct research attention. The present research explored how source efficacy may impact persuasion in different ways at different levels of motivation to process messages. Across three experiments, participants encountered message arguments of varying quality from a source manipulated to be relatively efficacious or inefficacious. When motivation to process the message was low, source efficacy served as a peripheral cue (Experiment 1). When motivation was high, efficacy information learned before the message biased processing of ambiguous messages (Experiment 2), but source efficacy learned after the message affected the amount of confidence people had in their message-related thoughts (Experiment 3). These effects of source efficacy were distinct from effects of perceived source expertise/credibility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Noted Judgment and Decision Making (JDM) researchers differ in their opinions of whether and how an attitudes and persuasion (A&P) view of anchoring might add to the existing anchoring literature. Epley and Gilovich (2010) and Russo (2010) supported the breadth of variables that an attitudinal view of brings to bear on anchoring phenomena and the potential operation of different psychological processes across different contexts. They also suggest extensions to other types of anchors (along with Frederick et al. 2010), to alternative paradigms, and to other classes of moderators, such as goals. Authors of all three commentaries wondered if the evidence we presented speaks to traditional issues related to processes underlying anchoring. Frederick et al. (2010) also took a different approach in suggesting that anchoring is always due to non-thoughtful processes despite the fact that thoughtful processes can also influence judgments. This approach diverges from prominent reviews of the anchoring literature and implies that the presence of any simple, associative mechanism makes the overall process that involves that mechanism “non-thoughtful.” We discuss how this approach differs from our own, and we discuss the implications of the other observations in each commentary. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Researchers across many domains have examined the impact of externally presented numerical anchors on perceiver judgments. In the traditional paradigm, “anchored” judgments are typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). Consistent with a long tradition in attitude change, we suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that have more lasting impact. We review recent anchoring research consistent with this elaboration-based perspective and discuss implications for past anchoring results and theory in judgment and decision making. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Two experiments examined the processes by which positive and negative mood states produce attitude change under high elaboration conditions. We hypothesized what under high elaboration conditions, mood would influence attitudes by affecting the perceived likelihood of occurrence for consequences presented in message arguments. In Experiment 1, arguments were framed positively, and positive mood led to greater perceived likelihood of the consequences and more favorable attitudes than negative mood for subjects high in need for cognition (NC). In Experiment 2, arguments were framed either positively or negatively, and a mood x frame interaction was obtained on attitude and likelihood judgments for high-NC subjects. That is, positive mood led to marginally greater perceived likelihood of positive consequences but to lower likelihood of negative consequences as compared to negative mood. As a result, positive mood tended to lead to more persuasion than negative mood when the message was framed positively, but to less persuasion when the message was framed negatively. In both experiments, path analyses supported the prediction that likelihood judgments mediated the impact of mood on attitudes for high-NC individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]