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This paper studies fiscal policy in a model with nominal gross domestic product (GDP) targeting. We find that, with wage rigidity, nominal GDP targeting generates lower welfare losses than inflation targeting and a Taylor rule. On the other hand, adopting this regime makes standard fiscal policy rules, whereby distortionary tax rates are designed to respond to economic activity, dependent on the behavior of inflation instead. We also find that the fiscal multipliers with nominal GDP targeting are smaller than the multipliers under inflation targeting and the Taylor rule. Therefore, nominal GDP targeting does not necessarily outperform other monetary policy rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the 'inflationary bias' result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this 'inflationary bias'. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an 'inflationary bias', and there also exists the possibility of a 'dis‐inflationary bias'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]