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Excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco have long been a dependable and significant revenue source in many countries. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the way in which such taxes may also be used to attain public health objectives by reducing the consumption of products with adverse health and social impacts. Some have gone further and argued that explicitly earmarking excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to finance public health expenditures—marrying sin and virtue as it were—will make increasing such taxes more politically acceptable and provide the funding needed to increase such expenditures, especially for the poor. The basic idea—tax “bads” and do “good” with the proceeds—is simple and appealing. But designing and implementing good “sin” taxes is a surprisingly complex task. Earmarking revenues from such taxes for health expenditures may also sound good and be a useful selling point for new taxes. However, such earmarking raises difficult issues with respect to budgetary rigidity and political accountability. This note explores these and other issues that lurk beneath the surface of the attractive concept of using increased sin excises on alcohol and tobacco to finance “virtuous” social spending on public health.

This background paper describes five different tools that can be used for the assessment of tax incentives by governments in low income countries’ (LICs). The first tool (an application of cost-benefit analysis) provides an overarching framework for assessment. Evaluations of the various costs and benefits of tax incentives are vital for informed decision making, but are rarely undertaken, partly because it can be a difficult exercise that is demanding in terms of data needs. The next three tools (tax expenditure assessment, corporate micro simulation models, and effective tax rate models) can be used as part of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, to shed light on particular aspects. Effective tax rate models shed light on the implications of tax parameters - including targeted tax incentives - on investment returns and help understand the implications of reform for expected investment outcomes. The document presents two tools for assessing the transparency and governance of tax incentives in LICs. These discuss principles in transparency and governance of tax incentives, and allow for benchmarking existing LIC practices against better alternatives.

This paper analyzes how investment incentives may or may not be used to foster private investment, particularly in developing countries. As practitioners and policymakers can attest, political economy exerts a powerful influence on incentives. Many incentives especially generous ones have persisted because of lobbying by special interests and politicians' need to curry favor. Yet little research has been done on how political economy affects incentive policy. Second, the paper sheds light on the role that political economy plays in the popularity of incentives and the related shortcomings. Incentives are sometimes used to dole out favors to investors, so investors who benefit from incentives resist attempts to eliminate them. This paper suggests a way to tackle such problems. Third, the paper compiles good practices on managing and administering incentives in developing countries, drawing on government and private sector experiences. Finally, the paper provides policymakers with a framework for analyzing the efficacy of investment incentives based on the sector and level of development involved, and suggests reforms for moving toward best practice.

The purpose of this handbook is to provide policy makers with a framework to assess a tax system in its entirety, measure its various parameters and how it is administered, and defines best practices for tax policy and administration that will yield a tax system that is simple and predictable and does not create an undue burden on private enterprise. This handbook is primarily designed for policy makers and tax practitioners. The goal is to analyze the impact of income tax, the value added tax (VAT), and other local taxes that are imposed on business. This handbook does not analyze the effects of trade and labor taxes such as social security. The administration of the customs duty is unique and has been addressed extensively in the literature on customs modernization. Labor taxes primarily imposed on salaried individuals are not covered by this handbook, even though their incidence affects business. VAT has been included even though it is a tax on consumption because the administrative burden to comply with it is primarily on business.

Doing Business in Egypt 2008 covers three topics at the sub national level: starting a business, dealing with licenses and registering property. These indicators have been selected because they cover areas of local jurisdiction and practice. In the last two years, doing business in Egypt has become more affordable the minimum capital required to start a business and the costs of registering property and dealing with licenses have been slashed. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records all procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a standardized warehouse. Doing Business in Egypt 2008 records the full sequence of procedures necessary when a business purchases land and a building to transfer the property title from another business so that the buyer can use the property for expanding its business, as collateral in taking new loans or, if necessary, to sell to another business. The ease of doing business index is limited in scope. The Doing Business indicators provide a new empirical data set that may improve understanding of these issues.