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This paper studies the effects on international trade from the annual tariff uncertainty about China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status renewal in the United States prior to joining the World Trade Organization. The paper makes four main findings. First, in monthly data trade increases significantly in anticipation of uncertain future increases in tariffs and falls upon renewal. Second, the probability of a tariff increase was perceived to be relatively small, with an average annual probability of non-renewal of about 4.5 percent. Third, what matters more is the expected future tariff rather than the uncertainty around it. These effects are identified using within-year variation in the risk of trade policy changes around the renewal vote and trade flows. An (s,S) inventory model generates this behavior and that variation in the strength of the stockpiling in advance of the vote is increasing in the storability of goods. Fourth, the costs associated with within-year trade policy induced stockpiling reduce entrants’ incentive to operate in a market with tariff uncertainty. The results explain why trade may hold up in advance of a prospective policy change, such as Brexit or the US-China escalating tariff war of 2018-19, but may fall sharply even if expected tariff increases do not materialize.

This paper studies the effects of trade policy uncertainty on the extensive and intensive margins of trade for a sample of 65 exporters at the Harmonized System six-digit level. The paper measures trade policy uncertainty as the gap between binding tariff commitments under trade agreements (multilateral and regional agreements) and applied tariffs -- what is also known as tariffs' water. The results show that trade policy uncertainty is an important barrier to exports and its effects are heterogeneous. On average and at the current level of tariff commitments, the paper estimates that the elimination of water, without any change of the applied tariff, would increase the probability of exporting by 6 percent and trade volumes by 1.3 percent. The negative impact of trade policy uncertainty on export participation is higher for countries with low-quality institutions and in the presence of global value chains. For a sample of new acceding countries, the analysis finds that removing water would boost the probability of trading by 50 percent and exports by 16 percent. The paper also estimates that the current system of commitments boosts trade by between 10 and 30 percent, compared with a world where at any moment tariffs could be raised to an arbitrarily high level.

The free flow of data across borders underpins today's globalized economy. But the flow of personal data outside the jurisdiction of national regulators also raises concerns about the protection of privacy. Addressing these legitimate concerns without undermining international integration is a challenge. This paper describes and assesses three types of responses to this challenge: unilateral development of national or regional regulation, such as the European Union's Data Protection Directive and forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation; international negotiation of trade disciplines, most recently in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); and international cooperation involving regulators, most significantly in the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Agreement. The paper argues that unilateral restrictions on data flows are costly and can hurt exports, especially of data-processing and other data-based services; international trade rules that limit only the importers' freedom to regulate cannot address the challenge posed by privacy; and regulatory cooperation that aims at harmonization and mutual recognition is not likely to succeed, given the desirable divergence in national privacy regulation. The way forward is to design trade rules (as the CPTPP seeks to do) that reflect the bargain central to successful international cooperation (as in the EU-US Privacy Shield): regulators in data destination countries would assume legal obligations to protect the privacy of foreign citizens in return for obligations on data source countries not to restrict the flow of data. Existing multilateral rules can help ensure that any such arrangements do not discriminate against and are open to participation by other countries.

This paper quantifies the wide-ranging costs of potential increases in worldwide barriers to trade in two scenarios. First, a coordinated global withdrawal of tariff commitments from all existing bilateral/regional trade agreements, as well as from unilateral preferential schemes coupled with an increase in the cost of traded services, is estimated to result in annual worldwide real income losses of 0.3 percent or US$211 billion relative to the baseline after three years. An important share of these losses is likely to be concentrated in regions such as East Asia and Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean which together account for close to one-third of the global decline in welfare. Highlighting the importance of preferences, the impact on global trade is estimated to be more pronounced, with an annual decline of 2.1 percent or more than US$606 billion relative to the baseline if these barriers stay in place for three years. Second, a worldwide increase in tariffs up to legally allowed bound rates coupled with an increase in the cost of traded services would translate into annual global real income losses of 0.8 percent or more than US$634 billion relative to the baseline after three years. The distortion to the global trading system would be significant and result in an annual decline of global trade of 9 percent or more than US$2.6 trillion relative to the baseline in 2020.

Kazakhstan is facing its greatest economic challenge since the global crisis. With oil prices at US$50 per barrel, the country urgently needs to adjust its economic model and find new sources of economic growth. Kazakhstan main export has been crude oil, considered a low-complexity mineral products, which has made the country extremely vulnerable to shocks. For Kazakhstan to reach high income status it will need to move up the value chain and find new sources of growth. However, new opportunities are arising. China's new Silk Road initiative, renewed regional integration efforts through the Eurasian Economic Union, CAREC and WTO accession are opening up new prospects for Kazakhstan to integrate more successfully with the region and the world and to position itself as a key trade and transit corridor between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. While Kazakhstan outperforms its regional peers in terms of overall business environment, it still ranks poorly in trading across borders. Kazakhstan is embarking on an economic transformation at a time where new global trends are reshaping economic fundamentals. As countries in Asia and Europe enhance their living standards, opportunity costs will matter more than direct transport costs, resulting in increasing opportunities to transport goods from East Asia to Europe.

Longstanding tension between the benefits of open commerce and public support for it has become particularly salient today. G20 leaders pledged to work harder to build an open world economy and to promote greater inclusiveness. They called for action to communicate better the benefits of open markets to the wider public and for domestic policies to distribute those benefits more widely. G20 leaders saw the issue not as a tradeoff between openness and inclusiveness, but as a challenge to achieve more of both. Improved domestic policies and further trade reform can stimulate growth that is more inclusive. Addressing the source of discontent is important in its own right and also critical to shoring up support for trade. This paper draws on a wide range of recent policy analysis. Existing studies from international organizations provide greater depth in a number of areas that goes beyond what is possible in the present paper. Throughout the paper, references to key pieces of research and policy analysis from academics, think tanks, and international organizations help to document the statements made and provide options for readers who wish to delve into certain topics. Lessons are also drawn from country experience.

While precise impact of Brexit on the EU/UK trade and investment agreements with third countries will depend primarily on the terms of the withdrawal agreement to be concluded between them, most scenarios suggest an extensive process of amendment of the text and/or commitments in multilateral and bilateral agreements. At the multilateral level, the UK will remain a WTO Member, but will no longer be represented by the EU. The separation of the UK obligations from the current EU lists of concessions and schedules of commitments will require amendments that, particularly regarding subsidies and quotas, may lead to a broader renegotiation process requiring consensus of all interested WTO members. At the bilateral level, the status of current EU PTAs with regard to the UK and its trading partners remains uncertain: Some elements suggest that these PTAs may no longer be valid for the UK, or that, even if legally valid, they will no longer cover the relationship between the UK and the third country. Further, EU agreements focusing on goods only will no longer apply to the UK. For these agreements to continue to apply, the UK and the third country will need to amend some aspects of the text of the agreement as well as of the lists of commitments. Investment treaties concluded by the UK with third countries will remain valid, and no amendment is in principle necessary. Parties could require amendments to the text of the treaty, due to a fundamental change in circumstances. LDCs and developing countries who benefit from the EU GSP will continue under this regime for the remaining EU member, but that GSP framework will no longer be applicable to the UK. The UK may introduce a new GSP regime of its own. In all cases, third countries who consider that Brexit has diminished the value of their negotiated commitments have the opportunity to request compensation in sectoral commitments or changes in the text of the agreements, or ultimately terminate the agreement The process of amending the trade and investment agreements requires comprehensive knowledge of their trade and investment flows with the EU and the UK.

Preferential trade agreements are an important feature of the global trade system. Several questions, ranging from the rationale for preferential arrangements to their impact on members, non-members and the broader multilateral trade system, are at the forefront of academic and policy debates in trade policy. This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it presents a new database that offers a detailed assessment of the content of preferential arrangements, examining the coverage and legal enforceability of provisions. The database covers 279 agreements signed by 189 countries between 1958 and 2015, which reflects the entire set of preferential trade agreements in force and notified to the World Trade Organization as of 2015. Second, the paper presents some novel stylized facts on preferential arrangements based on the analysis of the data. The key insight is that preferential trade agreements became deeper over time. A growing number of these treaties cover an extended set of policy areas, frequently with legally enforceable provisions, in areas under the current World Trade Organization mandate and in four leading areas outside the current World Trade Organization mandate: competition policy, investment, movements of capital, and intellectual property rights protection. Accounting for the changing coverage of preferential trade agreements, that is, their “horizontal depth,” is essential to gain a more complete and accurate understanding of where the global trading system is going and how its governance can be improved.

The Dominican Republic is often considered an example of the successful implementation of Special Economic Zones (henceforth SEZs) in the Western hemisphere. The zones fueled economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s and, while they experienced a sharp decline in employment due in part to the expiry of the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement and stronger international competition in the textile and apparel industry in 2005, signs of recovery have been observed since 2009. Surgical equipment, chemicals and plastics, and footwear have recently emerged as the new drivers of export dynamism in the zones (World Bank, 2015). The objective of this report is to inform the policy discussion around the developmental impact of SEZs in the Dominican Republic by empirically assessing i) the implications of regulatory reforms aimed at complying with WTO disciplines regarding the elimination of incentives conditioned on export performance for SEZs firms, ii) the extent to which SEZs participate in Global Value Chains, and iii) their linkages with domestic suppliers. The report is organized as follows: The second section presents the historical importance of SEZ as an engine of economic growth in the country. The third section depicts the structural shift in terms of production in SEZs and evaluates the degree of value addition taking place in the Dominican Republic. The fourth section evaluates the degree and evolution of linkages between SEZs and local firms. The fifth section shows the impact of the regulatory changes in the SEZ regimen undertaken to comply with WTO disciplines. Finally, some conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in section six.

Despite the importance of trade facilitation as an area of trade and development policy, there have been very few impact evaluations of specific trade facilitation reforms. This paper offers an evaluation of in-house clearance, a reform that allows qualified firms in Serbia to clear customs from within their own warehouse rather than at the customs office. The pooled synthetic control method applied here offers a novel solution to many of the empirical challenges that frustrate efforts to evaluate trade facilitation reforms. The method is used to estimate causal impacts on trade outcomes for 21 firms that adopted in-house clearance for import shipments. The program compressed the distribution of clearance times for adopting firms, but the estimated effects on median clearance times, inspection rates, and import value were not statistically significant. Tests for heterogeneous program impact do not indicate that the program affected adopting firms differently. Overall, the results suggest that the most evident benefit of the program for participating firms is reduced uncertainty about clearance times.

As a small and open economy, Belarus' development perspectives are intrinsically linked to its ability to produce and sell goods and services competitively in the global marketplace. While Belarus is an open economy, its trade links are concentrated both in terms of products and markets. Mineral goods –most importantly refined oil and potassium chloride - are the main export product accounting for more than 1/3 of total exports. Non mineral exports, including most importantly machinery, vehicles and transport equipment are mostly exported to Russia and other CIS markets, which account for 74 percent of non-mineral exports while the share of EU countries in Belarus non-mineral exports account for less than 15 percent. With Russia's WTO accession in 2012 competitive pressures on Belarus’ major market for non-mineral exports have further intensified. As Belarus is accelerating its own negotiations with the WTO, understanding the challenges and opportunities faced by the country's exporters is critical to putting in place an effective adaptation strategy that will enhance competitiveness and ensure Belarus can take full advantage of more open market access. The objective of this note is to analyze the economic impacts of Belarus' potential accession to the WTO. The note utilizes a modern computable general equilibrium model of the economy of Belarus to simulate impacts on the economy as a whole and on individual sectors.

This Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) explores how Uzbekistan can consolidate its recent achievements and accelerate progress on the twin goals of eradicating extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The SCD is organized into five chapters. Chapter one frames the issues of poverty reduction and shared prosperity, and situates them in the context of Uzbekistan’s recent development. It reviews the status and drivers of progress in these areas, identifies analytical constraints, and highlights areas for further study. Chapter two describes the necessary conditions for sustaining rapid economic growth and robust quality job creation. It underscores the importance of expanding private-sector participation and investment in key economic sectors. Chapter three considers how a well-functioning labor market and access to essential public services can enhance the inclusiveness of growth. Chapter four analyzes threats to the sustainability of Uzbekistan’s recent gains over both the medium and the long term. Chapter five concludes by examining the constraints to growth and development revealed by the analysis, and it proposes a framework for prioritizing policy actions designed to address them.

With the success of the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in reducing conventional tariff barriers, much of the recent focus of regional and multilateral trade agreements has switched to non-tariff measures, both border and behind-the-border policies. This paper considers the recent empirical and theoretical literature on non-tariff measures in the world trading system. It provides a set of stylized facts based on available data on non-tariff measures and reviews the key methods used to estimate their trade impact. It considers the theoretical treatment of these measures in the trade literature with a focus on the rules and institutions that govern non-tariff measures in the world trading system. It discusses some of the major issues regarding international cooperation in these policy areas, in particular whether such cooperation should entail deep integration (involving precise legally binding obligations) or shallow integration (which allows countries greater discretion in the setting of non-tariff measures). Finally, this paper reviews some of the specific features the World Trade Organization uses in dealing with non-tariff measures such as national treatment rules and non-violation complaints, and considers policy options beyond the WTO such as harmonization and mutual recognition of standards.

Evidence indicates that trade costs are a much more substantial barrier to trade than tariffs are, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This paper decomposes trade costs into: (i) trade facilitation, (ii) non-tariff barriers, and (iii) the costs of business services. The paper assesses the poverty and shared prosperity impacts of deep integration to reduce these three types of trade costs in: (i) the East African Customs Union–Common Market of East and Southern Africa–South African Development Community "Tripartite" Free Trade Area; (ii) within the East African Customs Union; and (iii) unilaterally by the East African Customs Union. The analysis employs an innovative, multi-region computable general equilibrium model to estimate the changes in the macroeconomic variables that impact poverty and shared prosperity. The model estimates are used in the Global Income Distribution Dynamics microsimulation model to obtain assessments of the changes in the poverty headcount and shared prosperity for each of the simulations for the six African regions or countries. The paper finds that these reforms are pro-poor. There are significant reductions in the poverty headcount and the percentage of the population living in poverty for all six of the African regions from deep integration in the Tripartite Free Trade Area or comparable unilateral reforms by the East African Customs Union. Further, the incomes of the bottom 40 percent of the populations noticeably increase in all countries or regions that are engaged in the trade reforms. The reason for the poor share in prosperity is the fact that the reforms increase unskilled wages faster than the rewards of other factors of production, as the reforms tend to favor agriculture. Despite the uniform increases in income for the poorest 40 percent, there are some cases where the share of income captured by the poorest 40 percent of the population decreases. The estimated gains vary considerably across countries and reforms. Thus, countries would have an interest in negotiating for different reforms in different agreements.

This paper explores the economic impacts of two related tracks of China's expected transformation—economic slowdown and rebalancing away from investment toward consumption—and estimates the spillovers for the rest of the world, with a special focus on Sub-Saharan African countries. The paper finds that an average annual slowdown of gross domestic product in China of 1 percent over 2016–30 is expected to result in a decline of gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1.1 percent and globally by 0.6 percent relative to the past trends scenario by 2030. However, if China's transformation also entails substantial rebalancing, the negative income effects of the economic slowdown could be offset by the positive changes brought along by rebalancing through higher overall imports by China and positive terms of trade effects for its trading partners. If global supply responds positively to the shifts in relative prices and the new sources of consumer demand from China, a substantial rebalancing in China could have an overall favorable impact on the global economy. Economic growth could turn positive and higher on average, by 6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.5 percent globally, as compared with the past trends scenario. Finally, rebalancing reduces the prevalence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with the isolated negative effects of China's slowdown, which slightly increase the incidence of poverty. Overall, China's slowdown and rebalancing combined are estimated to increase gross domestic product in Sub-Saharan Africa by 4.7 percent by 2030 and reduce poverty, but the extent of this varies by country.

After sharply declining in the first half of 2015, world trade began to grow, albeit at a slow pace. Preliminary data indicate that merchandise import growth was 1.7 percent in 2015, down from 3 percent in 2014. Recent trade developments should be seen in the context of a deceleration in trade growth since the early 2000s, and particularly since the global financial crisis. These developments reflected a combination of old and new cyclical factors as well as enduring structural determinants, such as the maturation of global value chains and the slower pace of trade liberalization. In particular, trade developments in Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia mostly reflected lower imports of recession hit commodity exporters such as Brazil and Russia. Latin America contributed 6 percent to the downward pull in global imports in 2015. Except for Japan, imports and exports of advanced economies did not show signs of a significant downturn, but were sluggish. Lower commodity prices have reduced real incomes in commodity producers and led to a contraction in their imports from all regions, including China. At the same time, the gradual shift from investment to consumption in China, and the more significant contraction in its industrial production seen in early 2015, have reduced its imports from other regions, including commodity producers.

This report explores the sectors that will be instrumental for positive CU impact and competitiveness in the medium term. The initial chapter analyzes the gaps and opportunities the Kyrgyz NQI presents for capturing benefits of access to the enlarged common market across sectors. The next three chapters take an in-depth look at three high-growth sectors and identify adaptation priorities and opportunities. Agriculture, services, and garments are a large and growing share of exports and are the sectors most likely to be transformed by accession to the CU and the increased tariffs to countries outside the EEU. Services added 56 percent to GDP in 2013, while agriculture contributed 18 percent, and manufacturing 16 percent. Exports in the garment sector were close to US$200 million in 2013, employing over 150,000 workers. The main findings of each chapter are summarized below followed by a summary of recommendations. This report is relevant to the Kyrgyz experience as it highlights important differences both in terms of regulations and technical requirements. The report highlights differences between the EU and CU regulatory systems in approaches to food safety and legislation, but it also analyzes the differences in infrastructure aspects of the NQI, such as testing laboratories and certification mechanisms between the EU and CU. The Customs Union approach is based on end-product compliance to a specific technical regulation or standard, whereas the European Union relies on preventive measures and minimizing risks associated with each process throughout the complete food chain. In the CU food control system, food control bodies verify that the end-product meets the required technical specifications established by the government; in the EU system, end-product attributes such as size, color, shape, smell, and taste are generally left to the marketplace to judge if they are acceptable. Importantly, the report pinpoints specific technical requirements for EU food safety that differ from the CU requirements (microbiological criteria for foodstuff, contaminants in food; maximum residue limits for residues of pesticides, and pharmacologically active substances).

Existing work on China's economic influence in Africa refers to Africa in broad terms, thereby generalizing the results to an extent that is unhelpful for policy-makers in a specific country. Moreover, the emphasis is on oil exporters. This paper remedies this by focusing on a single, oil-importing country: Kenya. The paper examines China's economic presence in Kenya and some of the popular myths surrounding Chinese economic activity. The first myth is that Chinese companies do not employ local workers. In fact, 78 percent of full-time and 95 percent of part-time employees in Chinese companies are locals. Second, although China represents a large potential market for local exporters, the study finds that China has a better chance of expanding its exports to Kenya than Kenya does to China based on existing specializations. This may change with recent oil discoveries in Kenya, increasing the space for Kenyan exports to China, as well as from China's shift to a consumption-driven economy which will increase demand for services, a growing strength of Kenya's economy (World Bank Country Economic Memorandum 2016). The paper emphasizes that Kenyan policy makers should be less concerned about bilateral trade imbalances and worry about Kenya's overall trade balance. However, the Standard Gauge Railway and Thika superhighway experiences suggest that Chinese firms offer relatively few technology transfer or supplier opportunities for local firms and academia. Third, the popular focus of Chinese competition is on the impact on well-organized Kenyan producers and not on consumers, thereby underestimating the benefits Kenyan consumer derive from the availability of more affordable Chinese goods. The paper concludes with policy directions for improving export competitiveness and transparency in infrastructure projects, and local content.

This report seeks to shed light on the ways in which the services sector has contributed to Lao PDR’s competitiveness and integration into the global marketplace. It focuses on two complementary roles that the services sector plays: first, as an avenue for export diversification and growth and, second,by providing inputs into other productive sectors of the economy, such as the manufacturing sector. As economies grow, the importance of the services sector generally increases, but its role as an enabler of other sectors of the economy in moving up the value chain is frequently overlooked. However, the services sector is critical in raising competitiveness of these other sectors to boost growth and create better quality jobs. The main policy recommendations that emerge from this report are aimed at increasing competition in the services sector, reducing distortive regulations, and opening up the sector to foreign participation, building up skills, both at the individual and at the firm level, and investing in hard and soft infrastructure to promote the development of the sector.

This paper uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran with and without strategic responses. Iran benefits the most, with average per capita welfare gains ranging from close to 3 percent, in the case when Iran's crude oil exports to the European Union recover to half their pre-embargo level, to 6.5 percent, in the best case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, successful domestic reforms that enable a strong supply response, and increased market access for Iranian exports in developed markets. Iran could achieve benefits close to the upper range if Gulf Cooperation Council oil exporters limit their crude oil exports to support the oil price. If they do nothing, however, the price of oil will decline by 13 percent in the case of complete recovery of oil exports to the European Union, leaving net oil importers better off and net oil exporters worse off.

Moldova’s recent Association Agreement with the European Union (EU), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), represents an important opportunity, as well as challenges. This analytical document has been commissioned by the World Bank Group to provide insights into potential outcomes of the DCFTA and of other trade options that Moldova has, using a Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (DCGE) model calibrated to its economy. This paper begins by describing the general trends in economic relations between Moldova and the EU over the past 10 years, with an emphasis on trade, as well as Foreign direct investment (FDI) and labor migration. This section includes some additional facts and details that complement the Trade Competitiveness Diagnostic. In the second section, the paper presents the main elements of the DCFTA and highlights the trade commitments and concessions that the EU and Moldova undertook. It also includes a short review of available literature on the ex-ante or ex post impact assessments of other Association Agreements between the EU and third countries that have been done using CGE models. The third section presents key features of the DCGE and discusses the data used for assembling the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). Then, the main features of the simulated trade scenarios are presented. Finally, this paper discusses the DCGE simulation results, including the effects of the various scenarios on welfare, trade, and economic activity level. Some distributional impacts are also brought into discussion. The final section concludes and makes several recommendations.

As a small economy, Moldova’s growth and development prospects are closely related to its performance in international and regional markets. In this report the authors have looked at the export performance and competitiveness of the Moldovan economy. This report provides an overview of Moldova’s trade competitiveness. Its objectives are twofold: (i) to present a comprehensive analysis of Moldova’s recent trade performance and (ii) to identify policy measures and interventions that can enhance the competitiveness of Moldova’s export firms and the value added of their exports. The report is divided into two main parts. Part one contains an exports outcome analysis. It assesses export performance along four dimensions that contribute to form a comprehensive picture of the sustainable competitiveness of the export sector, including (i) the level, growth, and market share performance of existing exports (the “intensive margin”); (ii) diversification of products and markets (the “extensive margin”); (iii) the quality and sophistication of exports (the “quality” margin); and (iv) the survival of export flows (the “sustainability margin”). Part two investigates constraints on Moldova’s competitiveness, focusing specifically on a series of supply-side factors, such as the role of backbone and input services and utilities, and access to finance; and the business environment, particularly government regulations affecting trade and governance and institutional quality. The rest of the report is structured as follows: Section two examines overall trends in trade flows, including the growth of exports and imports, the degree of trade openness, and the recent evolution in foreign direct investment flows. In Section three, the authors concentrate on export outcomes, analyzing the sectoral composition, the growth orientation, and degree of diversification of Moldovan exports. The authors also analyze the evolution in the quality and sophistication of exports and the survival of export relationships in different markets and sectors. In the second part of the report, the authors look at productivity dynamics of Moldovan firms in comparative perspective, and then investigate the impact of access to finance, backbone services, trade and customs regulations, and corruption on firm productivity. The authors conclude this report with policy recommendations to improve Moldova's export competitiveness and increase the product and market scope, quality, and sophistication of its export basket.

Belize has a rich history that dates back thousands of years. The country was first inhabited by the Mayans with records of their presence dating from 1500 BC. The first recorded European settlement was established circa 1638 by the British who called the country the Colony of British Honduras. The official name of the territory was changed from British Honduras to Belize in June 1973, and full independence was granted on September 21, 1981. There were several obstacles in the path toward independence, as illustrated by Guatemala's long-standing claim to the entire territory. It was only in November 1980, after several frustrated negotiations with Guatemala that Belizean diplomacy managed to obtain international support that led to the United Nations passing of a resolution that demanded the independence of Belize, but it was only in 1992 that Guatemala formally recognized Belize’s independence. After independence, Belize successfully implemented a development strategy which emphasized economic diversification and private sector development at a time where the terms of trade were favorable to the country. As a small, open economy, that is also extremely vulnerable to climate change and natural disasters, Belize’s ability to promote faster poverty reduction and greater shared prosperity will depend on how well the country deals with its main sources of vulnerability. In addition to weaknesses in infrastructure and in the skills of the labor force, several studies have pinpointed crime and violence and problems in the financial sector as important deterrents to growth. The analysis in this report confirms the centrality of these two factors. The predicament in the financial sector is largely driven by the small economic size of the country and the lack of competition in the banking sector, a common feature in small state economies that limits the availability of credit to small and medium enterprises. Stability issues in the sector complicate matters as these impose non-negligible risks to the health of the financial sector. On the other hand, the rise in the inflow of migrants from neighboring Central American countries with a history of crime and violence has been raised as a potential cause for high crime rates in Belize, but there is not enough evidence to substantiate that claim at this point. Policy interventions that could help halt the rise in criminality rates include ramping up the quality of education, keeping children at school, promoting education equivalency programs and job training, besides more direct approaches such as investing in safe neighborhood programs.

Once concentrated among a few large economies, global flows of goods, services, and capital now reach an ever-larger number of countries worldwide. Global trade in goods and in services both increased 10 times between 1980 and 2011, while foreign direct investment (FDI) flows increased almost 30-fold. A value chain is global when some of these stages are carried out in more than one country, most notably when discrete tasks within a production process are fragmented and dispersed across a number of countries. Southern African Customs Union (SACU) - region global value chains (GVCs) are both a new reality and significant opportunity for expanding non-commodity exports to support growth, diversification, and job creation in the region. The task-based nature of GVCs creates opportunities for developing countries to establish very quickly a position in global trade within a sector in which they may have had no previous experience. For South Africa, GVCs are seen as a route to higher manufacturing exports and greater value addition. For other SACU countries, GVCs are seen as a route to diversification and global integration, and to leverage the possibility of greater investment from South Africa itself. The main objectives of the study are as follows: (i) to understand trends of GVC participation and competitiveness of South Africa and the wider SACU region, the outcomes from this participation (exports, jobs, and productivity), and the factors that determine competitiveness; (ii) to map the extent of value chain integration across the region and identify barriers to deeper integration; and (iii) to identify policies and actions that will be required to develop a globally competitive, high value-adding factory Southern Africa.

How do global supply chain linkages modify countries' incentives to impose import protection? Are these linkages empirically important determinants of trade policy? To address these questions, this paper introduces supply chain linkages into a workhorse terms-of-trade model of trade policy with political economy. Theory predicts that discretionary final goods tariffs will be decreasing in the domestic content of foreign-produced final goods. Provided foreign political interests are not too strong, final goods tariffs will also be decreasing in the foreign content of domestically-produced final goods. The paper tests these predictions using newly assembled data on bilateral applied tariffs, temporary trade barriers, and value-added contents for 14 major economies over the 1995-2009 period. There is strong support for the empirical predictions of the model. The results imply that global supply chains matter for trade policy, both in principle and in practice.

Once concentrated among a few large economies, global flows of goods, services, and capital now reach an ever larger number of economies worldwide. Global trade in goods and services increased 10 times between 1980 and 2011, while FDI flows increased almost 30-fold. The sales from foreign-owned firms amount to $26 trillion. As many as 3,000 bilateral investment treaties have been signed to create the framework of deep agreements needed not only to facilitate the global movement of final goods and services but also to internationalize entire processes of production. All these flows have grown over time, creating increasingly dense and complex networks. This note is intended provide an overview of SACU countries’ participation and performance in GVCs, drawing on several data sources and indicators, and most importantly the recently released 189-country Eora multi-region-input-output (MRIO) database (Lenzen et al. 2012, 2013). Following this introduction, the note is structured in five additional sections. Section two discusses in greater detail the scope of the report, including the data sources and methodological approaches, as well as their respective limitations. Section three looks at structural integration in trade, including the degree to which SACU countries import and export intermediates. Section four analyzes trends in value-added exports as a first step in exploring GVC participation. Section five hones in on the core measures of GVC participation and a brief analysis of SACU countries’ position in GVCs. Finally, section six concludes by bringing together the main findings from the analysis.

This systematic country diagnostic (SCD) discusses on Belize’s ability to promote faster poverty reduction and greater shared prosperity which will depend on how well the country deals with its main sources of vulnerability. The main areas in need of a big push that could have the highest potential impact on the twin goals are : (i) improving education and skills; (ii) addressing crime and violence; and, (iii) increasing resilience to climate change and natural disasters. Strengthening resilience to natural disasters and climate change along with improvements in the existing infrastructure in Belize are critical to support the twin goals to end extreme poverty, and promote shared prosperity in poorer segments of society. Sustainable progress towards the achievement of the twin goals of reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity in Belize will also require prioritizing fiscal sustainability. This SCD is structured in six chapters that range from a brief description of the main features of Belize to the discussion of priorities for growth and shared prosperity. Chapter 1 presents the country context, highlighting Belize’s main features as a small upper middle income country that faces high volatility associated with its size and vulnerability to exogenous shocks. Chapter 2 discusses trends in poverty and shared prosperity. Chapters 2 through 5 discuss the main underlying factors that have been found to influence Belize’s growth performance as well as its economic, social and environmental sustainability. Each of these chapters discuss in greater detail the nature of the challenges, dig deeper into exploring the likely causes of these challenges, and identify policy areas that could be critical for boosting growth and inclusion and ensuring sustainability. These chapters also identify knowledge and data gaps on areas where new information could help strengthen a diagnosis and inform specific actions in the priority areas. The sixth and final chapter has three important and distinctive features. First, it provides a synthesis of the analysis and findings of the previous chapters. Second, it provides a discussion of the approach used to identify the priorities for action in Belize. And, third, it concludes with a discussion of the priorities to boost shared prosperity and ensure economic, social and environmental sustainability in Belize.

Cross border value chains are increasingly seen as critical for export growth, providing the conduit for more than half of developing countries exports in value-added terms. However, Africa’s contribution to cross border value chains remains low, at 1.5 percent. And African countries’ limited participation in value chains is in the lower-value, lower end stages of production. Reasons for this limited integration include infrastructure, thick borders, geographical remoteness, size, fragmentation, and the limited financial capacities and service industries of African countries.

This report addresses two questions: what explains Ethiopia’s growth acceleration?; and how can it be sustained? In brief, the authors find that Ethiopia’s rapid economic growth, concentrated in agriculture and services, was driven by substantial public infrastructure investment and supported by a conducive external environment. To sustain high growth, three policy adjustments are presented: identifying sustainable ways of financing infrastructure, supporting private investment through credit markets, and tapping into the growth potential of structural reforms.

An export-oriented development strategy fostered the Asia Pacific region’s economic success, making it the fastest growing region in the world. In recent years, despite waning demand from the crisis-hit Western economies, the accelerating demand from China boosted intraregional trade in Asia. Although China’s Asian trading partners benefit from increasing exports to China, this stronger linkage with China has made them more vulnerable to the risk of a Chinese slowdown. This paper examines the impact of a negative Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) shock on Asian economies by employing the Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) model, using the dataset through the third quarter of 2014 for 33 countries. The analysis finds that a negative Chinese GDP shock impacts commodity exporters, such as Indonesia, to the greatest extent, reflecting both demand and terms of trade shocks. Export-dependent countries in the East Asian production cycle, such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, are also severely affected. The analysis also finds that a negative shock to China’s real GDP would not only have an adverse effect on the price of crude oil, as some previous studies have also shown, but also on the prices of metals and agricultural products. The study also investigates the impact of a potential negative shock to the real GDP of the United States on Asian countries, and determines that although the U.S. economy has a larger influence on Asian economies than China’s economy, the Asian countries are more exposed to China than ever through increased economic ties.

As a small economy, Uruguay’s growth and poverty reduction prospects are closely related to its performance in international markets. This report analyzes export dynamics in Uruguay over the period 2000-2013, benchmarking them against relevant comparator countries. It looks at export outcomes through four different dimensions of export performance: (1) the evolution, composition, and growth orientation of the country’s export basket; (2) the degree of diversification across products and markets; (3) the level of sophistication and quality; and (4) the survival rate of export relationships. The report offers a number of hypotheses for an in-depth competitiveness diagnostic of Uruguay’s external sector, as well as policy recommendations to increase integration and to gain from it. In addition to the real depreciation of the peso that followed the crisis, the international prices of Uruguay’s main export products soared. This stimulated investment in technological improvements in the production of these natural-resource-intensive products. Section one analyzes the macroeconomic environment in which exporters operate in Uruguay during the period of analysis. Section two looks at level, growth, composition, and market share performance of Uruguay’s exports, as well as the country’s main trading destinations. Section three focuses on the diversification of products and markets, considering several measures of concentration, including the share of top five products and markets in exports, and the Hirschman-Herfindahl index for Uruguay’s export portfolio. Sections four and five address quality and sophistication and survival, respectively.

Recent data show that the institutional content of preferential trade agreements has evolved over time. Although pre-1990s preferential trade agreements mostly focused on tariff liberalization, recent agreements increasingly contain deep provisions in diverse areas, such as intellectual property rights, investment, and standards. At the same time, there has been a remarkable increase in the internationalization of production through foreign direct investment and outsourcing. This paper employs the Antràs and Helpman (2008) model of contractual frictions and global sourcing to study how deep trade agreements affect the international organization of production. The paper constructs new measures of the depth of preferential trade agreements and of vertical foreign direct investment to test the theory. Consistent with the model, the analysis finds evidence that the depth of trade agreements is correlated with vertical foreign direct investment, and that this is driven by the provisions that improve the contractibility of inputs provided by suppliers, such as regulatory provisions. Because this implication of the model is specific to the so-called “property rights” theory of the multinational firm, the findings provide empirical support to this approach vis-à-vis alternative theories of firm boundaries.

This background paper provides information on the study of the Group of 20 (G-20) and challenges faced by low-income developing countries (LIDCs). The study analyzes LIDCs development challenges and how G-20 economic policies can be coordinated so they can contribute to creating an enabling environment for their development. The focus of the paper is the role that trade and investment policies of G-20 countries play in this context. The paper is composed of three parts 1) the characteristics of LIDCs integration in the world economy, 2) the evolution of G-20 policies that affect LIDCs integration, and 3) the potential for changes in the G-20 trade and investment policy landscape to benefit LIDCs.

This paper analyzes how the exchange rate elasticity of exports has changed over time and across countries and sectors, and how the formation of global value chains has affected this relationship. The analysis uses a panel framework covering 46 countries over the period 1996-2012, and first finds evidence that the elasticity of manufacturing export volumes to the real effective exchange rate has decreased over time. The paper then examines whether the formation of supply chains has affected this elasticity using different measures of global value chain integration. Intuitively, as countries are more integrated in global production processes, a currency depreciation only improves the competitiveness of a fraction of the value of final goods exports. In line with this intuition, the analysis finds evidence that the rise of participation in global value chains explains on average 40 percent of the fall in the elasticity, and that corrections of the real effective exchange rate for participation in global value chains do not present the same decreasing pattern in elasticity.

Since we introduced the term “middle-income trap” in 2006, it has become popular among policy makers and researchers. In May 2015, a search of Google Scholar returned more than 3,000 articles including the term and about 300 articles with the term in the title. This paper provides a (non-exhaustive) survey of this literature. The paper then discusses what, in retrospect, we missed when we coined the term. Today, based on developments in East Asia, Latin America, and Central Europe during the past decade, we would have paid more attention to demographic factors, entrepreneurship, and external institutional anchors. We would also make it clearer that to us, the term was as much the absence of a satisfactory theory that could inform development policy in middle-income economies as the articulation of a development phenomenon. Three-quarters of the people in the world now live in middle-income economies, but economists have yet to provide a reliable theory of growth to help policy makers navigate the transition from middle- to high-income status. Hybrids of the Solow-Swan and Lucas-Romer models are not unhelpful, but they are poor substitutes for a well-constructed growth framework.

This paper analyzes the impacts of selected trade facilitation measures on international trade flows. A gravity model is used to estimate four equations: a pooled cross-section model; a fixed-effects model; a random effects model; and a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, the analysis uses a recent data set, a panel that includes trade data from 2011 and 2012 for 72 countries. Second, to measure the impacts of trade facilitation measures, the analysis includes dummy variables for the presence of an authorized economic operator program, the existence of a single-window program in the countries in the sample, and the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement between pairs of countries in the sample. The results show that the presence of an authorized economic operator program and the existence of a single-window program will improve countries’ trade performance. By contrast, the existence of a mutual recognition arrangement will not necessarily improve countries’ trade performance. These results suggest that, in general, trade facilitation measures as a whole will help countries improve their trade performance.

Economic activity in many African countries remains highly concentrated and exports are often dominated by mineral resources or a few primary products. The World Bank’s 2011 report on light manufacturing in Africa identified poor trade logistics performance as a constraint that especially penalized African exporters that relied on imported inputs, very often making them uncompetitive. The report highlighted research that demonstrated how poor logistics added roughly a 10 percent production cost penalty in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia across the five subsectors of light manufacturing where opportunities were identified as greatest in Africa. The report outlined how in Africa poor trade logistics increase production costs (often wiping out the labor cost advantage) and lead to long and unreliable delivery times, making local firm’s unattractive suppliers to lead firms in global value chains (GVCs), particularly for light manufacturing. This note seeks to contribute to a review of progress in achieving export diversification through greater exports of light manufacturing products. It looks at recent trends in the exports of the five categories of light manufacturing identified as having strong potential in Africa. The note reviews progress in improving trade logistics in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on the three countries highlighted in the light manufacturing study: Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia, and additionally Kenya and Uganda.

Traditional measures of trade diversification only take into account contemporaneous export baskets. These measures fail to capture a country’s ability to respond to shocks by allocating factors of production into activities for which it has already paid the fixed costs associated with exporting. This paper corrects for the shortcoming of traditional measures of diversification by introducing a novel measure of trade diversification—latent diversification—and proposes a proxy to measure latent diversification, which is calculated by taking into account the entire history of a country’s exports. The paper shows that the observed gaps between traditional measures of diversification and the proposed proxy of latent diversification are sizeable; countries hold latent export baskets that are, on average, three times as large as their average contemporaneous export basket, and these gaps are largest for poor and small countries. Moreover, latent diversification is an important determinant of volatility—more diversified latent export baskets are associated with lower terms of trade volatility and, subsequently, lower GDP per capita volatility, even after controlling for the degree of contemporaneous export diversification and other trade and country characteristics. The latter result, together with the disproportionately large latent baskets relative to contemporaneous baskets observed in poor and small countries, suggests that latent diversification is an important vehicle toward stability in countries that face barriers in building diversified contemporaneous export baskets.

This paper investigates how internal migration is affected by Brazil’s increased integration into the world economy. It analyzes the impact of regional differences in access to foreign demand on sector-specific bilateral migration rates between the Brazilian states for the years 1995 to 2003. Using international trade data, a foreign market access measure is computed at the sectoral level, which is exogenous to domestic migration. A higher foreign market access is associated with a higher local labor demand and attracts workers via two potential channels: higher wages and new job opportunities. Results show that both channels play a significant role in internal migration. Further, we find a heterogeneous impact across industries, according to their comparative advantage on the world market. However, the observed impact is driven by the strong reaction of low-educated workers to changes in market access. This finding is consistent with the fact that Brazil is exporting mainly goods that are intensive in unskilled labor.

Although Brazil has become one of the largest economies in the world, it remains among the most closed economies as measured by the share of exports and imports in gross domestic product. This feature cannot be explained simply by the size of Brazils economy. Rather, it is due to an economic structure reliant on domestic value chain integration as opposed to participation in global production networking. It also reflects more generally an export base that shows lack of dynamism. Opening up and moving toward integration into global value chains could produce efficiency gains and help Brazil address its productivity and competitiveness challenges.

This paper examines the implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, the paper models formal trade dispute negotiations as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policys costs to trading partners. The approach is to extend earlier theoretical models of trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations in order to guide the empirical assessment. The paper uses instrumental variables to estimate the model on trade volume outcomes from World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes over 1995–2009. The evidence is consistent with theoretical predictions that larger import volume outcomes are associated with products that have smaller increases in foreign exporter-received prices (terms-of-trade losses for the importer) as a result of the dispute, larger pre-dispute import volumes, larger import demand elasticities, and smaller foreign export supply elasticities. Dispute settlement outcome differences are also explained by variation in institutionally-motivated measures of retaliation capacity and the severity of the free-rider problem associated with foreign exporter concentration.

The devastating civil war in Syria is arguably one of the major civil conflicts in recent times. The conflict started with protests in March 2011 and soon after escalated to a violent internal war with no end in sight to this date. The conflict has by the end of 2014 caused well in excess of 150,000 fatalities, and 6 million internally displaced people (UN), and led 3 million refugees to move out of the country (UNHCR). Beyond the human tragedy, the conflict has disrupted the functioning of the economy in many ways. It has destroyed infrastructure, prevented children from going to school, closed factories and deterred investments and trade. The economic effects of the war extend beyond the country’s borders affecting also the neighboring countries. In particular trade is one of the main channels through which the effects of the crisis are transmitted to neighboring countries. For example, the demand for goods and services in Syria is likely to have fallen thus affecting the many exporters to Syria in neighboring countries. Moreover, to the extent that Syria has become harder to cross, the war may have made trade through Syria more difficult. At the same time producers in neighboring countries may have replaced Syrian producers in Syria and in other markets as their productive assets in Syria were destroyed. This report examines the effects of the Syrian war on the Lebanese economy via one of the most important channels through which the economic impact of the war occurs, i.e. the trade channel. In doing so, it partly updates and extends the previous economic assessment of World Bank (2013b) carried out last year. Focusing specifically on trade allows us to examine in more depth the trade effects than that report was able to do. Indeed, we go beyond the effects on aggregate and sectoral imports and exports to also examine the effects on exports at firms’ level, comparing the effects in Lebanon with those in other neighboring countries, including Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.

In the last decade Morocco undertook substantial, if gradual, trade liberalization by reducing tariffs, reforming trade regulations and signing free and preferential trade agreements with several regions and countries, including the United States, Turkey, the European Union and Arab countries. This paper analyzes the impact of input tariff reduction on Moroccan exporting firms through the channel of intermediate goods. Gaining access to more varied and cheaper inputs can make exporting firms more competitive, and as a result they export more. To evaluate how this policy may impact firms export performance, the paper analyzes the impact of input tariff reduction on different margins of trade with emphasis on export markets and product diversification. The identification of the effect of input tariffs on exports relies on a difference-in-difference estimator using heterogeneous access to import tariff exemption as a measure of different levels of exposure to input tariff reduction at the firm level. Overall, the analysis finds that firms that are relatively more exposed to input tariff perform better in those sectors with the largest input tariff reduction, with better access to markets, higher probability to survive when exporting new products in those sectors and higher export value growth.

Many production firms use intermediary trading firms to export indirectly. This paper uses Chinese export data at the transaction level to investigate the tax evasion motive through indirect trade. The paper provides strong evidence that, under Chinas partial export value-added tax rebate policy, production firms can effectively evade value-added taxes by underreporting their selling prices to domestic intermediary trading firms, especially when they sell differentiated products. Even for a moderate level of underreporting, the revenue loss is close to one billion U.S. dollars. The paper also finds that such underreporting behavior through domestic intermediaries may be associated with cross-border evasion through underreporting export values to foreign partners. In addition, the results indicate that the evasion motive is stronger for larger transactions.

The emergence of global value chains (GVCs) and their rapid expansion over the past two decades has transformed the global trade environment. GVCs involve task-based trade across multiple stages of the production process that take place across a number of different countries, in which multiple inputs and exports of intermediate goods and services are necessary to produce a final good, which may also be exported. GVC-oriented trade is seen to offer significant opportunities for developing countries, especially smaller ones, to benefit from global integration by changing the nature of competitiveness. With competition for GVC investment taking place in a truly global market, factor competitiveness relative to other countries matters a lot. In this context, the purpose of this note is to shed some light for policymakers, in this case specifically in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, on where to focus efforts to drive competitiveness for GVC participation. This is a data-intensive exercise that requires indicators to represent underlying capabilities, disaggregated international trade data, and finally, a classification of which products are likely to be trade within GVCs.

Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) are completely dependent on their transit neighbors infrastructure and administrative procedures to transport their goods to port. This publication provides a comprehensive ten-year review in order to assess the progress made in improving access of LLDCs to global markets, identify the remaining challenges faced by LLDCs, and present improved and innovative ways to overcome them. This publication is based on the practical knowledge from implementing the Almaty Program policies, shared by both of our institutions. It provides a snapshot of the economic trends in LLDCs, with regard to trade costs, connectivity constraints and trade diversification. It reviews the key access policies in the Almaty Program of Action framework that include infrastructure, transport and logistics services, regional integration, trade and transit facilitation. It combines data and substantial feedback from implemented projects and policy changes. The focus of the document is general in scope and does not include detailed economic or policy analysis of all the potential components of reforms. The publication is organized as follows: Chapter1: Economics of Landlockedness; Chapter 2: Connectivity Constraints; Chapter 3: Hinterland Connections; Chapter 4: Transit and Trade Facilitation, Regional Integration; Chapter 5: Physical Connectivity, Corridors. This document is based primarily on the experience of project implementation by the World Bank, and on analytical work on trade corridors and LLDCs, including reports and presentations on progress in implementing the Almaty Program of Action.

With global food crises and food price volatility in recent years, agricultural subsidies have once again gained prominence as a policy instrument in many developing countries. In Mongolia too, subsidies to the agriculture sector mainly through government budgetary transfers, have increased over time. These gained prominence in 2008 when a global, regional (the drought in Russia, and Kazakhstan, the two main suppliers to Mongolia), and the national food production shortfall sent domestic wheat prices soaring to record levels. Wheat production had reached an all-time low during the years 2005 to 2007. Consequently, subsidies to crop, livestock, and agroprocessing sectors have increased since 2008, and now represent a complex set of programs, sometimes with conflicting and overlapping goals and intended beneficiaries.

Economic growth slowed in 2012 due to capacity constraints in the oil sector, weaker global demand for metals, and unfavorable weather conditions affecting crop production. Overall, industrial output expanded by 0.5 percent in 2012, with negligible contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth for the year. Against the decline of agriculture, and little change in industry overall, real GDP growth was supported by a 10 percent year/year growth of the services sector in 2012. Higher export revenues supported strong domestic demand for trade and transportation, as well as for other non-tradable services. High oil prices continued spurring domestic consumption while fixed capital investments remained depressed. Private consumption remains the main contributor to GDP growth as it has been growing by 9-10 percent a year since 2010, supported by favorable commodity prices and high oil export revenue. Exports of oil largely influence the composition of Kazakhstans trading partners, while membership in the customs union appears to be affecting composition of imports. The European Union (EU) maintains the first place among trading partners of Kazakhstan, mainly due to large imports of oil and other mineral resources from Kazakhstan. Overall, employment creation continues to be driven by the services sector. Kazakhstan growth has been pro-poor, driven by job creation and real income gains. However, income disparity, which had improved up to 2009, has worsened slightly due to the crisis.

Since 2004 (Ethiopian Fiscal Year (EFY) 1997), Ethiopia has experienced strong and generally broad-based real economic growth of around 10.6 percent on average between then and 2011. Growth over the last nine years was far beyond the growth rates recorded in aggregate terms for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which on average only reached 5.2 percent, less than half of Ethiopia's average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate during that period. Inspired by the East Asian experiences for a comparison of selected indicators and policies of Ethiopia and China/Korea), growth was induced through a mix of factors including agricultural modernization, the development of new export sectors, strong global commodity demand, and government-led development investments. The initial double digits growth rates have now manifested slightly lower but remain at high single-digit levels. The economy is expected to stabilize at around seven to eight percent in 2012, largely owing to improved performance in the agriculture sector. GDP growth is likely to stay around that margin up until 2016 (EFY 2008) driven by rising foreign investment and exports (Economist Intelligence Unit 2012). High inflation persists, but is on a slightly decreasing trend. Economic growth brought with it positive trends in reducing poverty, in both urban and rural areas. Ethiopia follows a strategy of increasing exports to facilitate growth. This is appropriate given the currently limited size of its domestic market and it is consistent with the development experience of some of the recently successful countries, particularly in East Asia. Export of goods growth is to a good extent driven by volume growth across a variety of product groups, which indicates that this growth is a result of recent efforts to increase and diversify the export base. Overall export and import developments result in a significantly increased trade deficit by 43 percent, up from US$5.5 billion in 2010/11 to US$7.9 billion.

Tajikistan has successfully emerged from the global economic crisis. Economic activity was strong, driven by growth in industrial production and services. Inward remittances remain a key factor in stimulating domestic consumption. Although inflation returned to single digits, it continues to be susceptible to higher global prices of key imports. The country remains vulnerable to a range of external shocks, and economic outcomes depend critically on regional trade, transport, and investment policies. Concerns remain with respect to weaknesses in the financial sector. Structural reforms continue, and transparency has increased. The outlook is generally positive, but chronic risks remain.