1. Institutions as Signals: How Dictators Consolidate Power in Times of Crisis.
- Author
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Timoneda, Joan C.
- Subjects
- *
POWER sharing governments , *COUPS d'etat ,DOMINICAN Republic politics & government - Abstract
Formal institutions in dictatorship are known to improve authoritarian governance and promote power-sharing. Yet institutions also act as tools of information propagation and can be used by autocrats for signaling purposes. In this article, I argue that in times of weakness, dictators follow an expand-and-signal strategy, expanding the ruling coalition to decrease the relative power of coup plotters and then create visible formal institutions to signal strong support. Doing so decreases (1) the probability that a coup is launched and (2) that one succeeds if staged. I propose a formal model to unpack the mechanisms of my argument and use the case of the Dominican Republic during Rafael Trujillo's rule to illustrate my theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
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