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Time ambiguity—that is, having partially/fully incomplete information about when an outcome will occur—is common in everyday life. A recent study showed that participants preferred options with time‐exact delays over options with time‐ambiguous delays, a phenomenon they called time‐ambiguity aversion. However, the empirical robustness and boundaries of this phenomenon remain unexplored. We conducted three online studies: Study 2 (n = 118) was a replication of Study 1 (n = 76) using preregistered analyses; Study 3 (n = 202; preregistered) was a follow‐up study suggested during review. In Studies 1 and 2, participants completed hypothetical choices between €5 today versus later‐but‐larger (LL) rewards that systematically varied in their amount, delay, and time‐ambiguity level (e.g., for a 180 day delay, time ambiguity varied from 179 to 181 to 0–360 days). Effects of time ambiguity on choice were best encoded in an absolute, dose‐dependent manner and depended on delays and amounts: Increasing time ambiguity led to more time‐exact LL choices at shorter delays but more time‐ambiguous LL choices at longer delays. Additionally, time‐ambiguity ranges including today were chosen more frequently than ranges excluding today, akin to the present bias in intertemporal choice. Lastly, evidence suggested that more time ambiguity was preferred for smaller LL amounts yet disliked for larger LL amounts. Study 3 demonstrated that time‐risk and time‐ambiguity preferences are differentiable by giving participants choices involving hypothetical time‐exact, time‐ambiguous, and time‐risky options. Taken together, our results extend the nascent literature on time ambiguity by showing that (i) time‐ambiguity preferences are distinguishable from both time‐risk and delay preferences and (ii) time ambiguity is not generally aversive, but its impact depends on delay and amount magnitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors investigated risk taking and underlying information use in 13- to 16- and 17- to 19-year-old adolescents and in adults in 4 experiments, using a novel dynamic risk-taking task, the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The authors investigated risk taking under differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes with 2 versions of the CCT, constituting the most direct test of a dual-system explanation of adolescent risk taking in the literature so far. The "hot" CCT was designed to trigger more affective decision making, whereas the "cold" CCT was designed to trigger more deliberative decision making. Differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes in the 2 CCT versions was established by self-reports and assessment of electrodermal activity. Increased adolescent risk taking, coupled with simplified information use, was found in the hot but not the cold condition. Need-for-arousal predicted risk taking only in the hot condition, whereas executive functions predicted information use in the cold condition. Results are consistent with recent dual-system explanations of risk taking as the result of competition between affective processes and deliberative cognitive-control processes, with adolescents' affective system tending to override the deliberative system in states of heightened emotional arousal. (Contains 8 figures, 4 tables and 18 footnotes.)

The authors investigated risk taking and underlying information use in 13- to 16- and 17- to 19-year-old adolescents and in adults in 4 experiments, using a novel dynamic risk-taking task, the Columbia Card Task (CCT). The authors investigated risk taking under differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes with 2 versions of the CCT, constituting the most direct test of a dual-system explanation of adolescent risk taking in the literature so far. The 'hot' CCT was designed to trigger more affective decision making, whereas the 'cold' CCT was designed to trigger more deliberative decision making. Differential involvement of affective versus deliberative processes in the 2 CCT versions was established by self-reports and assessment of electrodermal activity. Increased adolescent risk taking, coupled with simplified information use, was found in the hot but not the cold condition. Need-for-arousal predicted risk taking only in the hot condition, whereas executive functions predicted information use in the cold condition. Results are consistent with recent dual-system explanations of risk taking as the result of competition between affective processes and deliberative cognitive-control processes, with adolescents' affective system tending to override the deliberative system in states of heightened emotional arousal. Keywords: risk taking, adolescence, affective and deliberative decision making, dual system, cognitive control Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014983.supp

Evaluations and value-based decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of confidence about whether or not the evaluation or decision is accurate. We argue that this feeling of confidence reflects the variation of an underlying value distribution and that this value distribution represents previously experienced values related to an object. Two preregistered experiments in which the variation of such value distributions was systematically varied provide causal evidence in favor of this hypothesis. A third preregistered experiment showed that, for natural food items with uncontrolled prior experiences, confidence in evaluations is again related to the variation of individuals' self-reported value distributions. Similarly, for choices between items, the variation of experienced values related to a choice pair influenced confidence in the perceived correctness of the choice. These findings converge with other domains of decision making showing that confidence tracks the variation of the underlying probability distribution of the evidence that a decision is based on, which in the case of value-based decisions, is informed by a value distribution reflecting priorly experienced values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study evaluated the aspects of complex decisions influenced by peers, and components of peer involvement influential to adolescents' risky decisions. Participants (N = 140) aged 13-25 completed the Columbia Card Task (CCT), a risky choice task, isolating deliberation-reliant and affect-reliant decisions while alone, while a friend monitors choices, and while a friend is merely present. There is no condition in which a nonfriend peer is present. Results demonstrated the risk-increasing peer effect occurred in the youngest participants in the cold CCT and middle-late adolescents in the hot CCT, whereas other ages and contexts showed a risk-decreasing peer effect. Mere presence was not sufficient to influence risky behavior. These boundaries in age, decision, and peer involvement constrain prevailing models of adolescent peer influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adolescence is characterized by considerable changes in cognitive and socio-emotional skills. There are considerable differences between adolescents with regards to the development of these skills. However, most studies examine adolescents’ average functioning, without taking into account this heterogeneity. The current study applies network analysis in order to examine heterogeneity of cognitive and socio-emotional functioning in adolescents on-track or delayed in their school progression. Data was collected at two time-points for on-track (n = 320) and delayed (n = 69) adolescents (M age = 13.30 years, SDage = 0.77). Repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant differences between the groups in cognitive and socio-emotional functioning (p ’s > 0.05). Network analysis revealed that executive functions play a key role in the network of cognitive, social, and emotional functioning. This is especially the case in the delayed group where executive functions are even more central, both at T1 (inhibition and shifting) and T2 (shifting). Subsequent community analysis revealed three profiles in both groups: a well-adapted and well-balanced group, a group with high levels of need for arousal and risk-taking, and a group with regulation problems. Compared to on-track adolescents, delayed adolescents showed even higher levels of risk-taking in the second profile and higher levels of executive function problems in the third profile at T1. These differences were leveled out at T2, indicating adolescents in the delayed group catch up with their peers. This study highlights the intricate balance between cognitive, social and emotional functioning in adolescents in relation to school performance and provides preliminary evidence of the importance of taking individual differences within groups into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freezing behavior, a commonly observed defensive stress response, shows relatively high stability over time in animals. Given the relevance of freezing for stress-coping and human psychopathology, it is relevant to know whether freezing behavior is also stable in humans, particularly during adolescence, when most affective symptoms develop. In a prospective longitudinal study, we investigated freezing-like behavior in response to social threat in 75 adolescents at age 14, repeated 3 years later at age 17. We used a well-established method combining electrocardiography (ECG; heart rate) and posturography (body sway) in response to emotional picture-viewing of angry, happy, and neutral faces. We hypothesized that individual differences in freezing-like behavior in response to social threat--operationalized by contrasting angry vs. neutral faces--would be relatively stable over time. Our results indeed showed relative stability between ages 14 and 17 in individual differences in freezing-like behavior in heart rate (r = 0.82), as well as in combined heart rate and body sway measures (r = 0.65). These effects were not specific for the angry vs. neutral contrast; they were also visible in other emotion contrasts. Exploratory analysis in males and females separately showed stability in body sway specifically for angry vs. neutral faces only in females. Together, these results suggest moderate to strong stability in human freezing-like behavior in response to social threat from mid to late adolescence (with exception for the body sway measure in males). This relative stability was not specific for threat-induction and may reflect a general stability that is particularly strong for heart rate. The fact that this relative stability was found over a relatively long time range of 3 years is promising for studies aiming to use freezing-like behavior as a marker for internalizing symptoms in adolescent development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals may differ systematically in their applied decision strategies, which has critical implications for decision neuroscience but is yet scarcely studied. Our study's main focus was therefore to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying compensatory versus noncompensatory strategies in risky choice. Here, we compared people using a compensatory expected value maximization with people using a simplified noncompensatory loss-minimizing choice strategy. To this end, we used a two-choice paradigm including a set of "simple" items (e.g., simple condition), in which one option was superior on all attributes, and a set of "conflict" items, in which one option was superior on one attribute but inferior on other attributes. A binomial mixture analysis of the decisions elicited by these items differentiated between decision-makers using either a compensatory or a noncompensatory strategy. Behavioral differences were particularly pronounced in the conflict condition, and these were paralleled by neural results. That is, we expected compensatory decision-makers to use an integrated value comparison during choice in the conflict condition. Accordingly, the compensatory group tracked the difference in expected value between choice options reflected in neural activation in the parietal cortex. Furthermore, we expected noncompensatory, compared with compensatory, decision-makers to experience increased conflict when attributes provided conflicting information. Accordingly, the noncompensatory group showed greater dorsomedial PFC activation only in the conflict condition. These pronounced behavioral and neural differences indicate the need for decision neuroscience to account for individual differences in risky choice strategies and to broaden its scope to noncompensatory risky choice strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The Emotional Cascade Model (ECM) by Selby et al. (2008) proposes that people often engage in dysregulated behaviors to end extreme, aversive emotional states triggered by a self-perpetuating vicious cycle of (excessive) rumination, negative affect, and attempts to suppress negative thoughts. Method: Besides replicating the ECM, we introduced intrusions as a mediator between rumination and behavioral dysregulation and tested this extended ECM for compulsions as part of obsessive-compulsive disorders. A structural equation modeling approach was used to test this in a sample of N D 414, randomly recruited from the general population. Results: Intrusions were found to fully mediate the effect of rumination on a broad array of dysregulated behaviors and compulsions. This mediation endured when controlling for symptoms of depression. Conclusion: These findings support the idea that rumination fuels intrusions, which in turn foster dysregulated behaviors. Therefore, addressing rumination as well as intrusions may improve psychotherapeutic interventions for mental disorders characterized by dysregulated behaviors and/or extreme aversive emotional states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Choosing between smaller prompt rewards and larger later rewards is a common choice problem, and studies widely agree that frontostriatal circuits heavily innervated by dopamine are centrally involved. Understanding how dopamine modulates intertemporal choice has important implications for neurobiological models and for understanding the mechanisms underlying maladaptive decision-making. However, the specific role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions is not well understood. Dopamine may play a role in multiple aspects of intertemporal choices-the valuation of choice outcomes and sensitivity to reward delays. To assess the role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions, we tested Parkinson disease patients who suffer from dopamine depletion in the striatum, in either high (on medication, PDON) or low (off medication, PDOFF) dopaminergic states. Compared with both PDOFF and healthy controls, PDON made more farsighted choices and reduced their valuations less as a function of increasing time to reward. Furthermore, reduced discounting in the high dopaminergic state was robust across multiple measures, providing new evidence for dopamine's role in making decisions about the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) override the drive to eat, forgoing immediate rewards in favor of longer-term goals. We examined delay discounting and its neural correlates in AN before and after treatment to test a potential mechanism of illness persistence. Methods Inpatients with AN ( n = 59) and healthy control subjects (HC, n = 39) performed a delay discounting task at two time points. A subset ( n = 30 AN, n = 22 HC) participated in functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning during the task. The task consisted of a range of monetary choices with variable delay times, yielding individual discount rates—the rate by which money loses value over time. Results Before treatment, the AN group showed a preference for delayed over earlier rewards (i.e., less steep discount rates) compared with HC; after weight restoration, AN did not differ from HC. Underweight AN showed slower response times for earlier versus delayed choices; this reversed with treatment. Underweight AN showed abnormal neural activity in striatum and dorsal anterior cingulate; normalization of behavior was associated with increased activation in reward regions (striatum and dorsal anterior cingulate) and decision-making regions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex). Conclusions The undernourished state of AN may amplify the tendency to forgo immediate rewards in favor of longer-term goals. The results suggest that behavior that looks phenotypically like excessive self-control does not correspond with enhanced prefrontal recruitment. Rather, the results point to alterations in cingulostriatal circuitry that offer new insights on the potential role of abnormalities in decision-making neural systems in the perpetuation of AN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early life-stress, particularly maternal deprivation, is associated with long-lasting deviations in animals' freezing responses. Given the relevance of freezing for stresscoping, translational research is needed to examine the relation between insecure infant-parent attachment and bodily freezing-like behavior in humans. Therefore, we investigated threat-related reductions in body sway (indicative of freezing-like behavior) in 14-year-old adolescents (N = 79), for whom attachment security was earlier assessed in infancy. As expected, insecure (vs. secure) attachment was associated with less body sway for angry vs. neutral faces. This effect remained when controlling for intermediate life events. These results suggest that the long-lasting effects of early negative caregiving experiences on the human stress and threat systems extend to the primary defensive reaction of freezing. Additionally, we replicated earlier work in adults, by observing a significant correlation (in adolescents assessed as securely attached) between subjective state anxiety and reduced body sway in response to angry vs. neutral faces. Together, this research opens venues to start exploring the role of freezing in the development of human psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adolescence is often described as a period of increased risk taking relative to both childhood and adulthood. This inflection in risky choice behavior has been attributed to a neurobiological imbalance between earlier developing motivational systems and later developing top-down control regions. Yet few studies have decomposed risky choice to investigate the underlying mechanisms or tracked their differential developmental trajectory. The current study uses a risk-return decomposition to more precisely assess the development of processes underlying risky choice and to link them more directly to specific neural mechanisms. This decomposition specifies the influence of changing risks (outcome variability) and changing returns (expected value) on the choices of children, adolescents, and adults in a dynamic risky choice task, the Columbia Card Task. Behaviorally, risk aversion increased across age groups, with adults uniformly risk averse and adolescents showing substantial individual differences in risk sensitivity, ranging from risk seeking to risk averse. Neurally, we observed an adolescent peak in risk-related activation in the anterior insula and dorsal medial PFC. Return sensitivity, on the other hand, increased monotonically across age groups and was associated with increased activation in the ventral medial PFC and posterior cingulate cortex with age. Our results implicate adolescence as a developmental phase of increased neural risk sensitivity. Importantly, this work shows that using a behaviorally validated decision-making framework allows a precise operationalization of key constructs underlying risky choice that inform the interpretation of results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally inducedemotion regulationstrategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates viahabitualuse of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the “cold” deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and—one month later—the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Real-world health and crime statistics indicate that adolescents are prone to engage in risks in the presence of peers. Although this effect has been documented in several lab studies, existing evidence varies and the psychological mechanisms that give rise to peer observation-induced shifts in adolescent risky decision-making remain poorly understood. We conducted a systematic literature review and meta-analysis to quantify the magnitude of the effect of direct peer observation on risky decision-making in adolescents. Across 186 effect sizes, representing data from 53 distinct research reports and over 5,000 participants, we found evidence that during adolescence, observation by peers increases decisions to take risks relative to decisions made while unobserved, with a small mean effect size (Hedges' g = 0.16). We also found high effect size heterogeneity (I2 = 82.63% and τ2 = 0.078), motivating analysis of moderation. We evaluated whether variables hypothesized by theory and prior research to amplify or reduce risk taking in the presence of peers systematically moderated the size of this effect, including factors related to the decision context, the peer context, and the experimental design. The overall effect was moderated by peers' expression of risk-seeking preferences, such that the effect of peer observation was only significant when peers were also expressing pro-risk attitudes. Evidence for publication bias was not consistently observed. Taken together, this work supports the notion that mere peer observation increases adolescent risky decision-making, but this effect is extremely small unless the peers are additionally expressing pro-risk preferences. Moreover, this work provokes questions regarding whether the field's approach to studying peer influence is optimal at conceptual and practical levels, and whether it is maximally translatable to real-world contexts. We offer suggestions for future work that could lead to a clearer understanding of peer observation effects during adolescence. Public Significance Statement: Adolescents are conceptualized as risk-takers in the presence of peers, as evident in real-world health statistics, laws, and policies such as graduated licensing procedures that restrict the number of nonfamily passengers for adolescent drivers. The present meta-analytic review found that peer observation increased adolescents' tendency to make risky decisions, but the effect is small in magnitude and was much greater when peers were expressing pro-risk preferences. We discuss the practical relevance of an effect of this size, provide recommendations to the field for conducting research toward a robust, translatable understanding of the nature of how peers influence preference for risk during adolescence, and discuss implications for policies involving youth decision-making in social contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) are often characterized as possessing excessive self-control and are unusual in their ability to reduce or avoid the consumption of palatable foods. This behavior promotes potentially life-threatening weight loss and suggests disturbances in reward processing. We studied whether individuals with AN showed evidence of increased self-control by examining the tendency to delay receipt of a monetary, non-food related, reward. Underweight AN (n = 36) and healthy controls (HC, n = 28) completed a monetary intertemporal choice task measuring delay discounting factor. Individuals with AN reduced the value of a monetary reward over time significantly less than HC (F[1,61] = 5.03; p = 0.029). Secondary analyses indicated that the restricting subtype of AN, in particular, showed significantly less discounting than HC (F[1,46] = 8.3; p = 0.006). These findings indicate that some individuals with AN show less temporal discounting than HC, suggestive of enhanced self-control that is not limited to food consumption. This is in contrast to other psychiatric disorders, for example, substance abuse, which are characterized by greater discounting. Though preliminary, these findings suggest that excessive self-control may contribute to pathological processes and individuals with AN may have neuropsychological characteristics that enhance their ability to delay reward and thereby may help to maintain persistent food restriction. (JINS, 2012, 18, 1–8) [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Morally challenging decisions tend to be perceived as difficult by decision makers and often lead to post-decisional worry or regret. To test potential causes of these consequences, we employed realistic, morally challenging scenarios with two conflicting choice options. In addition to respondents' choices, we collected various ratings of choice options, decision-modes employed, as well as physiological arousal, assessed via skin conductance. Not surprisingly, option ratings predicted choice, such that the more positively rated option was chosen. However, respondents' self-reported decision modes also independently predicted choice. We further found that simultaneously engaging in decision modes that predict opposing choices increased decision difficulty and post-decision worry. In some cases this was related to increased arousal. Results suggest that at least a portion of the negative consequences associated with morally challenging decisions can be attributed to conflict in the decision modes one engages in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals differ widely in how steeply they discount future rewards. The sources of these stable individual differences in delay discounting (DD) are largely unknown. One candidate is the COMT Val158Met polymorphism, known to modulate prefrontal dopamine levels and affect DD. To identify possible neural mechanisms by which this polymorphism may contribute to stable individual DD differences, we measured 73 participants' neural baseline activation using resting electroencephalogram (EEG). Such neural baseline activation measures are highly heritable and stable over time, thus an ideal endophenotype candidate to explain how genes may influence behavior via individual differences in neural function. After EEG-recording, participants made a series of incentive-compatible intertemporal choices to determine the steepness of their DD. We found that COMT significantly affected DD and that this effect was mediated by baseline activation level in the left dorsal prefrontal cortex (DPFC): (i) COMT had a significant effect on DD such that the number of Val alleles was positively correlated with steeper DD (higher numbers of Val alleles means greater COMT activity and thus lower dopamine levels). (ii) A whole-brain search identified a cluster in left DPFC where baseline activation was correlated with DD; lower activation was associated with steeper DD. (iii) COMT had a significant effect on the baseline activation level in this left DPFC cluster such that a higher number of Val alleles was associated with lower baseline activation. (iv) The effect of COMT on DD was explained by the mediating effect of neural baseline activation in the left DPFC cluster. Our study thus establishes baseline activation level in left DPFC as salient neural signature in the form of an endophenotype that mediates the link between COMT and DD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The likelihood of initiating addictive behaviors is higher during adolescence than during any other developmental period. The differential developmental trajectories of brain regions involved in motivation and control processes may lead to adolescents’ increased risk taking in general, which may be exacerbated by the neural consequences of drug use. Neuroimaging studies suggest that increased risk-taking behavior in adolescence is related to an imbalance between prefrontal cortical regions, associated with executive functions, and subcortical brain regions related to affect and motivation. Dual-process models of addictive behaviors are similarly concerned with difficulties in controlling abnormally strong motivational processes. We acknowledge concerns raised about dual-process models, but argue that they can be addressed by carefully considering levels of description: motivational processes and top-down biasing can be understood as intertwined, co-developing components of more versus less reflective states of processing. We illustrate this with a model that further emphasizes temporal dynamics. Finally, behavioral interventions for addiction are discussed. Insights in the development of control and motivation may help to better understand – and more efficiently intervene in – vulnerabilities involving control and motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Adolescents with a family history of SUD are impulsive in the delay discounting task. • Adolescents with and without family history of SUD did not differ in brain activity. • The delay discounting task engaged the expected reward and control brain regions. • Despite behavioral differences we observed no clear functional brain signatures for SUD risk. Adolescents with a family history (FH+) of substance use disorder (SUD) are at a greater risk for SUD, suggested to be partly due to the transmission of behavioral impulsivity. We used a delay discounting task to compare impulsivity in decision-making and its associated brain functioning among FH+ and FH - minority adolescents. Participants chose between Smaller Sooner (SS) and Larger Later (LL) rewards. The SS was available immediately (Now trials) or in the future (Not-Now trials), allowing for greater differentiation between impulsive decisions. The FH+ group showed greater impatience by responding SS more frequently than the FH - group, only on the Now trials, and even when the relative reward differences (RRD) increased. Surprisingly, there were no differences in brain activity between the groups. Combined, the groups showed greater reward activity during the Now vs. Not-Now trials in medial prefrontal/anterior cingulate, posterior cingulate, precuneus, and inferior frontal gyrus (i.e., an immediacy effect). As the RRD increased activation in the reward network decreased, including the striatum, possibly reflecting easy decision-making. These results indicate that risk for SUD, seen behaviorally among FH+ adolescents, may not yet be associated with discernable brain changes, suggesting that early intervention has the potential to reduce this risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the long‐lasting detrimental effects of internalizing symptoms, there is great need for detecting early risk markers. One promising marker is freezing behavior. Whereas initial freezing reactions are essential for coping with threat, prolonged freezing has been associated with internalizing psychopathology. However, it remains unknown whether early life alterations in freezing reactions predict changes in internalizing symptoms during adolescent development. In a longitudinal study (N = 116), we tested prospectively whether observed freezing in infancy predicted the development of internalizing symptoms from childhood through late adolescence (until age 17). Both longer and absent infant freezing behavior during a standard challenge (robot‐confrontation task) were associated with internalizing symptoms in adolescence. Specifically, absent infant freezing predicted a relative increase in internalizing symptoms consistently across development from relatively low symptom levels in childhood to relatively high levels in late adolescence. Longer infant freezing also predicted a relative increase in internalizing symptoms, but only up until early adolescence. This latter effect was moderated by peer stress and was followed by a later decrease in internalizing symptoms. The findings suggest that early deviations in defensive freezing responses signal risk for internalizing symptoms and may constitute important markers in future stress vulnerability and resilience studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current study focused on the degree to which decision context (deliberative vs. affective) differentially impacted the use of available information about uncertainty (i.e., probability, positive and negative outcome magnitudes, expected value, and variance/risk) when older adults were faced with decisions under risk. In addition, we examined whether individual differences in general mental ability and executive function moderated the associations between age and information use. Participants (N = 96) completed a neuropsychological assessment and the hot (affective) and cold (deliberative) versions of an explicit risk task. Our results did not find a significant Age × Hot/Cold Condition interaction on overall risk-taking. However, we found that older adults were less likely to use the full decision information available regardless of the decision context. This finding suggested more global age differences in information use. Moreover, older adults were less likely to make expected-value sensitive decisions, regardless of the hot/cold context. Finally, we found that low performance on measures of executive functioning, but not general mental ability, appears to be a risk factor for lower information use. This pattern appears in middle age and progressively becomes stronger in older age. The current work provides evidence that common underlying decision processes may operate in risk tasks deemed either affective or deliberative. It further suggests that underlying mechanisms such as information use may be paramount, relative to differences in the affective context. Additionally, individual differences in neuropsychological function may act as a moderator in the tendency to use available information across affective context. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disruption of function of left, but not right, lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) with low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) increased choices of immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. rTMS did not change choices involving only delayed rewards or valuation judgments of immediate and delayed rewards, providing causal evidence for a neural lateral-prefrontal cortex–based self-control mechanism in intertemporal choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Children and adolescents made overall less patient intertemporal choices than young adults. • Each age group (incl. children) took into account delay and amount information. • Sensitivity to amount differences showed a further monotonic increase with age group. • Sensitivity to delays did not differ across children, adolescents, and young adults. • More patient choices with age thus seem driven by changes in amount sensitivity. When choosing between sooner–smaller and later–larger rewards (i.e., intertemporal choices), adults typically prefer later–larger rewards more often than children. Intertemporal choice preferences have been implicated in various impulsivity-related psychopathologies, making it important to understand the underlying mechanisms not only in terms of how reward magnitude and delay affect choice but also in terms of how these mechanisms develop across age. We administered an intertemporal choice paradigm to 60 children (8–11 years), 79 adolescents (14–16 years), and 60 young adults (18–23 years). The paradigm systematically varied amounts and delays of the available rewards, allowing us to identify mechanisms underlying age-related differences in patience. Compared with young adults, both children and adolescents made fewer later–larger choices. In terms of underlying mechanisms, variation in delays, absolute reward magnitudes, and relative amount differences affected choice in each age group, indicating that children showed sensitivity to the same choice-relevant factors as young adults. Sensitivity to both absolute reward magnitude and relative amount differences showed a further monotonic age-related increase, whereas no change in delay sensitivity occurred. Lastly, adolescents and young adults weakly displayed a present bias (i.e., overvaluing immediate vs. future rewards; nonsignificant and trend, respectively), whereas children showed a nonsignificant but opposite pattern, possibly indicating that specifically dealing with future rewards changed with age. These findings shed light on the underlying mechanisms that contribute to the development of patience. By decomposing overt choices, our results suggest that the age-related increase in patience may be driven specifically by stronger sensitivity to amount differences with age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]