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The use of laboratory experiments to study issues in agricultural policy has grown in prominence within the fields of agricultural and environmental economics. Such experiments are often conducted with university students and framed in an abstract manner. This raises questions about whether the findings of these experiments provide reliable insights on the behaviour of actual agents in real settings. We contribute to this methodological debate by analysing the impacts of sample population and framing on behaviour in the experiment and on two policy effects: the direction and the magnitude of the policy impact. We also examine the channels through which differences in results may occur. For this, we test if behaviour is correlated with a set of covariates collected from our samples, including socio‐demographics, social and risk preferences. Our main finding is that the type of subject significantly affects the magnitude of the policy impact. The two populations differ substantially in the representation of key characteristics and preferences, which in consequence affects behaviour in the experiment. We find no significant impact of framing on behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past experiments show systematic differences in contributions to public goods under various framing conditions. Several explanations of these differences have been presented. Some suggest that social frames affect subjects' preferences, while others suggest that framing changes subjects' beliefs about others, and thus in turn affects behavior. In this paper, we test the effect of framing on the level of contributions in a series of public goods games designed to separate the impact of preferences from beliefs in shaping cooperative decisions. This is achieved by implementing a social value orientation measure to elicit social preferences from decision makers, which are then analyzed in concert with reported beliefs about others' cooperation and own contribution decisions from the linear public goods games. While we find mixed results on framing effects, our study demonstrates that preferences and beliefs are significant predictors of cooperation. Furthermore, the degree to which they influence cooperation is either strengthened or weakened by framing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are individuals of higher socio-economic status less ethical than those of lower status? Highly popularised research findings claim that this is the case. This paper provides evidence against this claim, based on data from two large survey experiments with more than 11,000 participants. We prime social status in two heterogeneous samples of the German population and then elicit ethical behaviour in an incentivised experimental task. Thus, our data allows us to study both correlation (using demographic data) and causality (using the priming). Our study rejects the claim that higher social status individuals are less ethical on both accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic deal in the form of a strong international response to address climate change. This outcome came as a surprise for some, as several controversial issues had been postponed from previous conferences, and were expected to complicate the talks in Paris. One related to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (L&D), and potential legal remedies for L&D in the form of compensation payments. This issue had been particularly contentious with some developing countries advocating ideas for climate damage liability, which developed countries were unwilling to include in an agreement. Although the negotiations on L&D secured many positive outcomes, Decision 1/CP.21 adopting the Paris Agreement notes that there is no possibility of claiming liability and financial compensation for developing countries. This article, however, argues that, rather than triggering endless compensation claims disputes, a liability mechanism could actually serve as a commitment and reciprocity device, ultimately increasing global policy ambition. In this regard, this article reports the results of two experiments testing the effects of liability rules on the climate policy investment decisions of two players that differ in wealth and vulnerability. Results show that liability rules imposing a responsibility for precaution on both parties increase cooperation significantly, consequentially minimizing risk of L&D occurrence in the first place. Liability rules could thus not only help to address future losses, but also to drive global mitigation and adaptation ambition. POLICY RELEVANCE The research results presented in this paper suggest that policymakers would be well advised to further intensify negotiations on a climate-related compensation mechanism beyond that already committed to in the Paris Agreement. Our findings show that a compensation mechanism that implements a rather simple negligence rule makes climate cooperation more attractive and rewarding, potentially leading rich and poor nations to boost their investments in mitigation and adaptation for climate protection. Thus, far from opening up a Pandora’s box of endless compensation claims towards industrialized countries, a liability mechanism could make global climate cooperation more effective, and in the longer run also less costly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide critical notes to the paper by Kallis et al. (2013) on monetary valuation. We evaluate the four criteria they propose for assessing valuation studies. We argue that no clear distinction is made between monetary valuation and pricing instruments. The selected criteria are more relevant to assessing policy than monetary valuation. The examples provided are not representative of the diversity of valuation studies encountered in the literature. Moreover, no clear examples are provided of where valuation and associated cost–benefit analysis of environmental policy go wrong. We plea for a more fair, constructive and consistent criticism of all “valuation languages” and offer relevant issues for consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]