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The objective of this work is to analyze how social networks coevolve with other dimensions of agents' choice. We present a model where agents choose their neighbors as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games, i.e. games where an individual's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. Links are costly. The cost of a link is shared between the two individuals involved in it, but not necessarily in a symmetric way. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the resulting social game and show how this set shrinks as the shares of the link cost are more equal. In the extreme case in which each agent pays half of the cost, there is a unique equilibrium. We also show that, as usual in the literature of network formation, there is a general misalignment between the stable and efficient states of the game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we address the general question of how social influence determines collective outcomes for large populations of individuals faced with binary decisions. First, we define conditions under which the behavior of individuals making binary decisions can be described in terms of what we call an influence-response function: a one-dimensional function of the (weighted) number of individuals choosing each of the alternatives. And second, we demonstrate that, under the assumptions of global and anonymous interactions, general knowledge of the influence-response functions is sufficient to compute equilibrium, and even non-equilibrium, properties of the collective dynamics. By enabling us to treat in a consistent manner classes of decisions that have previously been analyzed separately, our framework allows us to find similarities between apparently quite different kinds of decision situations, and conversely to identify important differences between decisions that would otherwise appear very similar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]