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Uncertainty is a fact of political life but not a fact of political communication. Elites are prone to make confident predictions and downplay uncertainty about future outcomes, presumably fearing that the acknowledgement of uncertainty would undermine public confidence in their predictions and the evidence they are based on. But this calculation might both exaggerate the costs and downplay the potential benefits of reporting uncertainty. On costs, the evidence from previous studies is mixed; on benefits, previous research has neglected the possibility that, by acknowledging that outcomes may be worse than expected, those communicating uncertainty will dampen public reactions to the bad news. Here, based on a two-stage online survey experiment (N = 2,165) from December 2020 about COVID-19 vaccines, we find results suggesting that governments are well advised to communicate uncertainty. The costs at Stage 1 were low: reporting a confidence interval around the safety and effectiveness of a hypothetical COVID-19 vaccine did not undermine belief in the statistics or intentions to take the vaccine. And there were indeed benefits at Stage 2: when outcomes turned out to be worse than expected but within that confidence interval, confidence in the vaccine was partly insulated from negative effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a national sample of 5087 Spaniards, we examine the prevalence of 10 specific misperceptions over five separate science and health domains (climate change, 5G technology, genetically modified foods, vaccines, and homeopathy). We find that misperceptions about genetically modified foods and general health risks of 5G technology are particularly widespread. While we find that partisan affiliation is not strongly associated with any of the misperceptions aside from climate change, we find that two distinct dimensions of an anti-elite worldview—anti-expert and conspiratorial mindsets—are better overall predictors of having science and health misperceptions in the Spanish context. These findings help extend our understanding of polarization around science beyond the most common contexts (e.g. the United States) and support recent work suggesting anti-elite sentiments are among the most important predictors of factual misperceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many residents of high-income countries (HICs) were eligible for COVID-19 vaccine boosters, while many residents of lower-income countries (LICs) had not yet received a first dose. HICs made some efforts to contribute to COVID-19 vaccination efforts in LICs, but these efforts were limited in scale. A new literature discusses the normative importance of an international redistribution of vaccines. Our analysis contributes an empirical perspective on the willingness of citizens in a HIC to contribute to such efforts (which we term international vaccine solidarity). We analyse the levels and predictors of international vaccine solidarity. We surveyed a representative sample of German adults (n = 2019) who participated in a two-wave YouGov online survey (w1: Sep 13–21, 2021 and w2: Oct 4–13, 2021). International vaccine solidarity is measured by asking respondents preferences for sharing vaccine supplies internationally versus using that supply as boosters for the domestic population. We examine a set of pre-registered hypotheses. Almost half of the respondents in our sample (48%) prioritize giving doses to citizens in less developed countries. A third of respondents (33%) prefer to use available doses as boosters domestically, and a fifth of respondents (19%) did not report a preference. In line with our hypotheses, respondents higher in cosmopolitanism and empathy, and those who support domestic redistribution exhibit more support for international dose-sharing. Older respondents (who might be more at risk) do not consistently show less support for vaccine solidarity. These results help us to get a better understanding of the way citizens' form preferences about a mechanism that redistributes medical supplies internationally during a global crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background In an ongoing public health crisis, the question of why some people are unwilling to take vaccines with particular attributes is an especially pertinent one, since low rates of vaccination mean that it will take longer for many nations to exit the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Methods In this article, we conduct a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Hungary (N  = 2512), where respondents were asked about their attitudes towards hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines whose characteristics varied across a number of attributes. Results Results indicate that vaccine attributes matter for the likelihood of uptake when it comes to the prevalence of severe side effects, efficacy and country of origin. Moreover, we find that our pre-treatment measure of institutional trust moderates the effect of our treatment, as differences in vaccine attributes are larger for those with robust levels of institutional trust compared to those with weaker levels. Conclusion Our findings suggest that institutional trust matters when it comes to understanding the relationship between vaccine attributes and likelihood of uptake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people prefer one particular COVID-19 vaccine over another? We conducted a pre-registered conjoint experiment (n = 5,432) in France, Germany, and Sweden in which respondents rated the favorability of and chose between pairs of hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines. Differences in effectiveness and the prevalence of side-effects had the largest effects on vaccine preferences. Factors with smaller effects include country of origin (respondents are less favorable to vaccines of Chinese and Russian origin), and vaccine technology (respondents exhibited a small preference for hypothetical mRNA vaccines). The general public also exhibits sensitivity to additional factors (e.g. how expensive the vaccines are). Our data show that vaccine attributes are more important for vaccine preferences among those with higher vaccine favorability and higher risk tolerance. In our conjoint design, vaccine attributes–including effectiveness and side-effect prevalence–appear to have more muted effects among the most vaccine hesitant respondents. The prevalence of side-effects, effectiveness, country of origin and vaccine technology (e.g., mRNA vaccines) determine vaccine acceptance, but they matter little among the vaccine hesitant. Vaccine hesitant people do not find a vaccine more attractive even if it has the most favorable attributes. While the communication of vaccine attributes is important, it is unlikely to convince those who are most vaccine hesitant to get vaccinated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does emphasizing the pandemic as a partisan issue polarize factual beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions concerning the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic? To answer this question, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment with a "questions as treatment" design in late March 2020 with 1587 U.S. respondents recruited via Prime Panel. Respondents were randomly assigned to answer several questions about then-president Donald J. Trump and the coronavirus (including receiving an information cue by evaluating one of Trump's tweets) either at the beginning of the survey (treated condition) or at the end of the survey (control condition). Receiving these questions at the beginning of the survey had no direct effect on COVID-19 factual beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries implemented restrictions to limit the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. travel restrictions and lockdowns). One path to loosening restrictions is to do so selectively only for vaccinated individuals (e.g. by implementing vaccine passports domestically or as a prerequisite for international travel). Setting different rules based on people's vaccination status is however a contentious issue among health policy experts, government officials, and the public. Our analysis focuses on the levels and correlates of public support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinated in April 2021, i.e. at a time when restrictions were in place and a selective lifting of these restrictions just for the vaccinated was debated in Europe. We use representative quota samples of the populations of France (N = 1,752), Germany (N = 1,759), and Sweden (N = 1,754). We find that a slight plurality support lifting restrictions for the vaccinated in France and Germany but not in Sweden. Vaccine hesitancy emerges as strong predictor of opposition to such a policy. Additionally, individuals who are already vaccinated (in France and Germany) and who are higher in risk-seeking express more support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinated. We discuss implications for the debate on vaccine passports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]