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This paper examines how international education (IE), as an important tool of public diplomacy (PD) and soft power (SP), faces unique challenges as issues of national security (NS) become more prominent in this era of new geopolitics. It presents a model to understand the relationship between PD, SP and NS and then applies this model to a comparative study. The contrasting histories, approaches and perspectives of IE as it operates as a component of foreign policy and at the nexus of PD, SP and NS in both the U.S. and Canada are analysed. The paper concludes with three challenges faced by IE in the contemporary context: first, the diminishing role of the university as a distinct and valued non-state actor; second, the weakening of foreign policy as an outward looking, distinctly international investment; and third, the problem with choosing isolation over engagement as a strategy.

Little research has examined public diplomacy as a comparative education issue, particularly regarding social-psychological, economic and political fears or personal and national insecurities. This paper discusses American public diplomacy as a mostly Cold War strategy adapted to post-9/11 national security interests, fears and desires. It further explores differences, similarities, and debates in Canadian media, policy documents and academia, in response to American political, economic and military pressures or demands for a "North American" (i.e. joint American-Canadian) security approach. From a critical pedagogy perspective the paper argues that modern public diplomacy has been a dubious, pseudo-educational, fear-mongering concept nurtured by academics, politicians and military leaders as part of an American foreign policy, military security and propaganda strategy. The paper further shows that post-9/11 Canada, problematically, adapted its own public diplomacy policies to serve American interests. Further research is needed to examine more closely public diplomacy's impacts on Canadian education. (Contains 1 note.)

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Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Besieged by insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and gripped by mounting pressure to enhance security and public safety at home, officials in Washington and Ottawa are now confronted with a serious homeland security dilemma: the greater the financial costs, public sacrifice and political capital invested in security, the higher the public's expectations and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the more significant the public's sense of insecurity after each failure, and, paradoxically, the higher the pressure on governments and citizens to sacrifice even more to achieve perfect security. The paradox of security dilemmas at the international level (Jervis, 1976, 1978) explains why perfectly rational decisions to enhance power actually diminish security by promoting unstable spirals in competitive defence spending--a common account of escalating military budgets throughout much of the Cold War. The homeland security dilemma represents the post-9/l I equivalent for domestic politics in the war on terrorism. The paper's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need, not because enhancing security makes terrorism more likely (although the incentive for terrorists to attack may increase as extremists feel duty bound to demonstrate their ongoing relevance), but because enormous investments in security inevitably raise public expectations and amplify public out-rage after subsequent failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As of November 2017, 60 known foreign terrorist fighters have been permitted to return and live in Canada without criminal consequence. The reason for this, according to the Minister of Public Safety, is the problem of using information collected for intelligence purposes as evidence in criminal proceedings. Often referred to as the “intelligence to evidence” (I2E) dilemma, this challenge has plagued Canada’s terrorism prosecutions since the Air India bombing in 1985. Yet, not all countries struggle to bring terrorists to justice. Canada’s prosecution statistics pale in comparison to the United Kingdom. In a democracy committed to upholding the rule of law and respecting human rights, prosecuting terrorists is the strongest and most transparent deterrent to this threat. This article argues that as the threat of terrorism grows both domestically and abroad, Canada must learn from the UK’s experience and reform the rules of evidence to ensure that criminal charges are pursued. This article will outline and compare the relevant Canadian and UK rules of evidence and assess their practical implications for national security prosecutions in light of primary research conducted in London in the fall of 2017. It concludes with a series of legislative and organizational reforms to improve the efficiency of Canadian terrorism trials. As of November 2017, 60 known foreign terrorist fighters have been permitted to return and live in Canada without criminal consequence. The reason for this, according to the Minister of Public Safety, is the problem of using information collected for intelligence purposes as evidence in criminal proceedings. Often referred to as the “intelligence to evidence” (I2E) dilemma, this challenge has plagued Canada’s terrorism prosecutions since the Air India bombing in 1985. Yet, not all countries struggle to bring terrorists to justice. Canada’s prosecution statistics pale in comparison to the United Kingdom. In a democracy committed to upholding the rule of law and respecting human rights, prosecuting terrorists is the strongest and most transparent deterrent to this threat. This article argues that as the threat of terrorism grows both domestically and abroad, Canada must learn from the UK’s experience and reform the rules of evidence to ensure that criminal charges are pursued. This article will outline and compare the relevant Canadian and UK rules of evidence and assess their practical implications for national security prosecutions in light of primary research conducted in London in the fall of 2017. It concludes with a series of legislative and organizational reforms to improve the efficiency of Canadian terrorism trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First - ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second - instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff - while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third - drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth - overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic - alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth - creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lester Crawford, acting commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, is worried that the importation of cheap pharmaceuticals could expose people in The U.S. to attack from bioterrorists. In an interview with the journal Associated Press, he raised the potential contamination of imported drugs as a threat to national security. In practice, the imports come mainly from Canada, where drugs are subject to government price controls. They are increasingly sanctioned by state governments in the United States, where citizens are tiring of paying inflated prices for medicines.