Search

Copyright of Mural Internacional is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article represents the first attempt to examine the Chinese elite's threat perception of Japan using statistics to analyse what, if any, differences exist among the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese economic institutes. It seeks to answer two questions that have not previously been addressed in the literature. First, has there been a change in perception of the Japanese threat in these three sectors over time? And if so, what can we deduce about the causes of this change? This study finds that there have indeed been two major shifts in China's threat perception of Japan since the 1980s, one in the late 1980s and the other in the mid-1990s. It also finds that there were no differences between sectors as to the direction and timing of these shifts. It suggests that Japan's military build-up in the late 1980s and the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance from 1996 onwards are what prompted these shifts in China's threat perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Alustath is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the increase in Japanese military spending and the reasons for this shift in policy. The 1980 Defense White Paper has communicated to the Japanese government that their Self Defense Forces are inadequate to meet current needs. Despite this, the author posits that Japan, while increasing its defense budget, will still depend on a strong relationship with the U.S. as a strategic deterrent. This means that Japan will continue to follow the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

In this article, we seek to advance the theoretic and empirical literature on the diversionary use of force. We argue that state leaders are more likely to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior when opposition groups from within the winning coalition press for policy changes, but the government rejects those policy demands. Only when domestic unrest threatens a loss of political support from groups that are politically important to the leadership do we expect leaders to try and rally their support through heightened international conflict. We test this argument in an analysis of Japanese foreign policy behavior from 1890 to 1941 regarding (i) the initiation of military threats, (ii) concessions in negotiations, and (iii) the escalation of military confrontations. Drawing upon new data sets collected on Japanese domestic politics and foreign relations, we find strong support for our argument in a series of statistical tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author examines the wielding of Japanese economic power in multilateral talks on North Korea. The policy is particularly effective when dealing with the United States, the article notes. The author examines the role played by Japan in nuclear negotiations concerning North Korea. He expresses the view that Japan's foreign policy and security concerns are in league with the degree of political power it has acquired, commensurate with its economic might. Among other issues Japan's re-militarisation is examined.

The article analyzes how Japan's leaders have sliced away at many of the restrictions on Japan's use of force and explores how the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) served as a model for what has been a stealthy enhancement of Japan's military capabilities. Although the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) operates a large fleet of ships, it still lacks the offensive or defensive capability to act as a full-fledged naval force. The enhancement of the JCG must be assessed as an adjunct to and multiplier of the capabilities of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Discusses the postwar Japan-China relations. Indications of poor Sino-Japanese relations; Reason behind the unwillingness of the Chinese society to accept Japan as a normal country; Factors which contribute to a more active Japanese foreign and defense policy.

The article shares the author's insights on the containment effort of the U.S. to retain its position as a major power in Asia which results to a struggle with China. The author points out that the U.S. containment of China depends on the chain of military bases in China's periphery. Vietnam on the other hand, represents the chain's anchor in Southeast Asia with its vast ports and airfields and its commitment to the American troops. The author cites that the U.S. military bases in Japan are responsible for the country's defense, yet the U.S. failed to link Japan to the containment policy. He suggested that the U.S. should refrain from military maneuvering in order to force Japan into a deeper commitment with its interests and to encourage increasing contacts between Japan and China.