Search

Social science can be a useful tool for courts when deciding upon issues relating to poverty, as it can provide information about the societal realities of the matter in question. This paper explores the use of social science evidence in poverty law-related Charter claims, looking at the specific example of Bedford v Canada (Attorney General). Bedford was a Charter application that ultimately struck down three provisions in the Criminal Code as unconstitutional because they interfered with sex workers' abilities to protect themselves against violence. Social science evidence played a vital role in the decision, demonstrating its effectiveness in these types of claims. The Supreme Court of Canada also made two important rulings in Bedford that increased the Court's recognition of the legitimacy of social science facts. This paper concludes that social science evidence is an essential aspect of many poverty-related Charter claims and that a solution should be found for ensuring that there is funding available for impoverished persons bringing these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada's seminal decision R v Gladue enunciated principles that recognized systemic bias and inter-generational trauma leading to the overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples in incarcerated populations. Now, nearly a quarter century later, longevolving efforts to meaningfully include Indigenous Peoples within colonial legal systems have focused primarily on Indigenous Peoples' interactions with the criminal justice system. Such efforts have yet to meaningfully reconcile Indigenous legal orders with Canada's civil justice system. This paper surveys the historical development of Canada's judicial approaches to reconciliation, and within that context, posits applications of Gladue principles to contemporary civil litigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Punitive damages are a controversial remedy in Canadian and non-Canadian law. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that punitive damages are entirely inconsistent with the goals and principles of private law and ought to be abolished. Notwithstanding these criticisms, the Supreme Court of Canada has treated punitive damages as a relatively uncontroversial private law remedy. However, the circumstances under which a court will consider awarding punitive damages have evolved with recent Supreme Court decisions. One example is the introduction of the independent actionable wrong requirement in Vorvis v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia. The independent actionable wrong requirement has been criticized as an incoherent and ineffective check on the availability of punitive damages. Moreover, the duty of honest contractual performance introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew has added a new and readily available source of an independent actionable wrong. This paper addresses two main issues. First, it discusses and rebuts various theoretical objections to the availability of punitive damages in private law. It then provides a cogent theoretical justification for the availability of the remedy. Second, the paper discusses the impact that the duty recognized in Bhasin may have on the availability of punitive damages. Ultimately, this paper argues that the duty recognized in Bhasin has crystallized the practical and theoretical irrelevance of the independent actionable wrong requirement and, consequently, that the requirement should be eliminated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically examines the decision making of the justices on the Supreme Court of Canada after the enactment of the Charter and before and after the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) to determine if the levels of judicial activism on the Court have changed. The term judicial activism is used by academics, journalists, and citizens alike but the phenomenon is ill defined and often used as a pejorative term. The field of law, particularly in traditional doctrinal analysis, has been reluctant to adopt this approach, as few legal scholars have attempted to understand the phenomenon using empirical methodology. This paper adopts a hybrid content analysis empirical approach to depict the elusive, but widely cited, occurrence of"judicial activism"in Canada. Drawing upon an adapted and critiqued version of Cohn and Kremnitzer's"multidimensional model of judicial activism", this paper argues that there have been statistically significant shifts in judicial behaviour since 9/11. The Cohn and Kremnitzer model measures activism across multiple dimensions and this paper argues that empirical measurements of the phenomenon of"judicial activism"can contribute to broader understandings of the Canadian Supreme Court's approaches to justice. In doing so, this paper projects two significant findings: firstly, that using a hybrid content analysis to analyse activism complements and challenges the existing methods for critiquing judicial behaviour and assessing judicial activism, and secondly, that the current approaches to understanding complex legal phenomena can be complemented and supplemented using empirical methodology [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Themis: Revista de Derecho is the property of Themis Asociacion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper engages critically with the new orthodoxy holding that individuals have a "right" to know their genetic origins and that such knowledge is crucial to realizing their identities. It examines two case studies: the Pratten litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding anonymous donor conception and scholarship approving a reform to Quebec's adoption law. It addresses the supposed "identity gap" between those who are adopted or donor-conceived and those who are neither. Arguments for law reform exaggerate that gap, opposing the incomplete, insecure identity of the adopted or donorconceived to the ostensibly complete, secure identity of those raised by their putatively genetic parents. A result is to overstate what is distinct and harmful about being adopted or donor-conceived. The paper also identifies a mistaken perception of law's role in fashioning identity and recognizing family ties, including what law does for those who are not adopted or donor-conceived and what it might do for those who are. Some claims for law reform in the service of identity expect more from law than it can or should provide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of the contract of employment in its wrongful dismissal jurisprudence over the last 25 years, with the aim of challenging the view that only by exempting the contract of employment from the ordinary workings of contract doctrine or by resorting to public policy considerations can the common law of dismissal provide adequate protection for employees. The Court's jurisprudence reveals a commitment to what this paper calls the presumption of employer freedom, a view of the contract of employment which has its origins in the status-based master and servant relationship and which continues to permeate the common law of wrongful dismissal. This paper offers a more straightforwardly contract-based account of these same entitlements, grounding them not in policy but instead in the work-for-wages exchange at the core of the contract of employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Law enforcement uses surveillance to gather evidence about suspects. This is facilitated by advances in technologies. But these advances also create new dilemmas for privacy and its regulation and protection. This paper aims to understand how changing technologies and contexts affect the conceptualisation of privacy through an examination of decisions made in the Supreme Court of Canada. The paper concludes by identifying two sets of distinctions made in the judgements which highlight firstly, the dangers of making analogies with human senses and, secondly, the importance of recognizing differences between the degrees of attention paid by others to our activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Association of Internet Providers [2004] 2 SCR 427 is significant for two reasons: (a) the Canadian Supreme Court held that Internet Service Providers should be exempted from copyright liability as long as they provide only a conduit service in transmitting copyright materials between Internet users (a point which is consistent with many national copyright laws); (b) the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that the appropriate test to determine whether an infringement for the unauthorized transmission of online copyright material has occurred within the Canadian jurisdiction is the 'real and substantial connection' test (LeBel J, however, dissented and was of the view that the correct test to apply is the 'host server' test). This paper studies these two tests as propounded by the Canadian Supreme Court and assesses their strengths and weaknesses, especially in light of the territoriality principle in copyright law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Canadian Supreme Court's 1998 decision on whether Quebec has a right to secede was initially lauded for granting both the federal government and secessionists their due. The Court found there to be an implicit Constitutional right for Quebec to secede, but by negotiation of the terms, not one-sided action. It thus deemed secession both a legal and a political phenomenon. This paper critically reassesses the decision in light especially of recent discussions about constitutionalizing secession. It argues that while a right to "nonunilateral" secession is warranted on general moral-political grounds, it should not be encoded or interpreted as a constitutional right, nor should it be called upon except to avoid systematic injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public support for legal recognition of same-sex marriage increased markedly in Canada over the course of the 1990s. The argument of this paper is that a sequence of Supreme Court decisions in the realm of same-sex relationship recognition—and the legislative activity that followed as a result—played a pivotal role in shaping public opinion on this issue. It is argued that the impact of these institutions was twofold. First, by framing the issue as one of equal rights, the courts and legislatures induced many Canadians to weigh equality-related considerations more heavily in the formation of opinions on same-sex marriage. Second, legal recognition of same-sex relationships directly persuaded many Canadians that such recognition was legitimate. The paper uses data from the Canadian Election Studies for 1993, 1997 and 2000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study uses strategic behaviour, leadership change, and feminist theories to examine patterns of judicial activity by the three post-Charter chief justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. Building on prior scholarship, we use various methods to examine patterns of majority voting, dissenting activity, opinion writing, ideological voting, and panel size across the 1973 to 2014 period. While Chief Justices Lamer and Dickson exhibited clear patterns of task leadership, we find strong evidence of strategic change by Chief Justice McLachlin following her elevation to chief. She moved from a prolific dissenter as a puisne justice to a chief who exhibited behaviour of both a task leader and a social leader, which scholars see as highly uncommon. Her efforts to solidify her central role as a collegial leader within her own court, which took place during a period of increasing panel sizes and a shrinking court docket, are remarkable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst heightened contemporary debate over mechanisms to improve Indigenous democratic engagement, the vehicle of constitutional intervention warrants study. This article proposes that increased Indigenous intervention in constitutional litigation may prove a valuable tool for increased Indigenous influence over Indigenous affairs. Given the scarcity of empirical scholarship in this field, quantitative and qualitative analysis is undertaken on the High Court's approach to Indigenous interventions in constitutional cases between January 2012 and June 2023. Despite historic criticism of the High Court's reluctant and inconsistent approach towards non-party intervention generally, this analysis suggests the Court may hold a larger-than-anticipated appetite to hear from Indigenous voices in constitutional litigation. Subsequently, by drawing on the expansive constitutional intervention practice by Aboriginal Canadians in the Supreme Court of Canada, an argument is advanced for increased Indigenous interventions in the High Court. Three distinct advantages are identified from such practice: (1) the clarification of 'constitutional facts'; (2) the provision of pertinent 'social facts'; and (3) its normative value. This article concludes with consideration of the divergent constitutional frameworks and procedures between Canada and Australia as potential -- but arguably not fatal -- impediments to increased Indigenous constitutional intervention in Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright owners' exclusive right to communicate to the public includes the 'making available' of a work, as set out in the WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996. The right has been implemented in countries such as Australia and Canada, however, the overlap between the 'making available' aspect of the communication right and the reproduction right remains unresolved. The Supreme Court of Canada has sought to limit overlaps between these rights. In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Entertainment Software Association of Canada ('SOCAN v ESA'), the Court held that when a person makes a durable copy of a work available for download, this is not a communication of a work to the public, but merely an 'authorisation' of its reproduction, and therefore an exercise of the reproduction right. The Canadian approach and sentiment towards overlaps may be contrasted with that of Australian courts, which tend to take overlaps in protection as a given, and show limited concern about double dipping or doctrinal clarity. The National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd case and relatively recent cases involving Redbubble Ltd decided by the Federal Court of Australia are examples of this. In drawing out lessons from the groundbreaking SOCAN v ESA decision, this article prompts Australian courts to interpret the communication right in a careful and considered manner that limits overlaps in protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a general approach by examining foundational issues, and the primary focus is on a single jurisdiction: Canada. It outlines the current legal criteria for euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada, identifying differences in criteria for the procedures set by the Supreme Court of Canada, Quebec's unique provincial euthanasia law, and the Criminal Code. Commentary drawing from anecdotal reports from eight dissenting physicians offers some insight into their experience since legalization ol the procedures. Material from the public record provides additional context, and the commentary is informed by difficulties that have arisen in relation to morally contested procedures. The experience of dissenting physicians is affected by a number of variables, including cultural and social dynamics, differing beliefs, differing moral and social sensitivity and individual personalities. Four sources of stress are identified: the demand for collaboration in killing, the prospect of punishment, the continuing need to distinguish between cooperation and collaboration, and concern for their patients. Particular concerns of palliative care physicians are discussed, as well as concerns shared by other dissenting physicians. A detailed review of the moral underpinnings of the trial court decision in Carter v. Canada demonstrates that morality precedes and drives law. From this it is argued that a judge will either assume or construct a moral justification that supports a decision, even if this is not explicitly articulated in legal reasoning. These assertions are tested against the ruling of the Irish High Court in Fleming v. Ireland & Ors, which came to radically different conclusions about the risks presented by legalization oi assisted suicide and euthanasia. An extensive discussion distinguishes the obligation to kill from the more familiar authorization or justification of killing. An obligation to kill can be based upon a contract model of obligation, a social contract (professional) model, and a fiduciary model, each with increasingly serious consequences. To allow the state to enforce an obligation to kill under any of the three models is subversive of life, liberty and security of the person, even before issues of freedom of conscience and religion are considered. In addition, the implications of an obligation to kill suggest that, in the long term, assisted-suicideonly regimes are likely to be unstable. Legislative developments demonstrate that the government of Canada supports totalitarian claims seeking total domination of will and intellect in moral decision-making, even in matters of life and death. The ground for this was prepared by demands that dissenting physicians should be forced to refer for abortion and contraception, which established popular support for the erroneous and incoherent principle that there can be a moral duty to do what one believes to be wrong. The Carter ruling formally rati feld a new establishment orthodoxy, according to which refusing to at least collaborate in killing in circumstances defned by Carter is unacceptable. This new orthodoxy can be expected to operate at a foundational level, exerting a significant infuence that may not be immediately obvious. A defense of freedom oi conscience and religion must take this into account. In particular, the medico-legal establishment sees the exercise of ffeedom of conscience and religion through the dogmatic lens of the new orthodoxy. Dissenting physicians are viewed as heretics threatening an establishment theory of social contract. This is dogmatic moral imperialism, and not less so because the dogmatists are not ecclesiastical theorists and functionaries. It should be identifed as such. Again, foundational moral beliefs shape jurisprudence. Judges should be challenged to candidly acknowledge and precisely articulate the philosophical or moral premises underpinning their positions. Similarly, what lies at the root ol current controversies about ffeedom ol conscience and religion is fundamental disagreement about the nature of the human person. Thus, judges should clearly acknowledge the credal concept of the human person that informs the evaluation of evidence and legal reasoning. Finally, freedom of conscience is exercised in two different ways. The first is by pursuing some good that one thinks should be done; call this perfective freedom of conscience, because the pursuit of the good as one understands it is thought to be perfective of the human person. The second is refusing to do what one believes to be wrong; call this preservative freedom of conscience, or preservative of personal integrity. No polity could long exist without restrictions of some sort on human acts, so some limitation of perfective freedom of conscience is not unexpected. On the other hand, suppressing preservative freedom of conscience by compelling people to serve ends they find morally abhorrent reduces them to a form of servitude that cannot be reconciled with principles of equality. It is inconsistent with the best traditions and aspirations of liberal democracy, since it instils attitudes more suited to totalitarian regimes than to the demands of responsible freedom. It arguably imposes upon them a particularly odious form of involuntary servitude, which is all but forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This does not mean that no restriction can ever be placed on preservative freedom ol conscience. It does mean, however, that if the restriction can be justified at all, it will only be as a last resort and only in the most exceptional circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The workload of the Supreme Court of Canada is shared among the Court's nine members, but is this sharing equal with respect to the writing of judgments? A simple count does not provide an answer because not all cases are equally important. This paper develops an objective measure of case importance--the Legal Complexity Index--and applies it to the cases decided by the McLachlin Court. It demonstrates that judgment-delivery opportunities for significant cases have not been shared equally, either overall or with respect to any of the major subdivisions of the caseload. Some judges enjoy the spotlight, while others are relegated to the margins. An assessment of the major correlates of this inequality--gender, seniority, and the "Chief Justice factor"--indicates that their combined impact poses a significant challenge for the Court. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Bar Review is the property of Canadian Bar Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Disability rights organizations have been active participants before the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) since the mid-1980s but they have been completely neglected in the literature on social movement legal mobilization. This paper seeks to remedy this lacuna by providing an overview of the litigation activity of the main disability rights organizations. It builds on an emerging complementary theoretical perspective for understanding the participation by movement actors in the Court. Through an analysis of shared and contested collective meaning frames within and across social movement organizations we can complement existing theoretical explanations for the overall development of legal mobilization by social movement actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author examines the role of international law on the development of Canada's security certificate regime. On the one hand, international law has had a perceptible impact on judicial reasoning, contributing to judges' increased willingness to recognize the rights of non-citizens named in certificates and to envision better ways of balancing national security and human rights. On the other hand, the judiciary's attitudes towards international law as non-binding sources of insight akin to foreign law has reinforced disparities in levels of rights afforded by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and those afforded by international human rights. Viewed skeptically, one might argue that the judiciary's selective result-oriented use of international law and foreign law helped it spread a veneer of legality over an otherwise unaltered and discriminatory certificate regime. Reviewing Charkaoui I and II in international context, the author suggests an alternative account. He suggests that the judiciary's use of international law and foreign law, although highly ambiguous and ambivalent, both was principled and has progressively brought named persons' Charter rights more closely in step with their international human rights. Although the current balance between national security and human rights is imperfect, the way in which aspects of Canada's certificate regime have been improved suggests that international law is a valuable resource for protecting the rights of non-citizens in Canada. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Native Studies is the property of Brandon University, CJNS, Faculty of Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) released its unanimous reasons for judgment in R v Powley. Powley was--and remains--the high court's only consideration of Métis rights, as "[A]boriginal rights," protected by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In addition to setting out the legal test for the establishment of Métis section 35 rights, Powley slayed a multitude of Métis rights denial dragons that had emerged over the generations, including two of the dragons most often relied on by governments: (1) that difficulties in identifying Métis rights-holders, and, (2) competing Métis representation claims made Crown inaction in relation to Métis rights justifiable. Instead of accepting these arguments, the SCC in Powley recognized a positive Crown duty to negotiate with the Métis. The author, who is a Métis lawyer that has been involved in much of the Métis rights litigation and negotiations that have occurred over the last seventeen years, argues that Powley and this duty have been effectively leveraged by rights-bearing Métis communities from Ontario westward to secure several significant negotiated agreements as well as keep most of the slayed Métis rights denial dragons at bay. This article goes on to review a disconcerting 2016 decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench on Métis consultation, which, if applied further, has the potential to re-invigorate these most duplicitous dragons. In Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta, while the trial judge recognized that Métis harvesting rights had been accommodated in the Fort Chipewyan area, the court accepted the Alberta government's arguments that difficulty in identifying the "proper rights-holder" and the potential of competing Métis claims were justifications for Crown inaction and its position of consulting with no Métis whatsoever. The author argues that the court's flawed reasoning in Fort Chipewyan turns Powley and the Crown's positive duties owing to the Métis on their head as well as has the potential to see the two above-noted Métis rights denial dragons take flight again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has historically been a crime in Canada to provide assistance to someone in ending their own life, however, this paradigm was inverted in 2015 when the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled that restrictions on this practice, within certain defined parameters, violated the right to life, liberty, and security of the person. Subsequently, recent legal and policy decisions have highlighted the issue of how to balance the rights of individuals to access MAiD with the rights of care providers to exercise conscience-based objections to participation in this process. We argue that there is significant harm and ethical hazard in disregarding individual and institutional rights to conscientious objection and since measures less coercive than the threat of regulatory or economic sanctions do exist, there should be no justification for such threats in Canada's health care systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the progression of s. 11(b) Charter jurisprudence, the impact of trial delays, and the possibility of replacing the remedy of a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter with a system of costs. It further critiques the Senate of Canada's recommendations to reduce trial delays. The article argues that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v Jordan fails to facilitate meaningful long-term change yet implementing a system of costs would further perpetuate trial delays. Ultimately, changes to the current structure and operation of the criminal justice system are required to immediately reduce trial delays beyond the current Jordan ceilings. All participants of the criminal justice system should strive towards the further reduction the ceilings for trial delay in Canada. Without these changes, the culture of complacency towards trial delay will continue to erode the s. 11(b) Charter rights of accused persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif 's ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary seeks to excavate Captain Latif 's fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically analyzes the Court's claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of McGill Journal of Law & Health / Revue de Droit et Santé de McGill is the property of McGill Journal of Law & Health and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What do the BCE case of 2008, the Securities Reference case of 2010, the Senate Reform Reference case of 2014, and the Carter (assisted suicide) case of 2015 have in common? All are unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in which the reasons for judgment--the explanation as to why the outcome is the legally and constitutionally appropriate one--are not attributed to any specific named judge or judges on the Supreme Court, but rather to a mysterious entity called THE COURT. Very few Supreme Court decisions take this form, and there was a time not that long ago when no headline-worthy decision ever did--this is a practice that emerged on an identifiable date with a trackable history. Moreover, it is a purely Canadian story--it is not part of the legacy of English law, not something that crossed from south of the border by imitative osmosis, not an idea copied from anybody else. It is something that was developed by Canadian judges, that emerged in response to a very specific Canadian event, and that has evolved since that first experience. This Commentary identifies and explores this underappreciated and understudied judicial innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent American debates about the relationship between the historic political compromises underlying constitutional provisions and their contemporary judicial application have been largely ignored in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has only twice referred to originalism--and never positively. But in two 2014 decisions about how central institutions of government--the Senate and the Supreme Court of Canada itself--might be changed, the Court relied on the underlying historic political compromises to interpret the Constitution, rejecting arguments from the text or democratic principle. In this article, I consider how Canadian courts have looked to history in the past and in the 2014 decisions, and I situate their approach within contemporary theories of originalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes in Canadian copyright law have prompted Canada's educational institutions to reexamine their need for a blanket copying license. Users' rights under the amended Copyright Act now include fair dealing for purposes of education, and the Supreme Court has established that copying short excerpts for classroom use can qualify as fair dealing. This study looks at one university's examination of copied course materials made available via library reserve, coursepacks and its learning management system, and likely sources for copyright permissions, when needed. Results suggest that fair dealing is the most important and the institution's blanket license is the least important basis for permissions clearance over a semester's worth of copying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the process of drafting of new constitutional rights by the Supreme Court of Canada especially when it comes to labor laws and the right to strike and discusses the need for invoking the use of Charter section 33 which is the legislative override provision.

The article compares the constitutional right to a jury trial including the right to select a jury from a representative cross-section of jury in the U.S. and Canada. Topics discussed include how the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court have defined the fair cross-section of the community, crisis of Aboriginal underrepresentation on coroner and petit juries in Ontario, Canada and fair cross-section arguments were marshalled by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in Boston Marathon bombing case.

Copyright of Osgoode Hall Law Journal is the property of Osgoode Hall Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Public Policy is the property of University of Toronto Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Osgoode Hall Law Journal is the property of Osgoode Hall Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses evidentiary assessments, legal arguments, and alleged inequality in relation to the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in the 2013 case Bedford v. Canada which deals with criminal liability for availing the prostitution of another person. Canadian case law and a prohibition against bawdy-houses (places) for prostitution are mentioned, along with human trafficking-related criminal offenses. The Court of Appeal for Ontario and a presumption of innocence are also examined.

The article presents speeches by Samuel Freedman, the Chief Justice of the Province of Manitoba, Canada, delivered at the U.S. and Canada. Topics of the speech included the issues related to the stare decisis, right to silence, human rights and the law, and status of laws for women under the Married Women's Property Act of 1882. It discusses the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the cases of Christie v. York Corp., Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell and Saumur v. City of Quebec.

In September 2013 in the case of Divito v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the issue of whether section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Charter, which grants Canadians the right to enter Canada was violated in a case where the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness declined to consent to the transfer of a Canadian citizen to serve his sentence in Canada where the sentencing state had consented to the transfer. Another issue was whether sections 8(1) and 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the International Transfer of Offenders Act, which granted the Minister the discretion to consent or not to consent to the transfer, were contrary to section 6(1) of the Charter. In resolving the above issues, the Court referred to its earlier jurisprudence, academic publications and international law. Although the Court agreed with the government that the appeal was moot because the appellant had left the USA by the time it was heard, it held that it retained 'a residual discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal if the issues raised are of public importance' and that this case was one of public importance because '[t]he issues are likely to recur in the future and there is some uncertainty resulting from conflicting decisions in the Federal Court.' The purpose of this article is to highlight the interpretative tools invoked by the court and the implications of the judgement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses moral, ethical, and legal issues in decisions relating to the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in Canada. Topics discussed include issues related to medical-resource scarcity in cases involving disagreement between physicians and family members based on life-sustaining treatment, the private system and the public nature of the healthcare system and Supreme Court of Canada case Cuthbertson v. Rasouli. It mentions issues of resource allocation.

The article distinguishes between expert determination and arbitration under the Canadian jurisprudence. It depicts the regulations in which parties can enforce or challenge a decision and finds how courts can interrupt in the process. It explores the 1998 Canada Supreme Court case Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer to distinguish arbitration from expert determination.

Copyright of Osgoode Hall Law Journal is the property of Osgoode Hall Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Osgoode Hall Law Journal is the property of Osgoode Hall Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) of the United Nations that support the claims of mothers to income support as child bearers and carers in Canada. It says that the Supreme Court of Canada has made a progressive vision of gender equality in mothers, however, the lower courts failed to follow the leadership. It also mentions that the court lacks understanding on the realities in the lives of women.

The article examines the shift in the Canadian privacy law and its impact on the Canadian media and investigative reporting practices. Topics discussed include the need to develop a common law tort for invasion of privacy, also referred to as intrusion upon seclusion, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal on the Jones v. Tsige case and the Supreme Court's defamation law analysis in the Grant v. Torstar Corp. case that led to the development of a two-stage framework for the intrusion tort.

The article presents a speech by Canadian Supreme Court Justice Marshall Rothstein at the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice in Toronto, Ontario, on August 5, 2011. Topics include administrative procedure in the U.S., the separation of powers, and constitutional law in the U.S. and Canada.

The article presents information on the judicial decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities Commission), in which the court analyzed the Ontario Securities Commission's (OSCs) power to uphold the public interest for protection of investors and capital markets. It discusses the case of In Re Magna International Inc. in which the OSC declined to stop the transaction under its public interest power.