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1. Secure access control and large scale robust representation for online multimedia event detection.

Author

Liu C, Lu B, and Li H

Subjects
Computer Security, Multimedia, Online Systems
Abstract

We developed an online multimedia event detection (MED) system. However, there are a secure access control issue and a large scale robust representation issue when we want to integrate traditional event detection algorithms into the online environment. For the first issue, we proposed a tree proxy-based and service-oriented access control (TPSAC) model based on the traditional role based access control model. Verification experiments were conducted on the CloudSim simulation platform, and the results showed that the TPSAC model is suitable for the access control of dynamic online environments. For the second issue, inspired by the object-bank scene descriptor, we proposed a 1000-object-bank (1000OBK) event descriptor. Feature vectors of the 1000OBK were extracted from response pyramids of 1000 generic object detectors which were trained on standard annotated image datasets, such as the ImageNet dataset. A spatial bag of words tiling approach was then adopted to encode these feature vectors for bridging the gap between the objects and events. Furthermore, we performed experiments in the context of event classification on the challenging TRECVID MED 2012 dataset, and the results showed that the robust 1000OBK event descriptor outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches.

Published
2014
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2. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY PRINTING AND RFID MARKS

Author

Iskren Spiridonov, Paper, Sofia, Bulgaria, Tatyana Bozhkova, and Kosta Shterev

Subjects
Security printing, Engineering, business.industry, business, Computer security, computer.software_genre, computer
Published
2018

3. Dragonblood is Still Leaking: Practical Cache-based Side-Channel in the Wild

Author

Mohamed Sabt, Pierre-Alain Fouque, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Embedded Security and Cryptography / Sécurité cryptographie embarquée (EMSEC), SYSTÈMES LARGE ÉCHELLE (IRISA-D1), Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires (IRISA), Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-École normale supérieure - Rennes (ENS Rennes)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Rennes 1 (UR1), Université de Rennes (UNIV-RENNES)-CentraleSupélec-IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire (IMT Atlantique), Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes), Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires (IRISA), Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT), Daniel De Almeida Braga is funded by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (Pôle de Recherche CYBER). We would like to thank the anonymous paper and artifact reviewers for their time and constructive feedbacks., Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées (INSA)-Université de Bretagne Sud (UBS)-École normale supérieure - Rennes (ENS Rennes)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-CentraleSupélec-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-IMT Atlantique (IMT Atlantique), and Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] (IMT)-Université de Rennes (UR)-Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes (INSA Rennes)

Subjects
FOS: Computer and information sciences, Dragonfly, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, computer.internet_protocol, Computer science, 0211 other engineering and technologies, 02 engineering and technology, Computer security, computer.software_genre, WPA3, Supplicant, [INFO.INFO-CR]Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR], 020204 information systems, 0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering, Password authentication protocol, Side channel attack, Wi-Fi, Key exchange, Password, 021110 strategic, defence & security studies, Authentication, PAKE, Elliptic curve, cache attack, computer, hostapd, Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Abstract

Recently, the Dragonblood attacks have attracted new interests on the security of WPA-3 implementation and in particular on the Dragonfly code deployed on many open-source libraries. One attack concerns the protection of users passwords during authentication. In the Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol called Dragonfly, the secret, namely the password, is mapped to an elliptic curve point. This operation is sensitive, as it involves the secret password, and therefore its resistance against side-channel attacks is of utmost importance. Following the initial disclosure of Dragonblood, we notice that this particular attack has been partially patched by only a few implementations. In this work, we show that the patches implemented after the disclosure of Dragonblood are insufficient. We took advantage of state-of-the-art techniques to extend the original attack, demonstrating that we are able to recover the password with only a third of the measurements needed in Dragonblood attack. We mainly apply our attack on two open-source projects: iwd (iNet Wireless Daemon) and FreeRADIUS, in order underline the practicability of our attack. Indeed, the iwd package, written by Intel, is already deployed in the Arch Linux distribution, which is well-known among security experts, and aims to offer an alternative to wpa\_supplicant. As for FreeRADIUS, it is widely deployed and well-maintained upstream open-source project. We publish a full Proof of Concept of our attack, and actively participated in the process of patching the vulnerable code. Here, in a backward compatibility perspective, we advise the use of a branch-free implementation as a mitigation technique, as what was used in hostapd, due to its quite simplicity and its negligible incurred overhead., Accepted at Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2020), December 7-11, 2020, Austin, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 13 pages, ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8858-0/20/12 Artifact available: https://gitlab.inria.fr/ddealmei/poc-iwd-acsac2020/-/tree/master/

Published
2020