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The study of energy sector security is in flux. A traditional focus on exploring the nexus between terrorism and physical energy infrastructure has given way to a new and specific emphasis on cyber attacks targeting electrical power grids. A noticeable gap in the literature exists in terms of presenting a more comprehensive assessment of the general threat environment. Our paper, and the larger project from which it stems, intends to fill this void and prompt more nuanced and empirically driven research on the topic that informs Canadian security policy. Our findings are informed by interviews conducted with American and Canadian energy sector officials, and a questionnaire carried out with energy sector companies. By examining a broader suite of disruptive threats to the energy sector, we paint a more inclusive picture of the many gateways through which the energy sector could be targeted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States, concerns that counter-terrorism laws and practices are directly and indirectly causing human rights violations have mounted. Much of the international focus has been on the United States. This paper highlights, however, that it is a debate with a truly global dimension. The author examines particular concerns that Canadian law enforcement and security agencies may have been complicit in the imprisonment and torture abroad of Canadian citizens who were of interest in the context of national security investigations. The cases are situated in the wider debate about torture that has emerged worldwide in recent years, and argues that any move to create exceptions to the absolute prohibition of torture, enshrined in numerous international treaties, would lead to both injustice and insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether Islamic terrorism has seen a marked increase in Canada since the September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks in New York City. It discusses the effect of the September 2001 terrorism to the Canadians and policymakers moving forward. The author argues that an analysis of terrorist incidents in Canada after the September 11 incident reveals a disturbing trend and also provides a clear indication of several areas which need to be investigated and addressed to mitigate this threat moving forward. It offers an overview of the six high profile terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada after the September 2001 terrorist attacks.

Entrapment has been a prominent, if rarely successful, defence in terrorism prosecutions. In this chapter, I sketch an egalitarian case for entrapment. On this account, the primary moral significance of entrapment is to prevent the police from generating crimes that would not otherwise have been perpetrated. In a context in which most people are, as Richard McAdams puts it, "probabilistic offenders," the power of the authorities to control the nature, frequency, and timing of an inducement to crime is the power to make criminals out of ordinary, but fallible, people. Entrapment is a means of constraining this power. In this regard, entrapment stands to undercover policing roughly as abuse of process stands to prosecutorial discretion: as a constraint on how officials choose which individuals to investigate, prosecute and punish. However, since judgments as to when this line is crossed are likely to be contestable, and since what is at issue is typically extraordinary state power used to ensnare particular individuals, I argue that courts should do more to encourage Parliament to regulate undercover policing ex ante rather than rely solely on an entrapment defence applied ex post, for instance by strictly applying an "authorized by law" condition in prosecutions based on undercover investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thwarted Toronto 18 terrorist plot was an early indication of things to come for terrorist financing in Canada and internationally. The self-financed plot demonstrated how terrorist cells, even those not directed by a terrorist group, could obtain enough money to fully fund a sophisticated and complex attack. In total, the main elements of the Toronto 18 plot likely cost thousands of dollars, but the organizers of the plot had accumulated far more than they needed for the components of the attack and had enough money to rent a safe house, pay for plane tickets to escape prosecution after the attack, and develop a plausible cover story for their activities. Despite the financial elements of the plot, no terrorist financing charges were laid in the case. This may have been due to the lack of international funding of the plot and a conceptualization within Canada's law enforcement and security services at the time that terrorist financing came from "abroad." The lack of financing charges, in this case, may have had longstanding implications in Canada, where, to date, very few charges of this nature have been laid, even 15 years after the plot was disrupted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Captain Javed Latif, a Muslim Canadian pilot from Pakistan, was denied pilot refresher training by Bombardier Aerospace Training Center in Canada based on information received from US national security officials. Almost 12 years after Captain Javed Latif 's ordeal began, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a decision by the Quebec Court of Appeal overturning a finding by a Quebec Human Rights Tribunal that Latif had been racially profiled. The Supreme Court of Canada's decision ultimately exposes and perpetuates a deep unwillingness to challenge the stereotyping of Muslims as terrorists in Canada. In response, this commentary seeks to excavate Captain Latif 's fuller story largely through a reading of silences. It critically analyzes the Court's claim that the Tribunal had little or no evidence before it to ground its finding of discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anne-Marie Slaughter has described the "new world order" as characterized by some "conceptual shifts," including an increasing cooperation of domestic courts across nation-state boundaries. The crossjurisdictional referencing of legal norms and decisions, as Slaughter holds, would lead into a "global community of courts." This article takes issue with that observation. We argue that for such a community to emerge, cross-referencing would need to be followed by an effective transmission of meaning from one (legal) context to another. Following recent insights in the field of International Relations norm research, however, we can expect such meanings to be contested--in particular, when different cultural repertoires operate on either side of the interactive processes. Therefore, a need for translation ensues (i.e., a translation of constitutional norms or concepts from one legal order into another). The conditions of a "global community of courts" are thus not easily met. In this respect, the aim of the article is to put Slaughter's thesis to an empirical test. To extrapolate the "normative structures of meaning-in-use" the article builds on the analysis of semi-structured interviews with legal practitioners who were involved in the jurisprudence on anti-terrorism measures in two countries, Canada and Germany. During this empirical work, we found a “global community of courts” not yet emerged. Although the concept of community does matter as an explanatory reference for research on legal cross-referencing across national borders, our research suggests that practice of cross-referencing is still more “culturally” fragmented than unified, and normative references are more regionally diverse than globally shared. Moreover, the normative context within which referencing takes place remains strong, so that the meaning of “foreign” concepts is often constructed by means of contestation rather than transferred from one contest into another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the developments in the Canadian intelligence community after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. It notes that the country's intelligence community gained substantial new resources and revised mandate, as well as the modification of institutional structures to focus on new threats and improve coordination, after the terrorist attacks. It states that the mobilization of resources to prevent a direct attack on Canadian citizens or Canadian infrastructure became the immediate priority of the government. The country's Department of National Defense was also increased to meet new military commitments and expanded its intelligence gathering.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

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This article argues that there are five major challenges currently facing Western intelligence communities. First - ensuring skills retention for intelligence officers and analysts, while developing knowledgeable managers and customers, all in an increasingly-complex security environment. Second - instituting and inculcating knowledge and expertise in these staff - while addressing an opponent in al-Qaeda which demonstrates increasingly sophisticated use of IT, new media, etc. Third - drawing-in outside expertise from the research and business communities, as is done currently in the US and Canada but in only a very limited manner in the UK. Fourth - overcoming institutional rigidity in dividing the foreign and domestic - alongside rigid sharing and co-operation relationships. Fifth - creating truly collaborative environments that offer genuine socio-cultural incentives to collaboration rather than mere 'IT solutions'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various developments that took place in Canada in 2008. It continued its Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the Dominican Republic, and four South American countries including El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On June 28, 2008 Canada entered a mutual recognition agreement with the U.S. recognizing the compatibility between the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program and Canada's Partners in Protection program.