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Organized surveillance, especially by governments poses a major challenge to individual privacy, due to the resources governments have at their disposal, and the possibility of overreach. Given the impact of invasive monitoring, in most democratic countries, government surveillance is, in theory, monitored and subject to public oversight to guard against violations. In practice, there is a difficult fine balance between safeguarding individual's privacy rights and not diluting the efficacy of national security investigations, as exemplified by reports on government surveillance programs that have caused public controversy, and have been challenged by civil and privacy rights organizations. Surveillance is generally conducted through a mechanism where federal agencies obtain a warrant from a federal or state judge (e.g., the US FISA court, Supreme Court in Canada) to subpoena a company or service-provider (e.g., Google, Microsoft) for their customers' data. The courts provide annual statistics on the requests (accepted, rejected), while the companies provide annual transparency reports for public auditing. However, in practice, the statistical information provided by the courts and companies is at a very high level, generic, is released after-the-fact, and is inadequate for auditing the operations. Often this is attributed to the lack of scalable mechanisms for reporting and transparent auditing. In this paper, we present SAMPL, a novel auditing framework which leverages cryptographic mechanisms, such as zero knowledge proofs, Pedersen commitments, Merkle trees, and public ledgers to create a scalable mechanism for auditing electronic surveillance processes involving multiple actors. SAMPL is the first framework that can identify the actors (e.g., agencies and companies) that violate the purview of the court orders. We experimentally demonstrate the scalability for SAMPL for handling concurrent monitoring processes without undermining their secrecy and auditability.

The aim of the study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical and legal, legislative and normative aspects of the effectiveness of legal mechanisms (material and procedural) for implementing the framework Law of Ukraine «On the peculiarities of state policy on ensuring the state sovereignty of Ukraine in temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts» (hereinafter – the Law) and «de-occupation laws» of Ukraine (separate acts of legislation in the field of security and defense), connected with the process of implementation of the "special" normative-law the provisions of the Law in the military-defense and civil-military sphere of social relations in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; development of theoretical and applied tools and methods of substantiation of ways of its improvement. Achievement of the set goal involves solving the following tasks: to establish the relevance of scientific research for the Armed Forces of Ukraine which, in the context of mortal danger, for the first time in its modern history as a sovereign and independent, democratic state is involved under the Law for the maintenance of national security and defense, repression and deterrence of armed aggression of the Russian Federation in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; to determine the state of development of scientific researches on the theoretical, legal, departmental normative features of the legal mechanism for implementation of the requirements of the "de-occupation legislation" of Ukraine in the conditions of the operation of the united forces; to carry out an analysis of the methods (rules, means) of the legislative technique, the basic normative part and the complex material-procedural mechanism of implementation of the Law at the presidential, governmental, military-departmental levels of government; to establish the state of efficiency of the rule-making block in the process of implementing the Law in conditions of operation of the united forces in the aspect of the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, one year after its adoption; outline the ways of improving the mechanism of implementation of the «occupation legislation» of Ukraine in the context of the operation of the combined forces. Methods of research are a complex combination of philosophical, general scientific and special methods. The system method allowed to analyze the components of the rule-making block, the system of acts in the field of security and defense in the process of implementation of the Law. The formal logical method has established material procedures, structure, components of legal mechanisms of implementation, collisions and gaps. The analysis and synthesis method defines the components of the implementation process, identifies the problems, formulates the conclusions and suggestions. It is revealed that the initial legislative-normative block contains separate destructive legal constructions that are capable of deforming the sub-law (military-departmental) level of the process of realization of the military legislation of Ukraine in the conditions of the operation of the combined forces. The ways of neutralization of destructive (formal, duplicate, declarative, collisional) legal constructions are proposed in order to optimize the effective, military-force and organizational-legal mechanism of the return of temporarily occupied territories in the East of Ukraine.

Carmines and Stimson's theory of racial issue evolution has strongly influenced scholarly and popular interpretations of U.S. party politics. The central proposition of this theory is that racial attitudes have shaped the party loyalties of voters who have entered the electorate since 1964. Using data from the 1980 and 1988 American National Election Studies, this paper undertakes a test of the theory of racial issue evolution by examining the relationships between racial attitudes and party identification among white U.S. citizens. The evidence presented in this paper shows that racial attitudes had very little influence on party identification among either younger or older whites. Other issues, especially those involving the scope of the welfare state and national security, played a much larger role in driving many whites away from the Democratic party during the 1980s. Furthermore, racial attitudes had a negligible impact on whites' candidate preference in the 1988 presidential election.

A civil society in the security sector is main element of social reform. One of the important issues of the civil society in the security sector in the democratic society is to be increased the participation of “civil society” in the development and implementation process of the national security and defense policy.Civil society is composed of the totality of many voluntary social relationships, civic and social organizations, and institutions that form of the basis of functional society, as distinct from the force-backed structures of the state. The civil society would not be opposed to the state. The activities and operations of the civil society might be possible to implement in the situations of the democratic society relations, in regarding too basis of the strengthened basement of the civil society establishment. Accordingly, that civil society is possible to develop elsewhere, that would be established strengthening possibility. Otherwise a civil society was developed elusively, when that is placed by the concurrence authoritarian and totalitarian condition. Civil society activities as subject provides different impact on ensure safety academic papers are a new area of security studies. Civil society’s participation in the security sector’s learning from the experience of the United States and Russia.

1 IntroductionThe field of electronic democracy and especially electronic voting is largely unexplored, its dimensions themselves being in a continuous changing process. There are numerous debates on this field, both in practice and literature, most of them on contradicting terms due to security problems and social and political implications. Thus, considering the expansion electronic voting systems built on the development of information and communication technology (ICT), solving the security aspect is crucial. Voting is a critical process of citizen participation to democracy, facilitating the manifestation of general opinion, but most specialists consider designing such a system complex and delicate.Security of electoral process must be perceived on the level of national security, because the legitimacy of a democracy depends on the degree of equitable, open and trustworthy elections [1]. The lack of trust in organization of the electoral process and government actions is a hot subject in democratic countries, thus also in Romania. Therefore a computerized system for electronic voting is a great responsibility, its failure having grave consequences on public trust in the political class. [2]Numerous international studies have been recently organized on international level with the purpose of evaluating the advantages and drawbacks of electronic voting. Worth mentioning is the European project Edemocracy: Technical possibilities of the use of electronic voting and other Internet tools in European elections (IP/A/STOA/FWC/2008096/LOT4/C1/SC2) [3] carried on between January 2010 and September 2011, which highlights in its final report E-public, eparticipation and e-voting in Europe - prospects and challenges the European experience in the field. However, the results and proofs are not conclusive because of the large diversity of existing systems that support a wide range of contexts and requirements. Examination of digital democracy cannot be isolated from other scientific and academic fields. Electronic voting is rather a social and political project then a technical one, a component of the political dimensions of the new media technologies, leading to improvements of social nature through increasing the number of citizens involved in the political decision process.Traditional voting processes seem to lack security. The concept of hiding a piece of paper inside an envelope to protect its confidentiality is more and more contested. In the current technological context, the voter - considered anonymous - can be easily identified using simple technology the reads finger prints or DNA samples, why wouldn't technology replace such a system? Since numerous countries (like Canada, USA, France, Great Britain, India, Estonia, Holland, Romania etc.) have approached the subject, the basic question is no longer if ICT must or must not be involved in the electoral process, but rather what kind of technology must be used in order to build an electronic voting system.Electronic participation must be understood as an interaction, mediated by technology, between the sphere of civil society and the sphere of politics. There are solutions and software systems destined to increase this participation, known as electronic methods or e-methods, like blog, webcast, polls, chats, forums, electronic petitions etc. Still, we must understand from the beginning that there is a major difference between e-shopping (for example) and e-voting.Electronic voting may be analysed from the perspective of a mechanism designed to improve electronic participation, the selection of procedures and technologies being a very important step. The electoral process is different from one nation to another, not only regarding the way to determine the elected candidates (for example proportional or according to majority), but also regarding the procedures and methods used to cast the votes, organizations involved etc.For example, in Europe voting varies from internet voting (in Estonia) [4] to fully manual process (in Greece and Italy). …

The true battles of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union were fought on the ideological front: pitting democracy and capitalism against totalitarianism and communism. The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was formed in the late 1940s to help combat the spread of Communism across Europe and in the United States. Part of the “psychological warfare” included the use of propaganda. Around the same time, British author George Orwell had recently published Animal Farm and Nineteen EightyFour. Both novels, due to the anti-Communist overtones, were adopted by the OPC as part of a larger anti-Soviet campaign. By examining the use by intelligence agencies of Orwell’s works during the Cold War and the potential use of those works in a post-9/11 global society, this paper aims to illustrate the fickle nature of literary works as propaganda. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss5/14

‘Disaster education’ is a fledgling area of study in lifelong education. Many countries educate their populations for disasters, to mitigate potential damage and loss of life, as well as contribute to national security. In this paper, which draws on interview data from the German Federal Office for Civil Defence and Disaster Assistance and the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, archival research, analysis of websites and promotional materials as well as relevant academic literature, I examine disaster education and preparedness for national emergencies in Germany. I argue that it is not generally extended to the general public, rather confined to trained experts, decentralised, localised and exclusive. Theorising disaster education as a ‘civil defence pedagogy’, a type of public pedagogy, which contributes to shaping narratives of national identity, I argue that it is unlikely that Germany will develop a more inclusive, universal, formalised nor high-profile campaign in disaster education in the foreseeable future. This, I suggest, is due to narratives of the German democratic nation as secure, federal, peaceful and unified, which originated at the founding of West Germany in 1949, and continue to shape contemporary political narratives.

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)China's civil society is under immense pressure. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, Chinese authorities have cracked down on a score of civil society organisations, while hundreds of activists and dissidents have been detained, arrested, and sentenced to prison. Control over cyberspace has been further tightened, and a new commission has been established to oversee national security across a wide spectrum of issues. A campaign against ?Western values? has been launched, and even the term ?civil society? is becoming increasingly sensitive in public or classroom discussion. As the crackdown continues, one might wonder whether the fang/shoucycle, the alternating pattern of relaxation and control that unleashed China's ?reform and opening up? in the 1980s and 1990s, is still applicable under Xi's China, where control (shou) has now become the norm and relaxation (fang) the exception. Previously, moderate or ?issue-based? groups and activists, although under constant state surveillance, remained intact as long as they steered clear of a political agenda. An Economistarticle in April 2014 even argued that ?a flourishing civil society is taking hold.?(1)A year later, however, it has become questionable whether such an observation is still valid.What are the implications for the development of China's civil society? This paper reviews recent crackdown efforts and new restrictions on civil society, and argues that these measures are diminishing the space for moderate and reformist NGOs and activists to negotiate their survival. It also shows that ad-hoc repression of civil society groups and activists is now moving towards a more systematic restriction of both foreign and domestic NGOs. While civil society is unlikely to disappear due to its resilience and its ability to adapt to barriers, there is little cause for optimism in the coming years.Rampant crackdown on civil societyIn the early days after Xi Jinping assumed office as China's president, the question of whether he was a liberal political reformer emerged among China observers. Yet the debate was brief and speculation was quickly dispelled. As Xi launched a rampant anti-corruption drive targeting both ?tigers? and ?flies,? the successive downfall of high-ranking officials neither opened up room for public criticism of the government nor created space for grassroots civil society to expand and prosper. Instead, Xi ruled out political reform, emphasised cadres' adherence to the central leadership of the Party, and revived the ?mass line? as a Maoist alternative to democracy so as to rebuild the Party's legitimacy among the masses.(2)In addition, Xi also warned against dangerous Western values that constitute ideological threats to China, highlighting seven ideas, including universal values, freedom of speech, and civil society, to be forbidden in public discussion.(3)On the institutional level, Xi's administration founded at least two governmental organisations delegated with expansive power over Chinese society. The National Security Commission, established in early 2014, was made responsible for coordinating a range of national security tasks and making relevant policies, putting paramount importance on safeguarding state security. Meanwhile, a new Internet regulatory body, the Cyberspace Administration of China, was endowed with expanded powers to defend cybersecurity against both domestic and foreign threats.Against the backdrop of a tightened political and ideological space under Xi's rule, the spate of crackdowns against civil society groups and activists came as no surprise. Several activists and opinion leaders were detained and arrested as early as 2013, the most prominent being Xu Zhiyong, a legal activist and the founder of the New Citizens' Movement (xin gongmin yundong ...), who was placed under house arrest in April 2013. Whereas Xu was sentenced to four years in prison in early 2014 for ? …

The principle of each contemporary democratic society implies division of power into legislative, executive and judicial. If there is no division into these three branches of power and if preconditions have not been satisfied for judicial power to be independent from the legislative and executive power, that inevitably leads to disrespect of human rights and freedoms, violation of political freedoms and absence of the rule of law. Independence of judiciary is the principal element for realization of a constitutional parliamentary state, primarily as the guarantor of protection of human, political and minority rights. The usual practice is that a security service in a democratic state has to ask for a court order if it wants to perform monitoring and other investigative procedures against a person or a group of persons. The order is usually pretty concrete concerning particulars with regard to the type of monitoring to be approved, against whom and for how long, as well as what is the legal basis for implementation. Courts and judicial bodies have a direct impact on protection of rights of individuals and on implementation of a democratic control over governmental institutions, especially over institutions of executive power, which include security services. This paper examines and analyzes the ways judicial authorities in the Republic of Serbia perform control of respect of constitutionality and legality in implementation of special procedures and measures and special measures, i.e., special evidence gathering actions, which security services apply for protecting of national security.

In many developing countries, land ownership remains a subject of contention. In South Africa, notwithstanding the strides that have been made to foster equitable land ownership, land reform policies have been unsuccessful in delivering land to the poor majority. Due to the nature of agriculture as a source of food production and national security, and the lack of farming skills and related competencies’ equilibrium, programmes intended to deliver land to black people have been inadequate in their reach. Whereas policy has emphasised the urgency of solving equity issues in land ownership, equally challenging has been finding the right set of programmes to achieve this without triggering a perennial land ownership squabble. After 18 years of democracy, a need remains to find a balance between continuity in food production and equitable redistribution of land in South African agriculture. In this paper, we argue that it is possible to achieve equitable and fair redistribution of land without inhibi...

This article discusses the national and international conjuncture that has produced the violence exercised by the State against society and that, until today, continues to promote the oblivion by refusing to reveal the past. In order to do that, this paper analyzes political forces in confrontation, the theoretical basis of the Cold War and its coercive practices. Besides that, it intends to relate the National Security Doctrine to the period of Military Dictatorship and it shows the struggling theories in the national memory reconstitution and the recomposition of the istorical truth. Key words: Doctrine of National Security, military dictatorship, social movement, democracy, memory and truth.

It was only weeks after the planes crashed into the twin towers on that bright, sunlit morning of September 11th, 200l, that it became apparent that the most important challenge now facing American democracy was how well would we strike a balance between liberty and security. This paper will look at the history of civil liberties in light of threats to national security. It will examine components of the US Patriot Act, how these provisions are being applied and the potential implication of the act on social work education and practice. Suggestions of how social work might respond to these new realities will be discussed.

THE BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO NATION-BUILDING James Dobbins, Sefh G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006. 275pp, US$35.00 paper (ISBN 978-0833039880)There is a certain bitter irony in the title of the RAND Corporation's The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building. Authored by a team led by James Dobbins, RAND's director of international security and defence policy and a noted nation-building expert, The Beginner's Guide goes to great lengths to explain that the United States should possess extensive experience in the field of stabilization and reconstruction operations. As Dobbins notes, military interventions and their related endeavours have emerged from the ashes of the Cold War as a major enterprise of both the United States and the United Nations. In the period from 1945 to 1989, the United States embarked on a military intervention on average once every 10 years, but it now conducts such operations roughly biannually. United Nations peacekeeping operations have accelerated even more dramatically since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The UN conducted an average of one new peacekeeping mission every four years during the Cold War. Today, that figure stands at one operation every six months.Not only have interventions increased in number since 1989, they have also grown in ambition. Cold War imperatives generally limited UN- and US-led ventures to relatively simple combatant separation operations and ceasefire monitoring. Unconstrained by the threat of superpower escalation, similar missions today seek to achieve the more challenging goals of reuniting divided countries, establishing the rule of law, and installing democratic institutions. What were once limited peacekeeping endeavours have graduated to full-blown nation-building exercises.Indeed, by the time its military invaded and occupied Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States possessed more potential experience in nationbuilding than any other country in modern times. As Dobbins highlights, Iraq marked the US government's seventh attempt at rebuilding a fractured society since the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. From actions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the United States should have learned, by the time of Iraq, a trove of lessons about the costs, burdens, responsibilities, and pitfalls of intervention and regime change.As recent history has shown, however, a political climate hostile to the realities of nation-building precluded the construction of such a repository. The Clinton administration, chastened by stumbles in Somalia and in dealing with the international community over the former Yugoslavia, turned away from early efforts to codify interagency nation-building processes. Condoleezza Rice's famous comment from the 2000 presidential campaign that "we don't need to have the 82nd airborne escorting kids to kindergarten" encapsulated the initial attitude of the Bush administration that began its tenure openly antagonistic to military operations other than large-scale, conventional wars.Only the mismanagement of postwar stabilization in Iraq and the growing insurgencies both there and in Afghanistan convinced large sectors of the US foreign and defence policy establishments of the need for a comprehensive blueprint for future nation-building operations. In late 2005, national security presidential directive 44, which explicitly outlined interagency coordination requirements in reconstruction and stabilization operations, reversed the White House's earlier course. The Department of Defense soon issued a complementary directive that gave "stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations" equal priority with traditional war fighting. While more in line with the realities of ongoing US activities abroad, it remains to be seen whether these doctrinal changes will result in sustainable, long-term institutional transformations. …

The institution of the President in the Republic of Kosovo represents a new political and constitutional institution, as is the Republic itself. As such, he is still untested against constitutional responsibilities with which he is charged by the country's constitutions. Moreover, the President has not yet been tested on the security crisis management, as in reality he still cannot exercise all of his powers as Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, as these competencies for now are being exercised by the political and military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO). However, in a constitutional and legal sense, the President of Kosovo enjoys all the powers for the realization of his constitutional role as a "representative of the unity of the people and guarantor of the democratic functioning of the institutions of the country'' and also as Commander of the Armed Forces with executive powers. Once the competences of the President in the authority of foreign policy are added then he appears to be one of the most powerful presidents, as compared with the presidents of parliamentary republics. It is exactly the powers of the President on national security issues that will be the topic of treatment in this paper, through an analysis not only the issues that are completely of the defense and security character, but also authorities dealing with other issues that can be used on behalf or in the name of national security.

Nigeria has been bedeviled by ethno-religious conflicts with both devastating human and material consequences since the return of democracy in 1999. The current terrorist insurgency by the Northern-based Boko Haram group has continued to pose a serious threat to Nigeria’s security and corporate political entity. This is evidenced in the group’s undeterred spate of terrorist attacks on citizens, the nation’s security personnel, wanton destruction of lives and property. This paper will focus on the assessment of the Boko Haram’s unprecedented campaign of terror that is growing both in number and brutality that has constituted itself as a national security threat to the continual and harmonious co-existence of the component nations that make up the Nigerian state. DOI: 10.5901/ajis.2014.v3n4p283

El objetivo del presente artículo es establecer si el modelo democrático contemporáneo es dirigido y se fundamenta en la difusión de miedo y el terror para exterminar al "enemigo". Para ello, lo primero es señalar el marco conceptual de la democracia dirigida y del terrorismo invertido tanto desde lo jurídico como desde lo sociológico. Luego se identifican aspectos diferenciadores como la democracia de la "seguridad nacional", los métodos disociadores, los económicos y políticos y, por último, la utilización del Derecho Penal del enemigo. Con estos elementos se definirá si en Colombia es posible afirmar la existencia de la democracia dirigida a partir de los factores y características descritas. The aim of this paper is to establish if the contemporary democratic model is guided and based on spreading fear and terror to exterminate the "enemy". To do this, the first thing is to note the conceptual framework of guided democracy and reverted terrorism both spent legally and sociologically. Then differentiating aspects of democracy as "national security" were identified as well as the disruptive, economic and political methods, and, finally, the use of the criminal law of the enemy. With these elements, it will be defined if it is possible to affirm the existence of guided democracy in Colombia taking into account the factors and criteria described above.

Many interpretations of Thailand's May 1 992 mass movement and military crackdown dwell on middle-class democracy formulae and/or mobacracy threats to national security. The paper argues that the two most interesting aspects of the May Events - non-violent tactics and non-governmental organizations - challenged not just the soldiers, but the whole military-directed discourse of political organization in Thailand. Utilizing feminist theory's notion of oppositional consciousness, the non-governmental organization/non-violent action dynamic is framed as a motivating force behind the social movement of April-May 1 992. This challenge can be called "post-modern" because, with its multi-centred organization and centrifugal forces, it jams the discourse of "normal" Thai politics leaving openings for a more participartory democracy. Survival ... is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the masters tools will never dismantle the masters house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.

The paper is about the issue of Mongolia cooperation with foreign companies playing an important role in its foreign policy strategy and national security. At the beginning of the 1990s, having proclaimed a “multipillar” policy strategy in relations with the world, Ulaanbaatar tends to follow it in the economic cooperation not willing to give any preference to any country. It creates a situation of competition between foreign companies backed by their states, especially such great powers as Russia, China, the USA. The most tense moment in the struggle for the influence in Mongolia is the rivalry betw een the different discourses, pretending the exclusive right to nominate the most effective model of cooperation between Mongolia and foreign states in the ore-mining industry. Among the most well-defined discourses, there are three of them. China prefers to define the discourse of “economic feasibility”. Western states, as a rule, tend to rely on the discourse of “values community”, which includes such concepts as “democracy”, “environmentally friendly”, “transparency” Russia often uses the “geopolitical” discourse. In spite of the attractiveness and relative effectiveness of the discourse selected by Russia, there are certain limits to its use.

With the enfranchisement of southern Blacks and the development of a two-party system in the region, several well-documented changes have occurred in southern politics. Among the most prominent of these changes is the greater liberalism exhibited by many southern Democratic members of Congress. Several scholars have noted the vastly increased support southern Democrats provide for civil rights measures. Other researchers have noted less conservatism by southern representatives on other issues. This paper explores roll call voting by southern representatives on national security issues. It demonstrates that despite some increased liberalism by southern Democrats, during the 1980s a wide regional gap existed within the Democratic caucus on foreign policy and military matters. Southern Democratic votes on national security issues were influenced by a representative’s overall ideology, by a district’s partisan preferences as indicated by presidential election results, the region of the South a representative is from, and by the strength of Republican opposition in a district.

The remolding of the state from an autocratic to a democratic one in postwar Japan is sometimes regarded as a successful case of external intervention for state-building. When Americans landed in Japan two weeks after Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender, they expected to meet a fanatic and intransigent people. Instead they were surprised by the orderly and peaceful behavior of Japanese soldiers and citizens (Tamaki 2005, 13-20). Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (into their home towns/villages) of millions of soldiers proceeded surprisingly smooth between 1945 and 1948. The authoritarian state gave way to a democratic one within two years of the beginning of the American occupation and democracy has persisted since1. And finally, the Japanese economy had already begun to experience high growth when the occupation ended in April 1952. In every respect, American occupation policies seem to have been successful. Against this image of the American occupation in Japan, this paper will argue that American policies were only partially helpful in the democratic remolding and economic development of postwar Japan. The prewar political and economic experiences of the Japanese themselves, and the psychological impact of the defeat, played equally important roles in the democratic rebirth of the Japanese state. Those in search of solutions to the development challenges facing fragile countries today should understand that Japan's 'success' did not begin in 1945 and was not the result of a peace settlement quickly followed by new institutions. The ground work for Japanese success was 80-90 years in the making. Analysis of state-building, economic development and democracy in Japan must start from the Meiji restoration of 1868.

Evidence from a recent study of Canadian attitudes toward civil liberties indicates that the issue of wiretapping presents an important exception to the familiar theory of democratic elitism. Ironically, the very sophistication and knowledge that leads elites to support individual rights and freedoms also makes them more likely to support wiretapping than the Canadian population as a whole. Over the past several years, the issue of wiretapping has been at the center of a debate regarding the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). This paper-based upon data from a new national study of Canadian attitudes toward civil liberties-explores two questions relevant to this debate: the state of public and elite opinion on the issue of wiretapping and the implications of these attitudes for an understanding of democratic politics. WIRETAPPING AS A PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE At issue in the debate over wiretapping has been the appropriate balance between national security needs and the rights and freedoms of JOSEPH F. FLETCHER iS an Assistant Professor of Political Science and a Research Associate of the Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto. He is also Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Social Research at York University. The research reported in this article is part of a larger project on attitudes toward civil liberties in Canada supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant no. 411-85-0011). Additional funds were also made available by the Independent Research Fund of the Solicitor General of Canada (grant no. 1512-FLOO100-8701/34 7250-26-86). The early stages of this work were particularly facilitated by a contribution from the solicitor general to the Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto. The author thanks Robert Boyd, Stuart Farson, Horst Intscher, Richard Powers, and Lyn Turner for their help with this article. Very special thanks go to the author's colleagues in the project, Paul Sniderman, Peter Russell, and Philip Tetlock. Public Opinion Quarterly Volume 53:225-245 K 1989 by the American Association for Public Opinion Research Published by The University of Chicago Press / 0033-362X/89/0053-02/$2.50 This content downloaded from 207.46.13.128 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:49:34 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 226 Joseph F. Fletcher individuals.' Among the most telling criticisms of CSIS have been those put forth in the annual reports of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), which was established under the terms of the 1984 CSIS Act to oversee the activities of the security service. The committee bluntly states that in targeting individuals for surveillance the security service "casts its net too widely" and "takes insufficient account of the potential harm to the principles of personal freedom and privacy" (SIRC, 1987:36-37). Responding to these concerns, the solicitor general formed an independent advisory team to assess whether the operations and management of CSIS met the intelligence needs of the government and whether these needs were effectively balanced by due regard for the rights of individuals. The report of the independent advisory team (1987) was released at the end of November 1987, and its recommendations were accepted by the government in their entirety. Accordingly, the solicitor general (1987) announced a major reorganization of the priorities and management of the security service, including greater controls on wiretapping and intrusive surveillance generally, elimination of the countersubversion branch of the service, and a host of management changes designed to improve monitoring and control. Whatever the impact of these changes, debate over security intelligence operations in Canada is far from over. Full parliamentary review of the act establishing CSIS is required in 1989.2 Insofar as the review will be conducted by those near the center of the decision-making process, one would hope that the debate will be continued largely among those with a relatively sophisticated understanding of both the national security and individual liberties issues involved. Yet the central finding reported in this paper casts doubt over whether this hope will be realized. Evidence from a recent survey of Canadian attitudes toward civil liberties indicates that the issue of wiretapping presents an important exception to the familiar theory of democratic elitism. Ironically, it seems that the very sophistication and knowledge that leads elites to 1. At times CSIS has appeared to protect neither national security nor individual rights in using its wiretapping powers. For example, in September 1987 a federal court of appeal in British Columbia learned that CSIS had used false information to support an application for a wiretap warrant in a case involving conspiracy to murder a visiting Indian cabinet minister (Globe and Mail, 12 September 1987, Al). This led in quick succession to the sudden resignation of the CSIS director (Globe and Mail, 12 September 1987, Al), the release of the accused (Globe and Mail, 16 September 1987, Al), and the announcement of an investigation into every wiretap warrant issued to the service since its inception (Globe and Mail, 16 September 1987, A9). 2. The review is likely to be thorough for in the wake of the 1985 McGrath reforms, Parliamentary review committees can now be fairly independent of the government in their inquiries (Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, 1985). This content downloaded from 207.46.13.128 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:49:34 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Mass and Elite Attitudes About Wiretapping 227 support individual rights and freedoms also makes them more likely than the Canadian population as a whole to support wiretapping. THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM Perhaps the most enduring contribution of surveys of attitudes toward civil liberties has been the finding that elites are more supportive than ordinary citizens of democratic rights and freedoms. This was Stouffer's central finding over thirty years ago in his groundbreaking investigation, and it has been corroborated in works by McClosky (1964), Nunn, Crockett, and Williams (1978), McClosky and Brill (1983), Sullivan and Barnum (1987), and others. Upon this finding a theoretical edifice has been erected: the theory of democratic elitism (see Bachrach, 1967). In essence, this theory holds that elite groups serve as major repositories of democratic values in Western democracies. More strongly supportive of ideals of democracy than the general public, elite groups provide an important bulwark against nondemocratic proclivities among the citizenry. Such proclivities were documented by Stouffer, who found the American public to be relatively intolerant and unsupportive of individual rights and freedoms. Fortunately, according to Key (1961), McClosky (1964), and others, those who are most intolerant and least supportive of democratic rights and freedoms are also likely to be without significant political influence. In contrast, those who do have significant influence are more tolerant, more supportive of democratic principles, and more consistent in applying those principles in particular cases. The reason for this difference, it has been suggested (McClosky, 1964; McClosky and Brill, 1983), is that decision makers move in circles where basic democratic values are more salient and intellectual consistency is more often demanded; hence their attitudes are more closely connected to basic democratic values. In short, they are part of an elite group, the "carriers of the democratic creed" (Prothro and Grigg, 1960). As such, they are the group most likely to resist encroachments upon individual rights and freedoms, even where rights and freedoms must be balanced against other values such as national security. In tribute to these qualities, this elite group has been lionized as "guardians of democracy" (cited in Sullivan and Barnum, 1987). Do these characterizations of mass and elite attitude differences offer an accurate picture of contemporary Canadian society? Are citizens less supportive of individual rights and freedoms than are elite groups when it comes to the issue of wiretapping? As part of a larger investigation of Canadian attitudes toward civil liberties, questions were included in a national survey of both citizens and decision makers conThis content downloaded from 207.46.13.128 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:49:34 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 228 Joseph F. Fletcher ducted in the spring and summer of 1987 which enable us to address these issues.

Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have adopted democratic forms of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc nations. Policy-makers in the west have expressed the hope that this democratic wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward to China. But the durability of this new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least half of the world’s young democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being “unconsolidated” or “fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have reverted back to authoritarian rule. Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq. The ability of fledgling democracies to maintain popular support depends in part on the ability of their governments to deliver economic policies that meet with widespread approval. But what sorts of economic policies are these, and are they necessarily the same as the policies required for tackling difficult issues of economic stabilization and reform? Conversely, what sorts of economic policies are most likely to spark a backlash against young and fragile democratic regimes? Do the leaders of young democracies face tradeoffs as they ponder their electoral and economic strategies? These are among the questions we explore in this paper, which provides an overview of the monograph we are currently writing on the economics of young democracies. We do so first by exploring the hypothesized relationships between democratic politics and economic policy, as well as the findings of several important empirical studies with respect to the economic performance of young democracies around the world. We then provide some descriptive statistics on how the new democracies have fared in practice, making use of a new dataset that we have compiled (and which, among other things, is more up-to-date than most others cited herein). Do the data reveal any distinctive economic patterns with respect to democratic consolidation and reversal? We will show that they do. In particular, we find that deteriorating or stagnant economic performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that the country is at risk of democratic reversal. Moreover, we find considerable variation in economic performance, suggesting that the design of political institutions in new democracies may have a significant influence on the probability of their survival. The Center for Global Development is an independent think tank that works to reduce global poverty and inequality through rigorous research and active engagement with the policy community.

Prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom the U.S. Government asserted that coalition forces would be liberating rather than occupying forces to justify military intervention on humanitarian grounds to reassure domestic and foreign audiences that the United States had no imperialistic ambitions in Iraq and to avoid actions that might cause the Iraqi people to view invading forces as conquerors. As U.S. forces advanced into Iraq and other nations called upon the United States to act as an occupying power under international law the United States refused and maintained that forces were liberating Iraq. When the United States displaced the Iraqi regime in Baghdad U.S. forces did not immediately assume control of the city and restore order. The lawless period that followed cost U.S. forces the support of many Iraqis complicated post-combat governance and endangered the U.S. strategic goal of the creation of a democratic government. This paper argues that if the United States had planned and used occupation authority effectively the United States could have prevented many of the problems that plague post-war Iraq. It recommends that the United States incorporate occupation law into future operations.

In the last few years Southern Africa has been forced to grapple with and redefine security priorities in a complex post-war period. Issues like demilitarisation, resettlement and restructuring of the armed forces in a way that contained erstwhile warring groups have become more strident than ever in the region. The paper focuses on the restructuring of the Mozambican armed services, which is taking place in the context of profound political transformation both at the domestic and regional levels. Its argument evolves around two main considerations: 1) that emerging democracies in Africa should espouse a concept of national security that adequately responds to the concerns of the citizens as much as those of the state, domestically, and promotes a common approach regionally; and 2) that in this context, the armed services should be oriented in such a way that, they do not threaten the new democratic political order but contribute positively to the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation, Africa Development 1999, Vol. XXIV, Nos 3 & 4, 135-176

An uneasy relationship between the army and the society within which it operates is a situation characteristic of most contemporary, relatively developed countries. The major tensions crystallize around three foci: first, the incompatibility between the continuous decline in the centrality and salience of the national security issue and the increased allocation of human andmaterial resources to the military institutions. Second, the societal dilemma between an ideology which advocates the total segregation of the army from the other institutional spheres and the tendencies towards overt or latent role expansion of the military system. Third, the decline of military values and roles as a result of the impact of competing values. As a result of these tensions, the balanced exchange between the social system and the military sub-system tends to be disturbed. The military is often geared to maintaining a level of national security which requires a commitment of resources to this function exceeding the actual input of such resources. Consequently, the performance of the military is often impaired, and the government comes under pressure to increase military spending. Our paper deals with two democratic political systems which, to a considerable extent, avoided this kind of tension between the society at large and its military institutions. The comparison will be between Israel and Switzerland, with the emphasis on the former. The comparison will be made in reference to specific points relevant to the problems under study and will not be a general comparison of the two systems.

In recent months, the Clinton administration has begun to advocate a replacement for the doctrine of containment that drove U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. According to Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the leading candidate to succeed containment is "a strategy of enlargementenlargement of the world's ... community of market democracies."' President Clinton concurs, noting that a strategy of enlargement serves U.S. interests because "democracies rarely wage war on one another."2 Several empirical analyses suggest that the Clinton administration's advocacy of enlargement is well-grounded. They conclude that democratic states do pursue distinctive foreign policies. Perhaps the most intriguing among their findings is that democratic states rarely, if ever, wage war against other democratic states. Indeed, some observers consider this finding to be "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."3 Yet doubts remain about whether the observed association reflects a causal relationship.4 In this paper, we attempt to resolve these doubts. In order to do so, we reexamine both the logic and the empirical basis of the claim central to

It is not possible to understand the national security state and the reasons which give rise to the need for dismantling it without mentioning the profound and wrenching events of the last fifty years. The national security state emerges from war, from fear of revolution and change, from the economic instability of capitalism, and from nuclear weapons and military technology.' It has been the actualizing mechanism of ruling elites to implement their imperial schemes and misplaced ideals.2 In practical terms its emergence is linked to the rise of a bureaucracy that administered things and people in interchangeable fashion without concern for ends or assumptions.3 This state formation matured during a period in which the office of the President became supremely powerful as a broker and legitimating instrument of national security activity.4 This paper argues in somewhat tendentious and breathless form that the state system which has emerged in the United States is a constitutional deformation which menaces the freedom and well being of its citizenry, and which poses a danger to world civilization. What is hanging in the balance in the last twenty-five years of this century is whether the people, scholars, lawyers and judges, and members of the government, can so organize their understanding and their political actions as to avert fascism or Bonapartism, a debilitating arms race that could end in the kind of horror from which there will be no