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This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Asia the rise of both China and India is becoming a reality. Their growth is of an unprecedented scale. While the US continues to be the only superpower, it needs the help of like-minded countries to deal with international challenges. Beyond 2030, the G3-the US, China and India as the pillars of a tri-polar world-may become a reality. In order to cope with changes of this magnitude, increased cooperation between the US, Europe and democracies in Asia is essential. To be successful in adopting this new strategic landscape, it is necessary to strengthen the ties between Europe and democracies in Asia. In this regard, rule-making is the key area for success. Japan is contributing to these efforts by applying a comprehensive engagement policy towards China while strengthening its alliance with the US. Establishing strategic ties with India is also important. Japan and Europe can do much to help achieve stability. After all, Japan needs a strong and engaging Europe, just as Europe needs a strong and active Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with the important and enormously complicated issue of US-Japan Ballistic Missile Defence1 (BMD) cooperation. A context for analysis is developed through the consideration of China's views of the causes and consequences of the highly controversial December 2003 Koizumi Cabinet decision to commit Japan to the US-led missile defence programme. An analytical trajectory is drawn between that decision and the emerging shapers of China's strategic thinking on the process of political, legislative and force-structure reform, which is underway in Japan's security policy. It begins by discussing the rationalisation used by Tokyo and Washington to justify BMD cooperation, and how it is linked at the various different levels of China's policymaking to 'new' threats that have emerged over the last seven years. This connection highlights the pressing need to distinguish between the following questions: what are missile defences (in an operational context), and what are they being used for? It concludes by arguing that the Koizumi and subsequent administration's enthusiasm for US-Japan BMD cooperation is, to many Chinese, tantamount to a long-term Japanese commitment to the materialisation of a new regional security order - one that is capable of forcing Japan to take on a larger security role and severely curtailing China's strategic reach to the outside world. This, for now, makes the very idea of missile defences one of the biggest impediments to more open, trusting and cooperative relations between China and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]