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The article cites U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's unique approach to the formulation of security policy. It highlights the failure of most presidents to fully comprehend the process of formulating grand strategy, particularly the utilization of the National Security Council (NSC) in formulating security policy. It highlight's Eisenhower's commitment to a studied development of U.S. national security strategy and his relevance for today's national security professionals and strategists.

The determination that strategy should have a long-term predictive quality has left strategy seemingly wanting when having to address what are currently called 'strategic shocks', such as the recent Arab Spring and the NATO commitment to Libya. The focus on grand strategy, particularly in the US, is responsible for this trend. Its endeavour to mitigate risk in the national interest is inherently conservative, rather than opportunistic, and it is favoured and probably required by powers that are committed to the status quo, that need to manage diminishing resources, and that are dealing with relative decline. Strategy as traditionally but more narrowly defined by generals for use in a military context, is much more exploitative and proactive. Precisely because it is designed to be used in war it presumes that its function is offensive, that it will have to deal with chance and contingency, and that its aim is change. Its task is to deal with the uncertainties of war, and to respond to them while holding on to long-term perspectives. Clausewitz addressed the issue of 'war plans' in book VIII of On war, but the thinker who did most to inject planning into European strategic thought was Jomini. His influence has permeated much of American military thinking. The effect of nuclear planning in the Cold War was to ensure that strategy at the operational level became conflated with broader views of grand strategy-not least when the Cold War itself provided apparent continuity to strategic thought. Since 1990 we have been left with a view of strategy which fails to respond sensibly to chance and accident. Strategy needs context, and a sense of where and against whom it is to be applied. Its core task is to embrace contingency while holding on to long-term national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a strategic defence review expected to begin in 2010, this article reflects upon the history of the review in British defence policy and planning. The authors argue that for decades successive defence reviews have followed a process in which policy development moves through four phases: failure, inertia, formulation and misimplementation. This has resulted in a cycle of defence reviews that have proved to be incomplete and unsustainable: a cycle in which each review leaves so much unfinished business that another radical reappraisal of defence policy is soon thought necessary, and a cycle from which a succession of governments have so far proved unable or unwilling to escape. The article suggests that the strategic defence (and security) review promised for the next parliament is in danger of continuing this pattern of policy deficiency. The authors contest that this need not be the case. With a close understanding of the pattern of past reviews it should be possible for the 2010 review finally to break the mould and produce a coherent and above all sustainable defence policy and strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the question of how well South African defense policies and investments during the apartheid and postapartheid era have supported the country's overall political objectives. Perhaps not surprisingly, the single-mindedness of mission during apartheid contributed, in many ways, to a defense strategy that was more cohesive than that of the postapartheid era. In the postapartheid era, opportunities for using the country's defense assets to achieve political objectives and overall national priorities have not been fully exploited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to provide an overview of the development of Turkey's defense industry from a historical perspective within the context of the country's national security strategy. Due to its unique geostrategic location and deep-rooted historical, socio-political and economic relations with the countries of its neighboring regions, it is appropriate for Turkey to possess a multidirectional foreign policy and defense concept. Since 1980, Turkey has been taking impressive steps to build a modern defense industry, launching initiatives at the national and international level, leading to the emergence of a new national defense industry strategy and defense concept for the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies, known as "strategic guidelines." The strategies adopted in 1956,1980, and 1993 represent major changes in China's military strategy, or efforts by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to wage war in a new way. Shifts in the conduct of warfare in the international system offer one explanation for why China, a developing country for most of this period, pursued major change in its military strategy. Such shifts in the conduct of warfare should be especially powerful if a gap exists between a state's current strategy and the requirements of future warfare. The PLA has only been able to change strategy, however, when the Chinese Communist Party leadership is united and agrees on basic policies and the structure of authority. When the party is united, it delegates substantial responsibility for military affairs to the PLA leadership, which changes or adjusts military strategy in response to changes in China's security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the author's comments regarding the strategy Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction meant for maintaining national security, maximizing the likelihood of reciprocation and evaluating the genuineness of reciprocations. According to the author, nuclear capacity can serve rational foreign policy if it is viewed as a security base to take limited risks in reducing tensions. A shift in military policy should be clearly indicated at the beginning.

Recent crises show clearly that Europeans security depends on external developments. The Common Security and Defense Policy failed to provide security, while the European Union military missions were limited in terms of their scope. This inability threatens the interests and security of the member states. Exactly, this research explores the concept of military power of the EU. In order to elaborate anatomy of military power of the EU, the descriptiveanalytic method is used. Military performance analysis proves that the EU is able to have the greatest impact in the global arena. The research shows that with the achievement of a political strategy among the stakeholder, on which the replacement of the consensus mechanism with an ordinary majority is predicted, the EU would be able to lead a proactive and efficient security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the current inadequacies of the civil-military relations model advanced by Samuel Huntington and embraced by the US military, the tensions and realities of security policy development, and the professional responsibilities military leaders have for providing the best military advice possible to political leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Preparations for the next UK defence review are under way; a struggle is imminent and the lines of battle are being drawn. There is a grave danger that in the new ‘age of austerity’ defence planning—and strategy generally—will be driven by tribal conflicts, either between supporters of one or other of the armed services or between contending viewpoints about the nature of conflict. And there will be others who will argue that the defence review should be driven simply by the need to reduce government expenditure, as quickly as possible. These arguments not only reduce the defence debate to a struggle between various incompatible and uncompromising tribal beliefs—‘war among the fetishes’, perhaps—they also miss the point. This article gauges the extent of the economic challenges which the UK defence establishment will confront over the coming decade. The authors consider how best to approach the problem of undiminished (and even expanding) commitments at a time of decreasing resources. They argue that defence planning should be driven by the notion of value (the ratio of function to cost), which in turn requires both a clear national political vision and a defence establishment which is output- rather than input-oriented. Finally, the authors assert that defence must transform itself to be able to achieve the outputs required in the most efficient and responsive manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On July 30 the European Union started its second largest military operation so far. However, for the EU, interventions abroad for security and peace are nothing new. The EU is involved in security interventions on three continents and in 11 missions. In parallel, the project of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is being advanced by the member states with battle groups, a European gendarmerie, and the Defence Agency. However, the more the EU extends its security policy engagement the more diffuse ESDP's political and strategic profile seems to be. In fact, at the end of 2003 the member states adopted the EU's first common security strategy, but even this document leaves a number of crucial issues unanswered, above all what EU military intervention would involve. A political and societal debate concerning what European Security and Defence Policy wishes to achieve, as well as its limitations and requirements, is urgent. The central question is the following: Is ESDP under the conditions of the twenty-first century defined primarily as a defense or as a political project? A juxtaposition of the concepts "offensive (self-) defense" and "human security" illustrates the conceptual and strategic alternatives facing Europe in security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]