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Following the declaration of Kosovo's independence, The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo - EULEX - has been deployed under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). EULEX mission, as one of the largest ESDP Missions, has induced considerable academic and policy debate within political science and security studies, as well. The mission as such is characterised with highly complex political state of affairs. Consequently, this plethora of the mission's complexity has resulted first of all in a number of difficulties, initially in its deployment then it was followed by evident inconsistencies in its profile within the CSDP framework. Nonetheless, from the security point of view, the paper tends to underline the importance of the EULEX Mission as an ultimate regional stability and security factor. Given that, not only Kosovo but all Western Balkan countries aspire European Integration, the EU perspective should not to be perceived only as a diplomatic and rhetorical discourse; from this end, a stable Kosovo would ultimately mean a stable region. Thus, taking into consideration EU's increased involvement in providing security as derives from CSDP, the paper tries to highlight the importance of the successful implementation of EULEX Mission by employing the Regional Security Complex theory. The paper tries to demonstrate the fact that the successful completion of EULEX mission will certainly have a crucial impact in the security dynamics of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than fifteen years after engaging in the endeavors of giving a political and security muscle to the already powerful economic European Union, there is still a good deal of work that needs to be done. Most of the institutions necessary for carrying out the security and defence tasks are already at work and still the European Union is rather shy in undertaking such responsibilities. The article is centered around the possible answers to the question of the extent to which the new by no means constitutional but still reform Treaty of Lisbon will be able to strengthen the authority of the European Union, in a very sensitive and highly important area for its respectability, as an effective actor on the world stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has mainly been used to deploy small-scale operations, which generally did not provide the member states with clear security benefits. This article combines insights from different theories of international relations to explain this disappointing track record. It argues that liberal theories adequately identify the domestic pressures the member states' governments need to accommodate in the area of crisis management. Constructivism, on its part, properly emphasises the diverging strategic cultures of the member states. Both theories however fail to explain why domestic pressures and diverging strategic cultures lead to small-scale operations. Rational-choice institutionalism does provide a convincing explanation for the latter by drawing attention to the CSDP's ineffective institutional design. Realism, in turn, is best positioned to explain why the CSDP was not designed more effectively, by emphasising the reluctance of states to transfer sovereignty to international organisations. The article concludes by discussing two measures that could alleviate the impact of the identified impediments on the CSDP's track record: devising a CSDP-strategy and adapting the consensus rule. However, since the latter is very unlikely in the near future, the CSDP is not expected to develop into a more effective framework for crisis management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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On July 30 the European Union started its second largest military operation so far. However, for the EU, interventions abroad for security and peace are nothing new. The EU is involved in security interventions on three continents and in 11 missions. In parallel, the project of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is being advanced by the member states with battle groups, a European gendarmerie, and the Defence Agency. However, the more the EU extends its security policy engagement the more diffuse ESDP's political and strategic profile seems to be. In fact, at the end of 2003 the member states adopted the EU's first common security strategy, but even this document leaves a number of crucial issues unanswered, above all what EU military intervention would involve. A political and societal debate concerning what European Security and Defence Policy wishes to achieve, as well as its limitations and requirements, is urgent. The central question is the following: Is ESDP under the conditions of the twenty-first century defined primarily as a defense or as a political project? A juxtaposition of the concepts "offensive (self-) defense" and "human security" illustrates the conceptual and strategic alternatives facing Europe in security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kosovo campaign of 1999 demonstrated unambiguously the weakness of European military forces. Recognition of the consequences of this lack of capability has put new vigour into the European defence debate. Yet decline in military capability is systemic in every European country. The Helsinki goals will do nothing to address this decline. National defence budgets over the past 15 years have been decreasing in real terms. Even if current aspirations to hold military spending levels were to be achieved, the decline in capabilities would continue. Military equipment and personnel costs rise faster than domestic inflation, and therefore fewer people and weapons systems can be afforded each year. There is no prospect of significant uplifts in defence budgets in Europe, despite the acknowledged need for a range of expensive enabling capabilities for post-Cold War operations. Palliative measures now on trial are unlikely to have a major impact. The only option for European nations is a progressive integration of their forces to realize the economies of scale that would allow effectiveness to be maintained. There are opportunities for initiatives that would produce short-term pay-offs. Despite the severe political difficulties of a long-term plan for integration, the alternative is worse. Trying to maintain sovereignty in defence provision will mean that the nations of Europe will eventually be unable either to meet the requirements of even their most modest security needs or to exercise any influence over US defence and security policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]