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President Obama's 2013 veto of a US International Trade Commission (ITC) exclusion order, issued to address Apple Inc.'s infringement of a patent owned by Samsung, thrust the ITC's public interest inquiry into the spotlight. Historically, however, these factors rarely weighed against a remedy at the ITC. Likewise, US district courts have rarely declined to issue a permanent injunction after finding a patent valid and infringed due solely to the public interest factor--the last of the four factors that the Supreme Court put in place in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. More recent decisions addressing the public interest in both forums, however, show a willingness by the adjudicators to weigh both traditional public interest issues, such as health and well-being, and non-traditional arguments, such as public reliance and environmental concerns, against a patent owner's right to exclude. In this Article, we examine some of the successful traditional and non-traditional public interest arguments, both at the ITC and in US district courts. From this analysis, the Article outlines how parties involved in high-stakes patent litigation in either forum can craft public interest arguments to combat the threat of a permanent injunction or an ITC exclusion order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the greatest challenges facing patent holders is the enforcement of their rights against foreign (non-US) infringers. Jurisdictional rules can prevent patent holders from filing patent infringement suits where they have the greatest likelihood of success in enforcement, such as where the infringer is located, has its seat, or holds its assets. Instead, patent holders must file lawsuits in the country where the infringed patent was issued. But filing a patent lawsuit in a US court against a non-US infringer may be subject to various difficulties associated with the fact that US substantive patent law (particularly as regards its territorial scope) and conflict of laws rules are not always compatible and interoperable with the conflict of laws rules of other countries. Such insufficient compatibility and interoperability can lead to US judgments not being enforceable outside the United States. In the Hague Conference's Judgments Project, which the Conference relaunched in 2012, the United States has an opportunity to negotiate internationally-uniform conflict of laws rules to improve cross-border litigation, including cross-border patent litigation. This Article provides data on cross-border patent litigation that can be used to show the extent of the cross-border patent litigation problem and assist in assessing the appropriate degree of US involvement in the Judgments Project. The Article updates the author's earlier research on cross-border aspects of patent litigation, contributes to the rapidly growing body of empirical literature on patent litigation (including the literature on the "patent troll" phenomenon), and enriches the literature on foreign litigants in patent disputes and on transnational litigation in general (both of which suffer from a dearth of statistical data). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technological standards allow manufacturers and consumers to rely upon these agreed-upon basic systems to facilitate sales and further invention. However, where these standards involved patented technology, the process of standard-setting raises many concerns at the intersection of antitrust and patent law. As patent holders advocate for their patents to become part of technological standards, how should courts police this activity to prevent patent holdup and other anti-competitive practices? This Note explores the differing approaches to remedies employed by the United States International Trade Commission and the United States District Courts where standard-essential patents are infringed. This Note further proposes that both adjudicative bodies should utilize the public policy prongs of their respective analyses to deny injunctive relief where an entity has previously pledged to license its standard-essential patent and fails to undergo appropriate negotiations prior to bringing a patent infringement suit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses two patent infringement cases related to implementation of new rules to determine reliability of expert damages analysis. Topics discussed include judicial trends for patent remedies, principles of legal pragmatism and decisions of district courts. Also mentioned are principles on patent damages, hiring of several economic experts and applications of Apple Inc. iphones.

The International Trade Commission (ITC) provides a special forum for adjudicating patent disputes involving imports. It offers several advantages over United States district courts to patentees, including relaxed jurisdictional requirements, speed, and unique remedies. Unlike district courts, the ITC almost automatically grants injunctive relief to prevailing patentees, and does not recognize certain defenses to infringement. These features have been justified as needed to prosecute foreign infringers who would otherwise evade U.S. district courts. They have also led to charges that the ITC is protectionist and unfair to defendants and that it fosters inconsistency in U.S. patent law. Based on an analysis of every patent investigation initiated at the ITC from 1995 to mid-2007, this Article assesses these charges. ITC cases involve domestic defendants as often as they do foreign defendants, and 72 percent of the time in combination. Thus, U.S. companies are just as likely to be named in ITC actions as defendants as are foreigners. When cases were adjudicated, plaintiffs at the ITC were more likely to win than plaintiffs in district court (58 percent vs. 35 percent). However, when cases filed in both venues were compared, most of this difference disappeared (54 percent vs. 50 percent), cutting against claims of an anti-defendant bias. The data, however, provide some support for the third contention. The ITC takes about half as much time to decide cases, is four times more likely to adjudicate its cases (44 percent vs. 11 percent), and more readily awards injunctions to prevailing patentees (100 percent vs. 79 percent) than district court. The ITC cannot award damages though, and its decisions do not bind district courts. The relief provided is thus neither complete nor final. This creates incentives for litigants to file in both venues, which is done at least 65 percent of the time and creates the possibility of duplicative litigation and inconsistent results. As the number of ITC-eligible cases expands with the growth in overseas manufacturing, the interface between the venues should be revisited. This Article suggests several ways to strengthen coordination between the ITC and district courts to take into account the increase in parallel litigation and concurrent risk of judicial inefficiency. These include (1) limiting patent jurisdiction at the ITC to cases that otherwise could not be heard in a U.S. district court; and (2) reducing the incentive for cases to be filed in both venues by harmonizing their rules and remedies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the alleged prejudice of the International Trade Commission (ITC) in its patent infringement cases in the U.S. It assumes to use the decisions of district courts as bases for review with ITC's judgments. Results from the review reveal that ITC favors patent holders more than district courts and grants injunctive help as a remedy for infringement more frequently.