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From being a relatively neglected field, the study of de facto states has developed rapidly in recent years. As the break-up of the Soviet Union produced seven de facto states – four that still exist to this day (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) and three that are now defunct (Chechnya, the Done – scholars from this region have contributed greatly to the development of this field. Russian scholars have been particularly active, with Russia serving as the patron state of three of the extant entities (having reintegrated/absorbed the three defunct ones), as well as of the patron of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia. But Western scholars have also made a sizeable contribution, although often working in relative isolation from “local” research. Whereas local researchers excel in in-depth knowledge of the history and culture of the region, their Western colleagues add to the comparative and theoretical approaches. And just as Russian researchers naturally focus on the relations of the Eurasian de facto states with their Russian patron, their Western counterparts often analyse the policies of their own countries towards these entities. Thus, we argue, two separate “ecosystems” of research into Eurasian de facto states have gradually developed: a “local” one and a “Western” one, each with its own peculiarities. In this article, we survey the “Western” literature on de facto states, noting the various assessments of the possibilities for US and EU engagement with the Eurasian de facto states. The scholarly literature discussing Western engagement emerges as partly analytical, explaining what Western states are doing and not doing and why, and partly normative, offering policy recommendations on how best to engage. Implicit in the concept of “engagement,” however, is the understanding that engagement is preferable to “ignoring” or “sanctioning.” According to this view, Western cooperation with de facto state authorities is inevitable.

De facto states – unrecognized secessionist entities that eke out a living on the margins of the international system – are often heavily dependent on external patron states for economic aid and investment. When the parent state – the state that the de facto state seeks to break away from – responds to the secessionist attempt by imposing sanctions or economic blockades, this further exacerbates such dependency. Moreover, due to their lack of international recognition, de facto states often have limited opportunities to engage with the outside world beyond the patron and the parent state. However, closer examination of one such de facto state, Abkhazia, reveals that de facto states can enjoy some bounded independent economic agency. Abkhazia’s maneuvering between Russia as “patron,” Georgia as “parent state,” and the wider international community (here exemplified by the EU) in the sphere of trade and economic interaction has important implications for de-facto state conflict transformation.

One widely recognized achievement of the Arctic Council and its various working groups has been the production of collectively generated assessments on Arctic problems. Assessment reports such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) provide an important baseline of shared knowledge for making collective circumpolar policy recommendations. But how does the knowledge produced through Arctic Council working groups figure into the policymaking of the Arctic states? This is an important question for understanding Arctic politics and the relationship between national decisionmaking and international relations more generally. Much of what the Arctic Council produces is in the form of recommendations, declarations of intent, and commitments to "best practices" in areas of shared interest and activity. While in recent years the Council has produced three binding agreements covering specific functional areas—search and rescue (2011), oil pollution preparedness and response (2013),and science cooperation (2017)—much ongoing Arctic collaborative work falls outside of these areas. This policy brief explores how science/policy outputs of and discussions at the Arctic Council fit into the Arctic political discourse of the USA, with an emphasis on key actors within the executive branch: the White House, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The Arctic Council and US domestic policymaking

Russia’s recently proclaimed turn toward Asia is fuelled by expectations of reaping benefits from integrating with the fast-growing markets of Northeast Asia. However, such a geoeconomic reorientation requires a viable springboard in the Russian Far East. For all the talk about Asia–Pacific markets, a key component of the Asian pivot is Russia’s own Far Eastern region, an underdeveloped, crisis-ridden backwater that currently constitutes a ‘double periphery’ – in relation to Moscow, and to the Asia–Pacific (Kuhrt 2012).

«DE RUSSISKE MINORITETENE I ESTLAND OG LATVIA. MINORITETERS RESPONSMEKANISMER VED ENDREDE RAMMEBETINGELSER» Oppgaven tar for seg de russiske minoritetene i Estland og Latvias valg av responsstrategier i forbindelse med de endrede rammebetingelsene som oppsto med oppløsningen av Sovjetunionen. Utgangspunktet er Albert Hirschmans typologi over 'exit', 'voice' og 'loyalty' kombinert med en case-spesifikk typologi utviklet av Rogers Brubaker. Ved å kombinere de to typologiene innføres det et skille mellom individuelle og kollektive løsninger, og det identifiseres seks grupper av responsstrategier. De to casene Estland og Latvia sammenlignes deretter for om mulig å avdekke forskjeller i de russiske minoritetene valg av responsstrategier. Hovedkonklusjonen er at de russiske minoritetene etter 1øsrivelsen har vært lite politisk aktive, men at stemmebruk-opsjonen gradvis har blitt mer utbredt blant minoriteten i Estland. I Latvia, hvor myndighetene har vært mer tilbakeholdne med å utfordre den russiske minoriteten, har graden av politisk mobilisering til forsvar for minoritetens rettigheter vært lavere. Oppgaven avsluttes med en kort vurdering av hvorvidt minoritetenes valg av responsstrategier har påvirket myndighetenes utforming av politikken. Det konkluderes med at dette i liten grad har vært tilfelle og at man for å få en fyllestgjørende forklaring på hvorfor myndighetene i enkelte tilfeller har valgt å moderere sin politikk overfor myndighetene synes å måtte trekke inn internasjonale aktører i analysen.

Almost two years ago, China and the United States instigated a trade conflict which has had serious international effects, a situation since exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. What has truly made a solution to this conflict elusive, however, is that its origins lie well beyond questions of trade deficits and fair competition, and are instead based on the looming question of a power transition between to the two states. The effects of this divergence are beginning to be observed in several economic realms, including the financial and the technological. Many other actors in the global economy have begun to experience the side effects of this completion, and may now have to face difficult choices about how to balance between these two emerging poles in the current fragile global economy.