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The last two decades saw multiple attempts to explain how the self is represented in the brain within the framework of the Bayesian brain. However, these attempts largely focused on describing a developed, adult self-representation. The current paper argues that looking at the developmental trajectory is crucial for understanding the structure of self-representation. It argues that emergence of self-representations should be understood as an instance of the process of acquisition of new internal models of hidden causes of sensory input. The paper proposes how such models emerge and develop over the course of life by looking at different stages of development of bodily and extra-bodily self-representations. It argues that the self arises gradually in a series of discrete steps: from first-person multisensory representations of one's body to third-person multisensory body representation, and from basic forms of the extended and social selves to progressively more complex forms of abstract self-representation. It discusses how each of them might emerge based on domain-general learning mechanisms, while also taking into account the potential role of innate representations. Finally, it discusses how predictions of the proposed model might be experimentally tested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a dynamic multisensory representation of the space around the body, influenced by internal and external sensory information. The malleability of PPS boundaries, as evidenced by their expansion after tool use or modulation through social interactions, positions PPS as a crucial element in understanding the subjective experiences of self and otherness. Building on the existing literature highlighting both the cognitive and bodily effects of mindfulness meditation, this study proposes a novel approach by employing focused-attention meditation (FAM) and a multisensory audio–tactile task to assess PPS in both the extension and sharpness of its boundaries. The research hypothesis posits that FAM, which emphasizes heightened attention to bodily sensations and interoception, may reduce the extension of PPS and make its boundaries less sharp. We enrolled 26 non-meditators who underwent a repeated measure design in which they completed the PPS task before and after a 15-min FAM induction. We found a significant reduction in the sharpness of PPS boundaries but no significant reduction in PPS extension. These results provide novel insights into the immediate effects of FAM on PPS, potentially shedding light on the modulation of self–other representations in both cognitive and bodily domains. Indeed, our findings could have implications for understanding the intricate relationship between mindfulness practices and the subjective experience of self within spatial contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peripersonal space (PPS) is a dynamic multisensory representation of the space around the body, influenced by internal and external sensory information. The malleability of PPS boundaries, as evidenced by their expansion after tool use or modulation through social interactions, positions PPS as a crucial element in understanding the subjective experiences of self and otherness. Building on the existing literature highlighting both the cognitive and bodily effects of mindfulness meditation, this study proposes a novel approach by employing focused-attention meditation (FAM) and a multisensory audio–tactile task to assess PPS in both the extension and sharpness of its boundaries. The research hypothesis posits that FAM, which emphasizes heightened attention to bodily sensations and interoception, may reduce the extension of PPS and make its boundaries less sharp. We enrolled 26 non-meditators who underwent a repeated measure design in which they completed the PPS task before and after a 15-min FAM induction. We found a significant reduction in the sharpness of PPS boundaries but no significant reduction in PPS extension. These results provide novel insights into the immediate effects of FAM on PPS, potentially shedding light on the modulation of self–other representations in both cognitive and bodily domains. Indeed, our findings could have implications for understanding the intricate relationship between mindfulness practices and the subjective experience of self within spatial contexts.

Neurological evidence has shown that brain damages canselectively impair the ability to discriminate between objectsbelonging to others and those that we feel are our own. Despitethe ubiquity and relevance of this sense of object ownership forour life, the underlying cognitive mechanisms are still poorlyunderstood. Here we ask whether psychological ownership ofan object can be based on its incorporation in one’s body image.To explore this possibility with healthy participants, weemployed a modified version of the rubber hand illusion inwhich both the participant and the rubber hand wore a ring. Weused the self-prioritization effect in a perceptual matching taskas an indirect measure of the sense of (dis)ownership overobjects. Results indicate that undermining the bodily self hascascade effects on the representation of owned objects, at leastfor those associated with the body for a long time.

Background: Disembodiment and socio-emotional deficits are core features of the schizophrenia spectrum from the prodromal stages to chronic illness. A recent study documented anomalous emotional embodiment in individuals with schizophrenia. Although bodily self disturbances have been shown to precede and predict psychosis onset in at-risk populations, the etiology of anomalous emotional embodiment remains largely unexplored. The present study investigated bodily maps of emotions in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of embodied emotions in the schizophrenia spectrum. Methods: A total of 419 participants (312 female; 19.50 ± 1.22 years) completed a topographical body mapping task where they reported patterns of embodiment experienced in the context of eleven different emotions and a neutral state (EmBODY). Embodied emotions were investigated in relation to multidimensional schizotypy. Results: Individuals with elevated negative schizotypy experienced embodied emotions with higher intensity (r = 0.16, p = 0.003) but lower clarity (i.e., endorsing activation and deactivation in the same bodily location; β = -0.28, 95% CI [-0.54, -0.03], Z = 2.25, p=0.02) and endorsed more incongruent bodily sensations of emotions (i.e., reporting bodily activation in the context of a low-arousal emotion, r = 0.12, p = 0.05; reporting bodily deactivation in the context of high-arousal emotions, r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In line with the anomalous emotional embodiment documented in individuals with schizophrenia, some of these differences were particularly notable for low-arousal emotions. Discussion: These results reveal negative schizotypy as a significant correlate of differences in emotional embodiment. More work is needed to link these differences to the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions documented in schizophrenia and assess their functional impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increasing amount of recent research has focused on the multisensory and neural bases of the bodily self. This pre‐reflective form of self is considered as multifaceted, incorporating phenomenal components, such as self location, body ownership, first‐person perspective, agency, and the perceptual body image. Direct electrical brain stimulation (EBS) during presurgical evaluation of epilepsy and brain tumor resection is a unique method to causally relate specific brain areas to the various phenomenal components of the bodily self. We conducted a systematic review of the literature describing altered phenomenal experience of the bodily self evoked by EBS. We included 42 articles and analyzed self reports from 221 patients. Three‐dimensional density maps of EBS revealed that stimulation in the middle cingulum, inferior parietal lobule, supplementary motor area, posterior insula, hippocampal complex/amygdala, and precuneus most consistently altered one or several components of the bodily self. In addition, we found that only EBS in the parietal cortex induced disturbances of all five components of the bodily self considered in this review article. These findings inform current neuroscientific models of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Bodily self-recognition requires the individual to be able to refer to himself through a reflexive representation, typically a schema or an image of one’s own body. Body ownership results from an interplay between exteroception and interoception (i.e., the ability to perceive one’s own body from the inside). It has been demonstrated that perceiving sensations inside the body could be associated with better regulation of emotions. Also, it has been reported that interoceptive awareness may be affected by gender. Therefore, this pilot study aimed to investigate gender differences in the interoceptive awareness among Italian people. Methods: 114 Italian volunteers (57 males and 57 females) completed the 32-item Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire to measure the multiple dimensions of interoceptive awareness. Results: The findings showed higher scores among females than among males for the ability to notice interoceptive input and the awareness of the relationship between bodily sensations and emotional states. Conclusions: Results suggested that women could be more inclined to notice and focus on internal cues. Also, the gender differences could be related to physical and hormonal changes that women experience during development. Future research on the relationship between gender and physiological responses (e.g., heartbeat, skin conductance) for a specific ethnographic sample is recommended.

BackgroundDisembodiment and socio-emotional deficits are core features of the schizophrenia spectrum from the prodromal stages to chronic illness. A recent study documented anomalous emotional embodiment in individuals with schizophrenia. Although bodily self disturbances have been shown to precede and predict psychosis onset in at-risk populations, the etiology of anomalous emotional embodiment remains largely unexplored. The present study investigated bodily maps of emotions in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of embodied emotions in the schizophrenia spectrum.MethodsA total of 419 participants (312 female; 19.50 ± 1.22 years) completed a topographical body mapping task where they reported patterns of embodiment experienced in the context of eleven different emotions and a neutral state (EmBODY). Embodied emotions were investigated in relation to multidimensional schizotypy.ResultsIndividuals with elevated negative schizotypy experienced embodied emotions with higher intensity (r = 0.16, p = 0.003) but lower clarity (i.e., endorsing activation and deactivation in the same bodily location; β = −0.28, 95% CI [−0.54, −0.03], Z = 2.25, p=0.02) and endorsed more incongruent bodily sensations of emotions (i.e., reporting bodily activation in the context of a low-arousal emotion, r = 0.12, p = 0.05; reporting bodily deactivation in the context of high-arousal emotions, r = 0.13, p = 0.02). In line with the anomalous emotional embodiment documented in individuals with schizophrenia, some of these differences were particularly notable for low-arousal emotions.DiscussionThese results reveal negative schizotypy as a significant correlate of differences in emotional embodiment. More work is needed to link these differences to the anomalous bodily sensations of emotions documented in schizophrenia and assess their functional impact.

Background: Bodily self-recognition requires the individual to be able to refer to himself through a reflexive representation, typically a schema or an image of one's own body. Body ownership results from an interplay between exteroception and interoception (i.e., the ability to perceive one's own body from the inside). It has been demonstrated that perceiving sensations inside the body could be associated with better regulation of emotions. Also, it has been reported that interoceptive awareness may be affected by gender. Therefore, this pilot study aimed to investigate gender differences in the interoceptive awareness among Italian people. Methods: 114 Italian volunteers (57 males and 57 females) completed the 32-item Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA) questionnaire to measure the multiple dimensions of interoceptive awareness. Results: The findings showed higher scores among females than among males for the ability to notice interoceptive input and the awareness of the relationship between bodily sensations and emotional states. Conclusions: Results suggested that women could be more inclined to notice and focus on internal cues. Also, the gender differences could be related to physical and hormonal changes that women experience during development. Future research on the relationship between gender and physiological responses (e.g., heartbeat, skin conductance) for a specific ethnographic sample is recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schizophrenia is associated with self-disturbances and anomalous embodiment of emotion such that the distinct patterns of bodily sensations that typically accompany specific emotions are disrupted. Previous evidence indicated that cultural factors might shape the embodiment of emotion and therefore influence the subjective experience of schizophrenia.We investigated embodiment of emotion in individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and matched control participants (CO) from Korea (26 ​K-SZ and 26 ​K–CO) and the USA (26 US-SZ and US-26 CO), using a topographical mapping task that requires participants to indicate the locations of bodily sensations that accompany 14 distinct emotions. We found that emotion-related bodily sensations, especially for low-arousal emotions, were diminished in SZ compared to CO in both cultures. Cultural differences emerged in the embodiment of sadness, shame and disgust such that the patterns of bodily sensations associated with these emotions were more similar between SZ and CO in the Korean sample than in the US sample.These findings suggest that emotional embodiment anomalies are present in SZ regardless of culture, supporting the universality of bodily self-disturbances in this population. However, there are culture-specific features of embodied emotional experiences that may be important to consider for future research and treatment.

Background and Hypothesis A primary disruption of the bodily self is considered a core feature of schizophrenia (SCZ). The "disembodied" self might be underpinned by inefficient body-related multisensory integration processes, normally occurring in the peripersonal space (PPS), a plastic sector of space surrounding the body whose extent is altered in SCZ. Although PPS is a malleable interface marking the perceptual border between self and others, no study has addressed the potential alteration of its plasticity in SCZ. We investigated the plasticity of PPS in SCZ patients after a motor training with a tool in the far space. Study Design Twenty-seven SCZ patients and 32 healthy controls (HC) underwent an audio-tactile task to estimate PPS boundary before (Session 1) and after (Session 3) the tool-use. Parameters of PPS, including the size and the slope of the psychometric function describing audio-tactile RTs as a function of the audio-tactile distances, were estimated. Study Results Results confirm a narrow PPS extent in SCZ. Surprisingly, we found PPS expansion in both groups, thus showing for the first time a preserved PPS plasticity in SCZ. Patients experienced a weaker differentiation from others, as indicated by a shallower PPS slope at Session 1 that correlated positively with negative symptoms. However, at Session 3, patients marked their bodily boundary in a steeper way, suggesting a sharper demarcation of PPS boundaries after the action with the tool. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of investigating the multisensory and motor roots of self-disorders, paving the way for future body-centred rehabilitation interventions that could improve patients' altered body boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bodily self disturbances are core features of schizophrenia. Body ownership, one component of the bodily self, can be assessed with the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), which is induced by a synchronous brushing of a visible fake hand and one's own occluded hand. Schizophrenia is associated with increased RHI strength and diminished body ownership. This study examined RHI in relation to schizotypy to extend our understanding of self-disturbances in the schizophrenia-spectrum.Ninety-seven college students completed the RHI task and self-report questionnaires. Regressions were used to assess the RHI strength in relation to the 3 schizotypy factors (positive, negative, disorganized). We also examined the correlations between self-reported bodily self disturbances and RHI strength.Positive schizotypy predicted a stronger subjective experience of the RHI, whereas negative schizotypy predicted weakened RHI susceptibility. Questionnaire measures of self-disturbances correlated with stronger RHI. In sum, we confirmed the link between positive schizotypy and the subjective experience of the RHI, which suggests a weakened sense of body ownership. Interestingly, we also found a relationship between negative schizotypy and reduced RHI, which implies strengthened body ownership. These results also underscore the complexity of the link between the phenomenological experience of bodily disturbances and the experimentally measured sense of body ownership.

Fibromyalgia (FM) is characterised by chronic, continuous, widespread pain, often associated with a sense of fatigue, non-restorative sleep and physical exhaustion. Due to the nature of this condition and the absence of other neurological issues potentially able to induce disorders in body representations per se, it represents a perfect model since it provides an opportunity to study the relationship between pain and the bodily self. Corporeal illusions were investigated in 60 participants with or without a diagnosis of FM by means of an ad hoc devised interview. In addition, motor imagery was investigated and illusions relating to body part movements and changes in body size, feelings of alienness, and sensations of body parts not belonging to one's own body (disownership and somatoparaphrenic-like sensations) were found. Crucially, these symptoms do not correlate with any of the clinical measures of pain or functional deficits. The results showed that motor imagery was also impaired, and the severity of the deficits found correlated with the functional impairment of the participant. This indicates that disorders in body representations and motor imagery are part of the clinical expression of FM. However, while motor imagery seems to be linked to reduced autonomy and functional deficits, bodily illusions are independent and potentially represent a concurrent symptom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The tactile sense plays a crucial role in the development and maintenance of a functional bodily self. The ability to differentiate between self- and nonself-generated touch contributes to the perception of the bodies’ boundaries and more generally to self-other-distinction, both of which are thought be altered in anorexia nervosa (AN) and autism spectrum condition (AS). While it has been suggested that AN and AS are characterized by overlapping symptomatology, they might differ regarding body perception and self-other-distinction. Methods: Participants with a diagnosis of AN (n = 25), AS (n = 29), and a comparison group without diagnoses (n = 57) performed a self-other-touch task during functional brain imaging. In the experimental conditions, they stroked their own arm or were stroked on the arm by an experimenter. Results: As shown previously, the CG group showed lower activation or deactivation in response to self-touch compared to social touch from someone else. A main group effect was found in areas including somatosensory cortex, frontal and temporal gyri, insula, and subcortical regions. This was driven by increased activations in participants with AN, while participants in the AS group showed mostly comparable activations to the comparison group. Conclusions: AN diagnosis was associated with an increased neural activity in response to both self-touch and social touch. Failure to attenuate self-touch might relate to altered predictions regarding the own body and reduced perception of bodily boundaries. Participants with an AS diagnosis were mostly comparable to the comparison group, potentially indicating unaltered tactile self-other-distinction.

Fibromyalgia (FM) is characterised by chronic, continuous, widespread pain, often associated with a sense of fatigue, non-restorative sleep and physical exhaustion. Due to the nature of this condition and the absence of other neurological issues potentially able to induce disorders in body representations per se, it represents a perfect model since it provides an opportunity to study the relationship between pain and the bodily self. Corporeal illusions were investigated in 60 participants with or without a diagnosis of FM by means of an ad hoc devised interview. In addition, motor imagery was investigated and illusions relating to body part movements and changes in body size, feelings of alienness, and sensations of body parts not belonging to one’s own body (disownership and somatoparaphrenic-like sensations) were found. Crucially, these symptoms do not correlate with any of the clinical measures of pain or functional deficits. The results showed that motor imagery was also impaired, and the severity of the deficits found correlated with the functional impairment of the participant. This indicates that disorders in body representations and motor imagery are part of the clinical expression of FM. However, while motor imagery seems to be linked to reduced autonomy and functional deficits, bodily illusions are independent and potentially represent a concurrent symptom.

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.

Surgical treatment of tumors, epileptic foci or of vascular origin, requires a detailed individual pre-surgical workup and intra-operative surveillance of brain functions to minimize the risk of post-surgical neurological deficits and decline of quality of life. Most attention is attributed to language, motor functions, and perception. However, higher cognitive functions such as social cognition, personality, and the sense of self may be affected by brain surgery. To date, the precise localization and the network patterns of brain regions involved in such functions are not yet fully understood, making the assessment of risks of related post-surgical deficits difficult. It is in the interest of neurosurgeons to understand with which neural systems related to selfhood and personality they are interfering during surgery. Recent neuroscience research using virtual reality and clinical observations suggest that the insular cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and temporo-parietal junction are important components of a neural system dedicated to self-consciousness based on multisensory bodily processing, including exteroceptive and interoceptive cues (bodily self-consciousness (BSC)). Here, we argue that combined extra- and intra-operative approaches using targeted cognitive testing, functional imaging and EEG, virtual reality, combined with multisensory stimulations, may contribute to the assessment of the BSC and related cognitive aspects. Although the usefulness of particular biomarkers, such as cardiac and respiratory signals linked to virtual reality, and of heartbeat evoked potentials as a surrogate marker for intactness of multisensory integration for intra-operative monitoring has to be proved, systemic and automatized testing of BSC in neurosurgical patients will improve future surgical outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Differentiation between self-produced tactile stimuli and touch by others is necessary for social interactions and for a coherent concept of “self”. In attention-deficit-hyperactivity-disorder (ADHD), tactile hypersensitivity and social cognition problems are part of the symptomatology, but pathophysiological mechanisms are largely unknown. Differentiation of self- and non-self- generated sensations might be key to understand and develop novel strategies for managing hypersensitivity. Here, we compared the neural signatures of affective self- and other-touch between adults with ADHD and neurotypical controls (NC). Methods: Twenty-eight adult ADHD participants and 30 age- and gender-matched NC performed a self-other-touch-task during functional magnetic resonance imaging: they stroked their own arm, an object, or were stroked by the experimenter. In addition, tactile detection thresholds and rubber hand illusion (RHI) were measured. Results: ADHD participants had more autistic traits than NC and reported to engage less in interpersonal touch. They also reported to be more sensitive to tactile stimuli. Compared to NC, ADHD participants showed enhanced responses to both the self- and other-touch conditions: stronger deactivation during self-touch in the anterior and posterior insula, and increased activation during other-touch in primary somatosensory cortex. ADHD participants had intact tactile detection thresholds, but were less susceptible to the RHI. Conclusions: Unaltered detection thresholds suggest that peripheral processing is intact, and that hypersensitivity might be driven by central mechanisms. This has clinical implications for managing somatosensory hypersensitivity in ADHD. The more pronounced differentiation between self- and other-touch might indicate a clearer self-other-distinction. This is of interest regarding body ownership perception in both NC and ADHD, and possibly other psychiatric conditions with altered self-experiences, like schizophrenia. A sharper boundary of the own body might relate to deficits in social cognition and tactile hypersensitivity.

Multimedia technologies and virtual reality offer unique possibilities to manipulate sensory, motor, interpersonal, and cognitive processes contributing to atypical developmental trajectories, thus holding an explosive potential to design innovative and engaging interventions. However, there has been little progress in developing interventions that go beyond the patient’s diagnosis or the fascination of technology and rather spring from a deep understanding of the specific neuropsychological processes to be nurtured in individuals. This perspective paper outlines how recent insights from developmental cognitive neuroscience can be leveraged to promote children’s multidimensional development and highlight future directions and challenges for innovating both research and clinical practice. Finally, we focus on some practical examples of multimedia and virtual reality activities we have designed to stimulate bodily-self experiences, which are crucial for building up a coherent sense of self and lay the foundation for interacting with the external world. Atypical bodily self is an early marker of heterogeneous neurodevelopmental conditions (such as autism spectrum disorders) and seems to be under-targeted in research and clinical approaches.

Exteroceptive and interoceptive signals shape and sustain the bodily self‐awareness. The existence of a set of brain areas, supporting the integration of information coming from the inside and the outside of the body in building the sense of bodily self‐awareness has been postulated, yet the evidence remains limited, a matter of discussion never assessed quantitatively. With the aim of unrevealing where in the brain interoceptive and exteroceptive signals may converge, we performed a meta‐analysis on imaging studies of the sense of body ownership, modulated by external visuotactile stimulation, and studies on interoception, which involves the self‐awareness for internal bodily sensations. Using a multilevel kernel density analysis, we found that processing of stimuli of the two domains converges primarily in the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally. Furthermore, we found a right‐lateralized set of areas, including the precentral and postcentral, and superior temporal gyri. We discuss these results and propose this set of areas as ideal candidates to match multiple body‐related signals contributing to the creation of a multidimensional representation of the bodily self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is currently not fully understood where people precisely locate themselves in their bodies, particularly in virtual reality. To investigate this, we asked participants to point directly at themselves and to several of their body parts with a virtual pointer, in two virtual reality (VR) setups, a VR headset and a large-screen immersive display (LSID). There was a difference in distance error in pointing to body parts depending on VR setup. Participants pointed relatively accurately to many of their body parts (i.e., eyes, nose, chin, shoulders, and waist). However, in both VR setups when pointing to the feet and the knees they pointed too low, and for the top of the head too high (to larger extents in the VR headset). Taking these distortions into account, the locations found for pointing to self were considered in terms of perceived bodies, based on where the participants had pointed to their body parts in the two VR setups. Pointing to self in terms of the perceived body was mostly to the face, the upper followed by the lower, as well as some to the torso regions. There was no significant overall effect of VR condition for pointing to self in terms of the perceived body (but there was a significant effect of VR if only the physical body (as measured) was considered). In a paper-and-pencil task outside of VR, performed by pointing on a picture of a simple body outline (body template task), participants pointed most to the upper torso. Possible explanations for the differences between pointing to self in the VR setups and the body template task are discussed. The main finding of this study is that the VR setup influences where people point to their body parts, but not to themselves, when perceived and not physical body parts are considered.

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else’s arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional ‘alien’ arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient’s shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the ‘alien’ embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an ‘alien’ arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter’s left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter’s arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the ‘alien’ embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the ‘alien’ arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the ‘alien’ embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment.

Objective Embodied emotions arise from interoceptive and somatosensory processes, and are essential to the development of a stable sense of self. Emotional embodiment is therefore inherently interwoven with our sense of bodily self-awareness, and allows us to navigate complex social situations. Given that the core feature of schizophrenia (SZ) is characterized by the presence of bodily self-disturbances and social-emotional deficits, we hypothesized that embodiment of emotion would be disrupted in SZ. Method Twenty-six medicated individuals with SZ and 26 demographically matched controls used a computerized topographical mapping tool ("EmBODY") to indicate on a body outline where they felt bodily sensations while experiencing an emotion. There were 13 different emotions plus a neutral state. The resulting bodily maps of emotions were quantitatively compared between groups using linear discriminant analysis and similarity scores. Results Bodily maps of emotions were anomalous in SZ as indicated by indistinguishable maps across different emotions. Relative to the control group, patients reported less discrete and less clear bodily sensations across emotions. In particular, bodily maps for low-arousal emotions were atypical in comparison with healthy controls. Conclusions Anomalous and undifferentiated mapping of embodied emotions in SZ could lead to deficits in linking bodily sensations to conceptual categories of emotions. Disrupted emotional embodiment could also contribute to poor social functioning. Abnormal bodily sensations of emotions might therefore be a promising target for future psychosocial interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pathological embodiment (E+) is a specific contralesional delusion of body ownership, observed following brain damage, in which patients embody someone else's arm and its movements within their own body schema whenever the contralesional 'alien' arm is presented in a body-congruent position (i.e., 1st person perspective and aligned with the patient's shoulder). This disorder is often associated with spatial neglect, a neurological syndrome in which patients are unaware of stimuli presented in the contralesional (often the left) space. Capitalizing on previous evidence demonstrating that prismatic adaptation of the ipsilesional arm to right-deviating prisms is effective in ameliorating neglect symptoms, here we investigated whether such amelioration also occurs in E+ patients with neglect when prismatic training is performed by the 'alien' embodied arm. Four left neglect patients (one with and three without pathological embodiment) underwent visuomotor prismatic training performed by an 'alien' arm. Specifically, while patients were wearing prismatic goggles shifting the visual field rightward, a co-experimenter's left arm presented in a body-congruent perspective was repeatedly moved toward visual targets by another examiner. In a control condition, the co-experimenter's arm was moved toward the targets from a body-incongruent position (i.e., 3rd person perspective). Neglect symptoms were assessed before and after training through paper-and-pencil tasks. In the E+ patient, neglect improved significantly more in 1st than in 3rd person perspective training, suggesting that prismatic adaptation of the 'alien' embodied arm is effective in modulating spatial representation. Conversely, for control E- patients (not embodying the 'alien' arm), we observed more limited improvements following training. These findings indicate that the 'alien' embodied arm is so deeply embedded in the patient body and motor schema that adaptation to prismatic lenses can affect multiple processing stages, from low level sensory-motor correspondences, to higher level body, motor and spatial maps, similarly as it occurs in normal subjects and neglect patients without pathological embodiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the expression “sense of self” is more natural than saying “representing” or even “imagining one’s self”. It is also easier and neater to talk in French about “sentiment du moi” than “representation du moi”; the expression “das Ichgefühl” is less grating than “die Ichvorstellung”, the latter being rather used to mean the conceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. […]

The aim of this study is to investigate the bodily-self in Restrictive Anorexia, focusing on two basic aspects related to the bodily self: autonomic strategies in social behavior, in which others' social desirability features, and social cues (e.g., gaze) are modulated, and interoception (i.e., the sensitivity to stimuli originating inside the body). Furthermore, since previous studies carried out on healthy individuals found that interoception seems to contribute to the autonomic regulation of social behavior, as measured by Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA), we aimed to explore this link in anorexia patients, whose ability to perceive their bodily signal seems to be impaired. To this purpose, we compared a group of anorexia patients (ANg; restrictive type) with a group of Healthy Controls (HCg) for RSA responses during both a resting state and a social proxemics task, for their explicit judgments of comfort in social distances during a behavioral proxemics task, and for their Interoceptive Accuracy (IA). The results showed that ANg displayed significantly lower social disposition and a flattened autonomic reactivity during the proxemics task, irrespective of the presence of others' socially desirable features or social cues. Moreover, unlike HCg, the autonomic arousal of ANg did not guide behavioral judgments of social distances. Finally, IA was strictly related to social disposition in both groups, but with opposite trends in ANg. We conclude that autonomic imbalance and its altered relationship with interoception might have a crucial role in anorexia disturbances.

This review article summarizes neuropsychological descriptions of abnormal body representations in brain-damaged patients and recent neuroscientific investigations of their sensorimotor underpinnings in healthy participants. The first part of the article describes unilateral disorders of the bodily self, such as asomatognosia, feelings of amputation, supernumerary phantom limbs and somatoparaphrenia, as well as descriptions of non-lateralized disorders of the bodily self, including Alice in Wonderland syndrome and autoscopic hallucinations. Because the sensorimotor mechanisms of these disorders are unclear, we focus on clinical descriptions and insist on the importance of reporting clinical cases to better understand the full range of bodily disorders encountered in neurological diseases. The second part of the article presents the advantages of merging neuroscientific approaches of the bodily self with immersive virtual reality, robotics and neuroprosthetics to foster the understanding of the multisensory, motor and neural mechanisms of bodily representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to investigate the bodily-self in Restrictive Anorexia, focusing on two basic aspects related to the bodily self: autonomic strategies in social behavior, in which others' social desirability features, and social cues (e.g., gaze) are modulated, and interoception (i.e., the sensitivity to stimuli originating inside the body). Furthermore, since previous studies carried out on healthy individuals found that interoception seems to contribute to the autonomic regulation of social behavior, as measured by Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA), we aimed to explore this link in anorexia patients, whose ability to perceive their bodily signal seems to be impaired. To this purpose, we compared a group of anorexia patients (ANg; restrictive type) with a group of Healthy Controls (HCg) for RSA responses during both a resting state and a social proxemics task, for their explicit judgments of comfort in social distances during a behavioral proxemics task, and for their Interoceptive Accuracy (IA). The results showed that ANg displayed significantly lower social disposition and a flattened autonomic reactivity during the proxemics task, irrespective of the presence of others' socially desirable features or social cues. Moreover, unlike HCg, the autonomic arousal of ANg did not guide behavioral judgments of social distances. Finally, IA was strictly related to social disposition in both groups, but with opposite trends in ANg. We conclude that autonomic imbalance and its altered relationship with interoception might have a crucial role in anorexia disturbances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients’ positive and negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23 schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat perception task. Patients’ symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This difference was not accounted for participants’ age, BMI, anxiety levels and heart rate. Furthermore, patients’ illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity, was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations.

Internal sensations, especially organic ones, are not only the foundation of our consciousness of life and self but also an integral part of each feeling. This is probably the origin of the genuine affinity between feelings and consciousness of life and self, an affinity that manifests itself even in speech. Indeed, the expression "sense of self" is more natural than saying "representing" or even "imagining one's self". It is also easier and neater to talk in French about "sentiment du moi" than "representation du moi"; the expression "das Ichgefühl" is less grating than "die Ichvorstellung", the latter being rather used to mean the conceived self as opposed to the self of which one is conscious all the time. The self is not a feeling, however, if only because there are no feelings that would be equally constant or, to be more precise, that would recur with equal constancy. Even so, we can say it is closer to emotive states than to any representation or mental image. [...]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients' positive and negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23 schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat perception task. Patients' symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This difference was not accounted for participants' age, BMI, anxiety levels, and heart rate. Furthermore, patients' illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity, was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses basic aspects of social cognition focusing on the pivotal role played by the lived body in the constitution of our experience of others. It is suggested that before studying intersubjectivity we should better qualify the notion of the self. A minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, defined in terms of its motor potentialities, is proposed. The discovery of mirror mechanisms for action, emotions and sensations led to the proposal of an embodied approach to intersubjectivity--embodied simulation (ES) theory. ES and the related notion of neural reuse provide a new empirically based perspective on intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeality. ES challenges the notion that folk psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. ES is discussed within a second-person perspective on mindreading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multimedia technologies and virtual reality offer unique possibilities to manipulate sensory, motor, interpersonal, and cognitive processes contributing to atypical developmental trajectories, thus holding an explosive potential to design innovative and engaging interventions. However, there has been little progress in developing interventions that go beyond the patient's diagnosis or the fascination of technology and rather spring from a deep understanding of the specific neuropsychological processes to be nurtured in individuals. This perspective paper outlines how recent insights from developmental cognitive neuroscience can be leveraged to promote children's multidimensional development and highlight future directions and challenges for innovating both research and clinical practice. Finally, we focus on some practical examples of multimedia and virtual reality activities we have designed to stimulate bodily-self experiences, which are crucial for building up a coherent sense of self and lay the foundation for interacting with the external world. Atypical bodily self is an early marker of heterogeneous neurodevelopmental conditions (such as autism spectrum disorders) and seems to be under-targeted in research and clinical approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]