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Complexity of banks can have important ramifications for the performance and the risks of the banking system. Financial sector reforms that were implemented in the past decade have thus aimed to reduce and to better manage the risk implications of bank complexity. Yet, surprisingly little is known about changes in complexity across countries, its drivers, and its effects. The International Banking Research Network (IBRN) used data and analytical advances to generate rich cross-country insights on the complexity and riskiness of banking organizations. The initiative has yielded four key findings. First, the largest banks in countries tend to be the more complex ones. Even controlling for size, there is substantial diversity across banking organizations in terms of complexity choices. Second, over the past decade, banking organizations have tended to reduce complexity by limiting the number of affiliates in domestic and foreign locations. Generally, however, complexity patterns are fairly persistent. Third, regulatory changes can alter both banking organization complexity and the associated risk profiles. Fourth, the link between complexity and risks involves trade-offs: diversification benefits and reductions in liquidity risk may weigh against agency problems, monitoring costs, and systemic risk contributions arising from higher complexity.

This paper presents the novel results from an internationally coordinated project by the International Banking Research Network (IBRN) on the cross-border transmission of conventional and unconventional monetary policy through banks. Teams from seventeen countries use confidential micro-banking data for the years 2000 through 2015 to explore the international transmission of monetary policies of the United States, the euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Two other studies use international data with different degrees of granularity. International spillovers into lending to the private sector do occur, especially for U.S. policies, and bank-specific heterogeneity influences the magnitudes of transmission. The effects are supportive of the international bank lending channel and the portfolio channel of monetary policy transmission. They also show that the frictions that banks face matter; in particular, foreign currency funding and hedging considerations can be a key source of heterogeneity. The forms of bank balance sheet heterogeneity that differentiate spillovers across banks are not uniform across countries. International spillovers into lending can be large for some banks, even while the average international spillovers of policies into nonbank lending generally are not large.

Investitionszuschüsse im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 'Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur' (GRW) haben eine hohe Bedeutung im Rahmen der Wirtschaftsförderung des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt. Die Ziele der GRW-Förderung in Sachsen-Anhalt umfassen den Aufbau einer breitgefächerten, modernen Wirtschaftsstruktur, die Modernisierung und Erneuerung des Kapitalstocks, die Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität und die Schaffung neuer wettbewerbsfähiger Arbeitsplätze. Die vorliegenden drei Expertisen evaluieren diese Förderung mit Blick auf die GRW-Landesregeln, den Zusammenhang zwischen den wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen und deren Wirkung sowie die Beschäftigungseffekte als einen Schwerpunkt der gewerblichen Förderung. - Inhaltsverzeichnis: - 1) Möglichkeiten einer wissenschaftlichen Evaluation der gewerblichen Förderung im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GRW) in Sachsen-Anhalt (Claudia M. Buch, Eva Dettmann, Gerhard Heimpold, Mirko Titze) - 2) Beurteilung der Förderregeln im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ in Sachsen-Anhalt Ergebnisse einer Literaturauswertung und theoretischer Überlegungen (Eva Dettmann, Mirko Titze) - 3) Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Evaluation der gewerblichen Förderung im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe „Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur“ (GRW) in Sachsen-Anhalt Beschäftigungseffekte der gewerblichen Förderung im Rahmen der GRW in Sachsen-Anhalt (Matthias Brachert, Eva Dettmann, Mirko Titze, Antje Weyh).

Macroprudential policy is a relatively new policy field. Its goal is to preserve financial stability and to prevent the build-up of systemic risk that may have adverse effects for the functioning of the financial system and for the real economy. New institutions have been tasked with the implementation of macroprudential policies, and new policy instruments have been introduced. Nonetheless, uncertainty about the state of the financial system and the effects and effectiveness of these policy instruments is high. This uncertainty entails two risks: the risk of acting too late (inaction bias) and the risk of choosing an inappropriate instrument or inadequate calibration. In this paper, we argue that both risks can be mitigated if macroprudential policy is embedded in a structured policy process. Such a policy process involves four steps: defining policy objectives for macroprudential policies, choosing intermediate objectives and appropriate indicators, linking instruments to these indicators through ex-ante evaluation studies, and analyzing the effects of these policies through ex-post evaluation studies. We argue that the infrastructure for this policy process can be further improved by providing data for policy evaluation, establishing or strengthening legal mandates for policy evaluation, establishing mechanisms for international cooperation, and building up repositories of evaluation studies.

The development of macroprudential policy tools has been one of the most significant changes in banking regulation in recent years. In this multi-study initiative of the International Banking Research Network (IBRN), researchers from 15 central banks and 2 international organizations use micro-banking data in conjunction with a novel dataset of prudential instruments to study international spillovers of prudential policy changes for bank lending growth. The collective analysis has three main findings. First, prudential instrument effects sometimes spill over across borders through bank lending. Second, international spillovers vary across prudential instruments and are heterogeneous across banks. Bank-specific factors like balance sheet conditions and business models drive the amplitude and direction of spillovers to lending growth rates. Third, international spillovers of prudential policy on loan growth rates have not been large on average. However, our results tend to underestimate the full effect by focusing on adjustment along the intensive margin and by analyzing a period in which relatively few countries implemented country-specific macroprudential policies.

The development of macroprudential policy tools has been one of the most significant changes in banking regulation in recent years. In this multi-study initiative of the International Banking Research Network, researchers from fifteen central banks and two international organizations use micro-banking data in conjunction with a novel data set of prudential instruments to study international spillovers of prudential policy changes and their effects on bank lending growth. The collective analysis has three main findings. First, the effects of prudential instruments sometimes spill over borders through bank lending. Second, international spillovers vary across prudential instruments and are heterogeneous across banks. Bank-specific factors like balance sheet conditions and business models drive the amplitude and direction of spillovers to lending growth rates. Third, the effects of international spillovers of prudential policy on loan growth rates have not been large on average. However, our results tend to underestimate the full effect by focusing on adjustment along the intensive margin and by analyzing a period in which relatively few countries implemented country-specific macroprudential policies.

We develop a new measure of uncertainty derived from bank-level data. We apply the measure of firm-level uncertainty developed by Bloom and others (2012) to banking. Uncertainty is measured as the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks to banking-sector specific variables. We then analyze how uncertainty in banking affects lending by domestic and foreign-owned banks. We find that, first, higher uncertainty in banking has negative effects on bank lending. Second, the effect is heterogeneous across banks: Lending by banks which are better capitalized and have higher liquidity buffers tends to be affected less. Third, foreign-owned banks do not react differently to uncertainty in the host country compared to domestically-owned banks.

Moderne Evaluationsmethoden auf der Basis ökonometrischer Verfahren und randomisierter Feldexperimente machen es für immer mehr Politikbereiche möglich, die Wirksamkeit wirtschaftspolitischer Maßnahmen zu überprüfen. Gleichwohl sind diese Methoden in der deutschen Evaluationspraxis nicht der Standard. Andere Länder sind Deutschland in dieser Hinsicht voraus. Gerade vor dem Hintergrund knapper öffentlicher Mittel ist eine Verbesserung der Evaluationspraxis dringend geboten, um die Mittelverwendung auf solche Maßnahmen fokussieren zu können, deren Wirksamkeit nachgewiesen ist. In diesem Beitrag werden institutionelle Voraussetzungen für methodisch valide Wirkungsanalysen diskutiert und mögliche Schritte hin zu einer stärker evidenzbasierten Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland vorgeschlagen.

Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates.

Does the structure of banking markets affect macroeconomic volatility and, if yes, is this link different in low-income countries? Banking markets in low-income countries differ from those in developed market economies. Banking systems in lower-income countries are typically smaller and less open. In this paper, we explore the channels through which the structure of banking markets affects macroeconomic volatility. Our research has three main findings. First, we study the relevance of granular effects: if the degree of market concentration in the banking sector is sufficiently high, idiosyncratic volatility at the bank-level can impact aggregate volatility. We find weak evidence for a link between granular banking sector volatility and macroeconomic fluctuations. Second, a higher share of domestic credit to GDP coincides with higher volatility in the short run. Third, a higher level of cross-border asset holdings, i.e. a higher degree of de facto financial integration, increases volatility in low-income countries.

Activities of international banks have been at the core of discussions on the causes and effects of the international financial crisis. Yet, we know little about the actual magnitudes and mechanisms for transmission of liquidity shocks through international banks, including the reasons for heterogeneity in transmission across banks. The International Banking Research Network (IBRN), established in 2012, brings together researchers from around the world with access to micro-data on individual banks to analyze issues pertaining to global banks. This paper summarizes the common methodology and results of empirical studies conducted in 11 countries to explore liquidity risk transmission. Among the main results is, first, that explanatory power of the empirical model is higher for domestic lending than for international lending. Second, how liquidity risk affects bank lending depends on the whether the banks are drawing on official sector liquidity facilities. Third, liquidity management across global banks can be important for liquidity risk transmission into lending. Fourth, there is substantial heterogeneity in the balance sheet characteristics that affect banks' responses to liquidity risk. Overall, bank balance sheet characteristics matter for differentiating lending responses across banks mainly in the realm of cross-border lending.

The economic and financial crisis that emerged in 2008 also initiated an intense discussion on macroeconomic research and the role of economists in society. The debate focuses on three main issues. Firstly, it is argued that economists failed to predict the crisis and to design early warning systems. Secondly, it is claimed that economists use models of the macroeconomy which fail to integrate financial markets and which are inadequate to model large economic crises. Thirdly, the issue has been raised that economists invoke unrealistic assumptions concerning human behaviour by assuming that all agents are self-centred, rationally optimizing individuals. In this paper, we focus on the first two issues. Overall, our thrust is that the above statements are a caricature of modern economic theory and empirics. A rich field of research developed already before the crisis and picked up shortcomings of previous models.

The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks' balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.

In this paper, we use detailed data on the sovereign debt holdings of all German banks to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt exposures and the implications of sovereign exposures for bank risk. Our main findings are as follows. First, sovereign bond holdings are heterogeneous across banks. Larger, weakly capitalised banks and banks with a small depositor base hold more sovereign bonds. Around 31% of all German banks hold no sovereign bonds at all. Second, the sensitivity of banks to macroeconomic factors increased significantly in the post-Lehman period. Banks hold more bonds from euro area countries, from low-inflation countries, and from countries with high sovereign bond yields. Third, there has been no marked impact of sovereign bond holdings on bank risk. This result could indicate the widespread absence of marking-to-market for sovereign bond holdings at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

The global financial crisis has brought to an end a rather unprecedented period of banks' international expansion. We analyze the effects of the crisis on international banking. Using a detailed dataset on the international assets of all German banks with foreign affiliates for the years 2002-2011, we study bank internationalization before and during the crisis. Our data allow analyzing not only the international assets of the banks' headquarters but also of their foreign affiliates. We show that banks have lowered their international assets, both along the extensive and the intensive margin. This withdrawal from foreign markets is the result of changing market conditions, of policy interventions, and of a weakly increasing sensitivity of banks to financial frictions.

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a linked micro-macro panel dataset. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact on GDP. Second, financial openness lowers GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.

Durch die schwere Banken- und Finanzkrise der vergangenen Jahre ist die Notwendigkeit einer besseren Regulierung der Banken und einer besseren Aufsicht über die Märkte offenkundig geworden. Hierzu liegt eine Reihe von Vorschlägen zur Änderungen der Regulierung auf dem Tisch bzw. sind bereits umgesetzt worden. Mit der „Bankenunion“ sollen zentrale Kompetenzen über die Aufsicht von Banken auf die europäische Ebene gezogen werden. Damit bedeutet die Bankenunion einen Schritt weg vom Prinzip des Binnenmarktes, in dem die Aufsicht über die Banken in nationaler Verantwortung liegt.

[Vorwort] Gemäß § 6 Absatz 1 des Gesetzes über die Bildung eines Sachverständigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung vom 14. August 1963, zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 128 der Verordnung vom 31. Oktober 20061, legt der Sachverständigenrat sein 50. Jahresgutachten vor. Das Jahresgutachten 2013/14 trägt den Titel: Gegen eine rückwärtsgewandte Wirtschaftspolitik. Im Herbst 2013 zeichnet sich eine wirtschaftliche Erholung ab. Der Anstieg der Weltproduktion dürfte sich nach 2,2 % in diesem Jahr auf 3,0 % im kommenden Jahr beschleunigen. Aufgrund des schwachen Jahresbeginns wird das Bruttoinlandsprodukt des Euro-Raums im Jahr 2013 voraussichtlich eine Veränderungsrate von -0,4 % aufweisen. Für das Jahr 2014 wird eine Zuwachsrate von 1,1 % erwartet. Der sich jetzt abzeichnende Aufschwung, der durch die sehr expansive Geldpolitik gestützt wird, ist allerdings angesichts der nach wie vor hohen Schuldenstände noch nicht selbsttragend. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird sich im Jahr 2014 die konjunkturelle Lage in Deutschland voraussichtlich aufhellen. Während für das Jahr 2013 lediglich ein Zuwachs des Bruttoinlandsprodukts von 0,4 % erwartet wird, prognostiziert der Sachverständigenrat für das Jahr 2014 einen Zuwachs in Höhe von 1,6 %. Die aktuelle wirtschaftliche Situation und die relativ gute Position Deutschlands im Vergleich zu den Krisenländern des Euro-Raums scheinen vielfach den Blick auf die großen zukünftigen Herausforderungen verstellt zu haben. So gehen viele der derzeit diskutierten Maßnahmen, wie etwa die Mütterrente, die Aufstockung von niedrigen Renten oder großzügige Ausnahmen von der Rente mit 67, überwiegend zu Lasten der kommenden Generationen. Die künftigen Herausforderungen werden sogar um ein Vielfaches schwerer zu bewältigen sein, wenn die Reformen der Agenda 2010 verwässert oder in Teilbereichen gänzlich zurückgenommen werden. Gleiches gilt für neue wachstums- und beschäftigungsfeindliche Maßnahmen, wie den Mindestlohn oder Steuererhöhungen. [...]