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This paper examines the concept of group knowledge. I start by noticing that we often seem compelled to attribute epistemic attitudes to groups, even when those attitudes differ from the ones held by their individual members. However, it is also the case that ideally responsible agents are subjected to a ‘deflationary pressure’ to ground those attitudes in concrete individuals. In the light of this, I argue that epistemically responsible groups should be conceived of as dynamic entities. Correlatively, group knowledge can be defined in terms of a family of possible paths between distributed and common knowledge. Finally I show that the Logic of Public Announcements can be used in this context as adequate tool to monitor the satisfaction of normative requirements by epistemically responsible individuals

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world's scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a '10 second survey', where the participant is presented with a single statement to consider, and a standard five-point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I comment on M.Á. Fernández's paper on veritism and the value of understanding. I begin by observing that veritism relies on a definition of epistemic value that threatens to trivialize the discussion. Then I proceed to examine Fernandez's arguments with some detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author comments on the reasons and epistemic rationality based on the Reason-Knowledge Principle (RKP) proposition of John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley on the correlation of knowledge and action. The author believes that Hawthorne and Stanley should not raise probability claims as reasons if they still cannot prove such claims. She also argues that if probability judgments are taken to translate personal measures, then the RKP is still insufficient to what people need.