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The conclusion of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in 2018 was intended to put an end to a very long and difficult negotiation process to determine the legal regime for this closed water body, which has no natural connection with the World Ocean. The Convention was supposed to fill the gaps in the management of this water area that existed in the framework of the previous Soviet-Iranian agreements of 1921 and 1940, which were in force but not up to date, and to give all the Caspian states common and equal rights and powers to use and exploit the spaces and resources of this maritime region. However, up to 2022, the Convention has not entered into legal force, as one of the Caspian countries — the Islamic Republic of Iran — has not yet ratified this regional agreement, considering that it is the most disadvantaged party. Despite the resolution of the Caspian Sea seabed delimitation issues in its northern part in previous years, the problem of delimitation in its southern part may require both enormous efforts and time, further complicating the current situation. There is as yet no final understanding as to what delimitation models can be used here to satisfy the interests of all the states involved. Moreover, the implementation of the norms and provisions of the 2018 Convention requires the drafting and signing of new bilateral and multilateral documents that close a whole series of “gaps” in the proposed convention regime. In fact, the fate of the 2018 Convention depends on how these contradictions will be resolved. The analysis of these problems is the focus of this paper.

The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a new region of interstate confrontation and clash of national interests. This is largely due to the discovery of oil and gas reserves, the development of which is becoming possible with the existing technology. The Republic of Turkey has a special position regarding this maritime region. The paper analyzes those bases - historical, political and legal - that determine Turkeys current policy with regard to maritime delimitation and the settlement of maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Particularly, it is shown that Turkeys policy in the region continues to be based on the approaches that were announced by Turkey during the I-III UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea (1958, 1960, 1973-1982 respectively), which have remained unchanged up to now. This position, as regards both the outer limits of the territorial sea, the legal regime of islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf, continues to define the essence of the controversy between Turkey and other countries of the region, including Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, it is shown that there is a set of circumstances that significantly limit the prospects of solving these interstate contradictions within the framework of international judicial instances, including the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The conclusion is made that, for both Turkey and Greece, the most acceptable option would be to work out a model of settlement, which would not imply the obligation of its immediate implementation. Particular attention is paid to the ideological and practical framing of Turkish claims within the framework of the Blue Homeland doctrine, developed by a number of retired Turkish officers. It shows how Ankara uses the ideas of pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism to justify its claims to vast maritime spaces. The distinctive feature of this doctrine most likely is its anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-European orientation. There is a paradoxical situation when certain ideas enshrined in this concept directly correlate with the interests of the Russian Federation.

The Black Sea region has a special geopolitical significance for at least two states - Russia and Turkey. In order to identify the key factors that complicate regional cooperation between the two countries, the article considers the main problems of Russian-Turkish cooperation in the Black Sea area under the conditions of post-crisis resumption of bilateral relations after the 2015 incident. Regional contradictions between Moscow and Ankara are largely caused by different positions on such issues as Crimeas joining to Russia, the regime of the Black Sea Straits as well as the policy of pan-Turkism pursued by Turkey towards the Turkic-speaking peoples of the region in the strive to form a Turkic world. In conclusion the authors explain the need to further strengthen versatile bilateral cooperation with Turkey and to pay special attention to security and humanitarian fields.

The second part of the paper shows that the regime of navigation in the Arctic, particularly on the NSR, defended by Russia today, is much more liberal than that which existed in the Soviet years: up to the Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech the Soviet Arctic was a closed sea region for foreign navigation. Permissive order of passage established today at the level of Russian national legislation applies only to civil ships, and in the framework of the 1982 Convention, measures to protect the marine environment from pollution from ships cannot be applied to warships, military auxiliary ships, and ships on the state non-commercial service. However, the presence on the Northern Sea routes of water areas with the status of internal historical waters, including several Arctic straits, plus the special legal status of the Arctic, which is not limited exclusively to the 1982 Convention, allows Russia to insist on the applicability of the permit regime also to foreign warships. This approach is based mainly on the two states’ practice with the longest coastline in the Arctic: the USSR and Canada. Navigation along the NSR in today’s ice conditions is not yet possible without passing through the waters of the Russian Arctic Straits, whose waters are classified by the USSR as internal on historical legal grounds. Although under the 1982 Convention, they can be conditionally regarded as international, the lack of permanent transit through them makes it possible not to recognize them as such. However, the Russian Federation’s task to turn the NSR into an international shipping route may lead to a weakening of the current legal position. A similar situation may arise concerning the enforcement of Article 234 “Ice Covered Areas” of the 1982 Convention, which gives the Arctic countries additional rights in the field of navigation control. Lack of ice cover in the Arctic during most of the year can significantly strengthen the position of Russia’s opponents, who insist on a too broad interpretation of this article on our part. Finally, climatic changes may lead to the NSR becoming more latitudinal, and then the Russian Federation will lose any legal grounds to regulate navigation.

Despite the growing tension in Russia-West relations, the Arctic region continues to remain a zone of peace and cooperation. The level of interstate collaboration here is extremely high, unlike other maritime regions. The interaction is developing in scientific research, protection of the marine environment and biodiversity, regulation of fisheries, improvement of search and rescue efforts, control of oil spills, and regulation of navigation. However, interstate competition has not disappeared in the Arctic. The countries participating in the maritime activities in the region often have completely different priorities and are firmly defending their national interests. Under sanctions’ pressure, the Russian Federation is forced to seek new partners and allies in the Arctic. This choice is extremely difficult since the coincidence of positions on one issue or another is often minimal. In order to defend its interests, Russia needs to achieve such a format of interaction with the Arctic and non-Arctic countries which would be extremely mutually beneficial and work for the good of our country, but not to its detriment.

The experiment has been carried out with 10 lactating buffaloes (Bulgarian Murrah breed) in an interval of two successive days. They were kept in shade(first day) and exposed to direct solar radiation (second day) with ambient temperature not less than 30 0 C for 12 h. Rectal temperature(RT) and respiratory rate (RR) were measured at 8 a.m., 11 a.m., 3 p.m. and 8 p.m. Both RT and RR increased significantly at temperature – humidity index (THI)- 77.83, showing that the lactating buffaloes are sensitive to heat stress and are not able to maintain their core temperature within the thermoneutral zone. The same THI had no significant effect on rectal temperature elevation when the buffaloes were kept in the barn. These data demonstrate that lactating buffaloes need protection against direct solar radiation. Plasma cholesterol and total protein levels tended to be lower during the exposure to direct solar radiation compared to the morning levels. Plasma urea level increased and plasma indol level remained unchanged when the buffaloes were exposed to sun. It is suggested that the level of the first three parameters is closely related with the dynamic of cortisol and blood volume fluctuation in animals under heat.

The objective of this study were 2 fold: to determine whether the weaning (abrupt transition from liquid to solid diet) at the age of 90 days causes stress in buffalo calves, and if so, to alleviate the negative effect of stress by chromium picolinate supplementation (400 μg daily). All buffalo calves were separated from their mothers immediately after birth. Chromium supplementation started 3 days before the weaning and was terminated 5 days later. Plasma cholesterol and indol levels declined significantly after weaning in both groups. Both the weaning and supplemental chromium had no effect on plasma urea level. Our results indicate that when the negative emotional arousal, caused by the interruption of the physical contact mother – calf, is avoided, as it is in our case, then the abrupt transition from liquid to solid feed at 90 d of age has no stress-inducing effect. Supplemental chromium reduced plasma cortisol levels both before and following the weaning, but had no significant effect on the determined metabolites since its effect is more pronounced during extreme stress load.