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Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We examine whether the facial attractiveness of borrower firms' chief financial officers (CFOs) influences bank loan contracting terms. Using a machine learning‐based algorithm to measure facial attractiveness, we document that firms led by CFOs with greater facial attractiveness receive more favourable loan contracts from their banks. We further show that the relation between CFO facial attractiveness and bank loan contracting terms is significantly influenced by the characteristics of both the borrower and the lender. Collectively, our results suggest that loan contracting is not an entirely rational process, as the 'beauty premium' is at least partly driven by taste‐based discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We first review the recent research published in the Journal of International Accounting Research (JIAR) on the influence of international institutions on accounting practices. We follow this with a discussion of the literature by studying the influence of institutions on tax avoidance and tax evasion. We then propose a new methodological approach that draws on the theory of institutional hierarchy proposed by Williamson (2000) and examine the relative importance of three broad types of institutions (informal, formal, and media) in curtailing perceived tax evasion activities. We contribute to the international accounting literature by summarizing the recent research that addresses tax avoidance and tax evasion and by providing preliminary evidence on how employing an institutional hierarchy approach can address the interdependencies between commonly used institutional factors. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: H26; G28; O16. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore how expansionary monetary policy (EMP) influences bank loan loss provisioning. We find that banks' discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLPs) increase during periods of EMP. This effect is stronger for banks with greater risk-taking, a larger proportion of influential stakeholders, lower ex-ante transparency of loan loss provisions, and more stringent bank regulation, which is consistent with external stakeholders requiring more conservative and timelier loan loss provisioning. We also find that both the timeliness and the validity of banks' loan loss provisions (LLPs) increase during EMP periods. Our results are robust to the use of instrumental variable estimation and exogenous variations in monetary policy. Lastly, we show that conservative (i.e., higher DLLPs) and timely loan loss provisioning discipline banks from excessive risk-taking during periods of EMP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

SUMMARY: We investigate the chief audit executive's (CAE) internal audit supervisory role by examining the change in internal audit monitoring effectiveness following the turnover of CAEs. Using a sample of firms listed on the small and medium enterprise board of China's stock exchange, we find that CAE turnover is accompanied by a reduction in financial reporting/internal control quality and that the reduction is more pronounced for firms whose successor CAEs have lower financial expertise than their predecessors. Further analysis shows that the negative association with financial reporting/internal control quality is stronger when the turnover is for personal reasons than when it is for internal transfer of the CAE. These findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including placebo tests and matching diagnostics. Our results highlight the importance of the CAE for a firm's internal audit functions. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34; M42; M51. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the association between disclosures about key value drivers (i.e., growth, synergies, human capital, brands, customers, and technology) in press releases announcing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals and acquirer stock returns upon the announcement. We find that, after controlling for the main characteristics of the deal, acquirers that use more terms about these value drivers in press releases exhibit more negative market returns around the M&A announcement. An increase of 10% in the number of terms used about generic value drivers is associated with a decrease in announcement market‐adjusted returns of approximately 43 basis points. The negative association between terms about value drivers and acquirer stock returns is stronger for larger deals. We also find that disclosures about these value drivers in M&A announcement press releases are consistent with the subsequent subjective valuation of intangible assets recognized in acquirers' financial statements through the purchase price allocation. Our findings are relevant for investors attempting to interpret early signals about the performance of M&A and for managers communicating about these strategic investment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We hypothesize that if individual auditors possess unique audit styles that they consistently apply to different audit engagements, then client firms with a common signing auditor will exhibit higher earnings comparability. Using a large sample of Chinese firms, we find that client firms report more comparable earnings when they are audited by the same individual auditor than when they are audited by (1) different audit firms, (2) the same audit firm, but different audit offices, and (3) the same audit office, but different individual auditors. The individual auditor style effect is stronger for larger audit firms, senior signing auditors, and signing auditors with more stable teamwork experience. We also document that having a common signing auditor is associated with lower analyst earnings forecast error and dispersion for client firms. This study contributes to the literature by showing that individual auditors have a significant impact on client firms' earnings comparability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]