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During adolescence, youth venture out, explore the wider world, and are challenged to learn how to navigate novel and uncertain environments. We investigated how performance changes across adolescent development in a stochastic, volatile reversal-learning task that uniquely taxes the balance of persistence and flexibility. In a sample of 291 participants aged 8-30, we found that in the mid-teen years, adolescents outperformed both younger and older participants. We developed two independent cognitive models, based on Reinforcement learning (RL) and Bayesian inference (BI). The RL parameter for learning from negative outcomes and the BI parameters specifying participants' mental models were closest to optimal in mid-teen adolescents, suggesting a central role in adolescent cognitive processing. By contrast, persistence and noise parameters improved monotonically with age. We distilled the insights of RL and BI using principal component analysis and found that three shared components interacted to form the adolescent performance peak: adult-like behavioral quality, child-like time scales, and developmentally-unique processing of positive feedback. This research highlights adolescence as a neurodevelopmental window that can create performance advantages in volatile and uncertain environments. It also shows how detailed insights can be gleaned by using cognitive models in new ways.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) models have revolutionized the cognitive and brain sciences, promising to explain behavior from simple conditioning to complex problem solving, to shed light on developmental and individual differences, and to anchor cognitive processes in specific brain mechanisms. However, the RL literature increasingly reveals contradictory results, which might cast doubt on these claims. We hypothesized that many contradictions arise from two commonly-held assumptions about computational model parameters that are actually often invalid: That parameters generalize between contexts (e.g. tasks, models) and that they capture interpretable (i.e. unique, distinctive) neurocognitive processes. To test this, we asked 291 participants aged 8-30 years to complete three learning tasks in one experimental session, and fitted RL models to each. We found that some parameters (exploration / decision noise) showed significant generalization: they followed similar developmental trajectories, and were reciprocally predictive between tasks. Still, generalization was significantly below the methodological ceiling. Furthermore, other parameters (learning rates, forgetting) did not show evidence of generalization, and sometimes even opposite developmental trajectories. Interpretability was low for all parameters. We conclude that the systematic study of context factors (e.g. reward stochasticity; task volatility) will be necessary to enhance the generalizability and interpretability of computational cognitive models.

In the real world, many relationships between events are uncertain and probabilistic. Uncertainty is also likely to be a more common feature of daily experience for youth because they have less experience to draw from than adults. Some studies suggest probabilistic learning may be inefficient in youths compared to adults, while others suggest it may be more efficient in youths in mid adolescence. Here we used a probabilistic reinforcement learning task to test how youth age 8-17 (N = 187) and adults age 18-30 (N = 110) learn about stable probabilistic contingencies. Performance increased with age through early-twenties, then stabilized. Using hierarchical Bayesian methods to fit computational reinforcement learning models, we show that all participants' performance was better explained by models in which negative outcomes had minimal to no impact on learning. The performance increase over age was driven by 1) an increase in learning rate (i.e. decrease in integration time scale); 2) a decrease in noisy/exploratory choices. In mid-adolescence age 13-15, salivary testosterone and learning rate were positively related. We discuss our findings in the context of other studies and hypotheses about adolescent brain development.

The authors regret that their article title was incorrectly spelled, and should have read as above. The authors would like to apologise for any inconvenience caused.

Multiple neurocognitive systems contribute simultaneously to learning. For example, dopamine and basal ganglia (BG) systems are thought to support reinforcement learning (RL) by incrementally updating the value of choices, while the prefrontal cortex (PFC) contributes different computations, such as actively maintaining precise information in working memory (WM). It is commonly thought that WM and PFC show more protracted development than RL and BG systems, yet their contributions are rarely assessed in tandem. Here, we used a simple learning task to test how RL and WM contribute to changes in learning across adolescence. We tested 187 subjects ages 8 to 17 and 53 adults (25-30). Participants learned stimulus-action associations from feedback; the learning load was varied to be within or exceed WM capacity. Participants age 8-12 learned slower than participants age 13-17, and were more sensitive to load. We used computational modeling to estimate subjects' use of WM and RL processes. Surprisingly, we found more protracted changes in RL than WM during development. RL learning rate increased with age until age 18 and WM parameters showed more subtle, gender- and puberty-dependent changes early in adolescence. These results can inform education and intervention strategies based on the developmental science of learning.

As we transition from child to adult, we navigate the worlddifferently. In this world, many of the relationships betweenevents are unclear or uncertain because they are probabilisticin nature. We wanted to know how learning about probabilis-tic relationships changes with development and to interrogatethe underlying processes. We investigated these questions in aprobabilistic reinforcement learning task (The Butterfly Task)with 302 participants aged 8-30. We found performance in thistask increased with age through early-twenties, then stabilized.Using hierarchical Bayesian methods to fit computational rein-forcement learning models, we showed that this performanceincrease was driven by 1) an increase in learning rate (i.e. de-crease in integration time horizon); 2) a decrease in exploratorychoices. By contrast, forgetting rates did not change with age.We discuss our findings in the context of other studies and hy-potheses about adolescent brain development.

While the exertion of mental effort improves performance on cognitive tasks, the neural mechanisms by which motivational factors impact cognition remain unknown. Here, we used fMRI to test how changes in cognitive effort, induced by changes in task difficulty, impact neural representations of working memory (WM). Participants (both sexes) were precued whether WM difficulty would be hard or easy. We hypothesized that hard trials demanded more effort as a later decision required finer mnemonic precision. Behaviorally, pupil size was larger and response times were slower on hard compared with easy trials suggesting our manipulation of effort succeeded. Neurally, we observed robust persistent activity during delay periods in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), especially during hard trials. Yet, details of the memoranda could not be decoded from patterns in prefrontal activity. In the patterns of activity in the visual cortex, however, we found strong decoding of memorized targets, where accuracy was higher on hard trials. To potentially link these across-region effects, we hypothesized that effort, carried by persistent activity in the PFC, impacts the quality ofWM representations encoded in the visual cortex. Indeed, we found that the amplitude of delay period activity in the frontal cortex predicted decoded accuracy in the visual cortex on a trial-wise basis. These results indicate that effort-related feedback signals sculpt population activity in the visual cortex, improving mnemonic fidelity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some aspects of cognition are more taxing than others. Accordingly, many people will avoid cognitively demanding tasks in favor of simpler alternatives. Which components of these tasks are costly, and how much, remains unknown. Here, we use a novel task design in which subjects request wages for completing cognitive tasks and a computational modeling procedure that decomposes their wages into the costs driving them. Using working memory as a test case, our approach revealed that gating new information into memory and protecting against interference are costly. Critically, other factors, like memory load, appeared less costly. Other key factors which may drive effort costs, such as error avoidance, had minimal influence on wage requests. Our approach is sensitive to individual differences, and could be used in psychiatric populations to understand the true underlying nature of apparent cognitive deficits. Author summary: Anyone who has tried to mentally calculate how much to tip at a restaurant knows that cognitive effort can feel aversive. Doing math in your head, like most high-level cognitive abilities, depends critically on working memory (WM). We know that WM is sometimes effortful to use, but we don't know which aspects of WM use drive these effort costs. To address this question, we had participants request wages in exchange for performing various tasks that differed in their specific WM demands. Using computational models of their wage demands, we demonstrated that some aspects of WM are costly, such as bringing new information into memory and preventing interference. Other factors, like the amount of information in memory and attempts to avoid mistakes, were less costly. Our approach identified which specific subcomponents of WM are aversive. Future research could use these methods to test theories about how motivational problems might be masquerading as cognitive deficits in psychiatric populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]