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In order to understand variation in post-transition levels of democracy, this thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Niger. Despite similarities, Mali had substantially more success with democratization than Niger. This thesis employs a detailed process tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders in Mali and Niger at critical junctures when democratic institutions were put to the test to evaluate the empirical validity of existing explanations. It seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal mechanisms linking political culture and democratic success. The evidence however, suggests something different. There is a remarkable parallel in the behavior of political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates the hypotheses. The most likely alternative explanation is the role of key individuals. The analysis indicates that "good guys" in Mali may have had a part in encouraging the forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran counter to their agendas, whereas "bad guys" in Niger who, to varying degrees, engaged in actions that were arguably illegal,l as they ran counter to the respective Niger constitutions, may have had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law., http://archive.org/details/disparityindemoc109455021, US Marine Corps (USMC) author, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Mali and Niger to determine possible differences that may have influenced the path of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. Specifically, it seeks to determine if (1) the degree of governmental decentralization achieved after multiple peace agreements led to less government control in one country over the other, and (2) the counterinsurgency strategies applied by each country during previous rebellions could have led the rebels to believe Mali would be a softer target to attack than Niger. The evidence indicates that despite an earlier start and an intense public relations campaign, Mali did not achieve a significantly different level of decentralization than Niger by 2011, removing it as a possible influence on the 2012 rebellion. Both countries created new community level governments charged with administering all aspects of civil services but lacked the revenue to operate without international assistance. The difference in counterinsurgency strategies between the two countries, however, is stark. Malis habitual willingness to compromise with past rebel groups contrasts greatly with Nigers insistence on seeking a military solution to conflicts, giving the 2012 rebels a logical indication of where success would be more likely.

In order to understand variation in post-transition levels of democracy, this thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Niger. Despite similarities, Mali had substantially more success with democratization than Niger. This thesis employs a detailed process tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders in Mali and Niger at critical junctures when democratic institutions were put to the test to evaluate the empirical validity of existing explanations. It seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal mechanisms linking political culture and democratic success. The evidence however, suggests something different. There is a remarkable parallel in the behavior of political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates the hypotheses. The most likely alternative explanation is the role of key individuals. The analysis indicates that "good guys" in Mali may have had a part in encouraging the forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran counter to their agendas, whereas "bad guys" in Niger who, to varying degrees, engaged in actions that were arguably illegal,l as they ran counter to the respective Niger constitutions, may have had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law.

This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Mali and Niger to determine possible differences that may have influenced the path of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. Specifically, it seeks to determine if (1) the degree of governmental decentralization achieved after multiple peace agreements led to less government control in one country over the other, and (2) the counterinsurgency strategies applied by each country during previous rebellions could have led the rebels to believe Mali would be a softer target to attack than Niger. The evidence indicates that despite an earlier start and an intense public relations campaign, Mali did not achieve a significantly different level of decentralization than Niger by 2011, removing it as a possible influence on the 2012 rebellion. Both countries created new community level governments charged with administering all aspects of civil services but lacked the revenue to operate without international assistance. The difference in counterinsurgency strategies between the two countries, however, is stark. Malis habitual willingness to compromise with past rebel groups contrasts greatly with Nigers insistence on seeking a military solution to conflicts, giving the 2012 rebels a logical indication of where success would be more likely., http://archive.org/details/decentralization1094527919, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.