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Frankel and Romer (1999), hereafter FR, proposed an instrument variable for trade intensity to assess robustly the causal impact of international trade on income per person. They generated the instrument by estimating a gravity equation with only exogenous, geography-related explanatory variables on a cross-section from 1985 using ordinary least squares (OLS). This paper revisits the FR study using a new estimation strategy, the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator (PPML), for creating the instrument for 1985. Next, I repeat the IV regressions for 2005 using both OLS and PPML for estimating the instruments. I find that the IV regressions are sensitive to the period, the sample size and the estimation strategy on which the instrument is estimated. OLS based instruments are not significant in IV regressions for 2005, while PPML-based instruments are statistically and economically significant and robust to time, but do not convincingly pass tests for weak instruments.

Frankel and Romer (1999) proposed an instrument variable for trade intensity to robustly assess the causal impact of international trade on standards of living. The instrument is based on OLS estimates of the gravity equation and has been widely used in the literature. In this note I show that the instrument is unrelated to income in the mid-2000s. Re-estimating the gravity equation using PPML, I show that the resulting instrument is strongly related to GDP per capita, but weakly correlated with trade, suggesting that what is captured may be a direct link between geography and income.

This paper highlights India’s unique services export led growth path. Observing that Indian business services have helped manufacturers all over the world to become more efficient and productive, it raises the question how Indian business services can do the same for local manufacturers and thus support the Make in India initiative. The paper also explores the potential for broadening the export base in services. The services sector that appears to have the largest prospect for unleashing the potential of both manufacturing and knowledge intensive business services is the telecommunications sector, particularly broadband internet services. In addition reforms in the distribution sector that enable multi-channel wholesale and retailing could facilitate the development of marketing channels for SME manufacturers both across the vast Indian market and abroad. Reforms in the logistics sector would further improve the competitiveness of local manufacturers producing time-sensitive goods including inputs to global value chains. Finally, competitiveness in knowledge-intensive services is obtained through knowledge sharing across borders. A prerequisite for broadening the export base in these sectors is openness to foreign professionals. The set of proposed recommendations emerging from this analysis underlines the importance of streamlining sector-level regulatory frameworks in all sectors to encourage foreign entry and competition, and the role that cross-cutting improvements in the trade and business environment would play to render services providers as well as down-stream manufacturers more competitive.

This book synthesises recent work by the OECD analysing services trade policies and quantifying their impacts on imports and exports, the performance of manufacturing and services sectors, and how services trade restrictions influence the decisions and outcomes of firms engaged in international markets. Based on the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) - a unique, evidence-based tool that provides snapshots of regulations affecting trade in services in 22 sectors across 44 countries (representing over 80% of global trade in services) - the analysis highlights the magnitude, nature and impact of the costs entailed by restrictive services trade policies. The new evidence uncovered is meant to inform trade policy makers and the private sector about the likely effects of unilateral or concerted regulatory reforms and help prioritise policy action.

The contribution of this paper to the literature is to make an empirical assessment of the relative importance of non-actionable institutional and cultural factors and actionable policy measures for services market integration, using the Nordic countries as a case study. It finds that intra-Nordic trade in services is about 2.5 times larger than predicted from the gravity model. This may not be surprising since the Nordics are perceived as a cluster of similar countries, but a detailed analysis of the Nordics’ policy framework, trade agreements, institutional and cultural factors concludes that these cannot explain the intra-Nordic bias. An unexplained “Nordicness” factor of this magnitude indicates that integration of services markets may rely on deeper institutional and cultural factors that do not readily lend themselves to trade negotiations. Conversely, trade agreements may yield the largest benefits among countries that share common cultural and institutional features.

This paper uses recent OECD data on services trade restrictions (STRI) to analyse the relationship between services trade policies and cross-border trade in services. A standard gravity model is enhanced by the STRI indices in a cross-section regression analysis. Services trade restrictions are negatively associated with both imports and exports of services. The surprisingly strong effect on services exports is probably explained by a negative relationship between the STRIs and sector performance indicators. Consequently, services suppliers from less open countries are less competitive abroad. Bilateral differences in regulation are also found to curtail services trade over and above the impact of the trade liberalisation level. At the margin, regulatory differences have a larger effect on trade flows the lower the level of the STRI.

This paper first portraits Swedish services exporters and services MNEs; second it analyses the determinants of services exports and affiliate sales; and third it studies the choice of mode of entering a foreign market. Emanating from a heterogeneous firm internationalization model, the main contribution of the paper is to explore the interaction between firm characteristics and foreign market characteristics, particularly policy-induced services trade barriers, in shaping services trade and investment patterns. Exploiting a large and very detailed firm-level dataset for the 2008-2013 period, the descriptive analysis finds that most exporting firms export one or two products to a few, most often other Nordic countries. Still, firms that export to 25 or more markets account for more than 80% of total export value. Furthermore, firms that export to 20 countries export more than 60% to their main destination country. Similar patterns are found for affiliate sales. Using a gravity approach we then study the determinants of the extensive and intensive margin of exports and affiliate sales in pooled as well as sector level regressions. We find that trade costs, both natural and policy-induced have the largest impact on the extensive margin of trade, suggesting that trade costs facing services exporters are mainly in the form of fixed entry costs. This is further supported by the finding that incumbency is the most important determinant of future exports and affiliate sales, and incumbents tend to be protected and thrive behind trade barriers., Jean Monnet TIISA Network (The Trade and Investment in Services Associates Network)

This article analyses the services trade impact of recognition of professional qualifications using a unique database compiled by the European Commission. It observes that there is large variation in the number of regulated professions across the EU. The number of recognitions is small relative to total employment in regulated professions. Nevertheless, a robust positive relationship between services trade and recognition of qualifications is found. Recognition stimulates two-way trade between the source and the host country, suggesting that arms-length exports as well as cross-border outsourcing take place. Recognitions in health and education professions are most strongly related to services trade.

This paper presents indices of regulatory heterogeneity based on the rich information in the STRI regulatory database. The indices are built from assessing – for each country pair and each measure – whether or not the countries have the same regulation. For each country pair and each sector, the indices reflect the (weighted) share of measures for which the two countries have different regulation. Estimates of the relationship between regulatory heterogeneity and trade shows that on average a reduction in the regulatory heterogeneity by 0.05 points is associated with 2.5% higher services exports and that the impact is larger the lower the level of trade restring regulation. The trade costs associated with the average score on the regulatory heterogeneity index (0.26) amounts to an ad valorem equivalent trade cost of between 20 and 75% at low levels of the STRI. Regulation has become slightly more similar from 2014 to 2015 in telecommunications. For the other sectors, countries have become slightly less similar over the same period.

This paper uses newly released OECD data on services trade restrictions (STRI) to analyse the relationship between services trade restrictions, cross-border trade in services and trade in downstream manufactured goods. A standard gravity model is enhanced by the STRI indices in a cross-section regression analysis. Services trade restrictions are negatively associated with both imports and exports of services. The surprisingly strong effect on services exports is probably explained by a negative relationship between the STRIs and sector performance indices. Consequently, services suppliers are less competitive abroad. A negative relationship is also found between the STRI indices and exports, imports and intra-industry trade in manufactured goods. The statistical significance and the elasticities vary across services and goods sectors in ways that intuitively make sense.

Firms that engage in international trade are on average larger, more productive and more often foreign owned than firms that service the local economy only. Nevertheless, there are vast opportunities for services SMEs to engage in international trade. It takes substantial scale to service international markets. But in the digital economy the additional cost of adding a new customer can be tiny and even start-up services firms can enter international markets – being born global. Music, films, computer software, computer games and the like are often produced for the global market by young SMEs. Most services markets rely on the physical world in addition to the digital economy, however. For these, services start-ups can leverage their reach through participation in international value chains. An alternative way for services SMEs to participate in international trade is by franchises with multinational, often manufacturing firms. The franchisors provide a trade mark, know-how, and sometimes credit. SMEs may also engage in international trade by using foreign Internet platforms to connect with local customers to whom they deliver the service offline. Although the opportunities are many, and it has been argued that the 21st century belongs to the micro multinational, the challenges and obstacles are also numerous. First, it is always more difficult for SMEs to absorb burdensome regulations and redtape than larger firms. Second, staying power requires keeping abreast with rapidly changing technology and consumer tastes, which require significant human and financial resources. Firms are born small, and a few are also born global. The vast majority of services firms that manage to survive in international markets grow rapidly to reach a sustainable scale. Some grow organically, some integrate into international networks and many are acquired by larger firms. Policy should first and foremost remove unnecessary obstacles to entrepreneurship, and barriers to enter foreign mark

This paper presents the scoring and weighting methodology for calculation of the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for 18 sectors. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The scoring system is based on binary scoring. To reconcile the complexity of services trade restrictions with binary scoring, non-binary measures are broken down to multiple thresholds; complementary measures are grouped and scored as zero only if all measures in the bundle are not restrictive. Finally in cases where one restriction renders others irrelevant, those measures that are rendered irrelevant are automatically scored one. The paper presents the general methodology that applies to the core measures found in all sectors as well as sector-specific scoring where relevant.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for motion pictures, television and broadcasting and sound recording. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for audio-visual services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.06 and 0.72 for motion pictures, 0.07 to 0.78 for television and broadcasting, and between 0.05 and 0.37 for sound recording. The sample averages are 0.18 for motion pictures, 0.28 for television and broadcasting and 0.16 for sound recording. Limitations on foreign entry, including foreign equity limits contribute to about two thirds of the index values in television and broadcasting. In motion pictures screen quotas contribute to the indices in many of the countries with scores above average. Sound recording, i.e. music, is the most open of the three audio-visual services sectors where limitations on movement of people account for more than 40% of the index value. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for transport and courier services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for transport and courier services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The STRI supports the view that these services are subject to very different regulatory frameworks and, in some cases, to a relatively elevated degree of regulation. Indices for air transport covering measures affecting commercial establishment and accompanying movement of natural persons are on average quite high (0.43), with little variation across countries. A preliminary assessment of restrictiveness in cross-border trade in the sector shows that, while some progress in easing restrictions has been achieved through open skies agreements, significant limitations remain in place. The maritime transport sector is moderately open with an average STRI of 0.25. Foreign equity restrictions are still quite common in the sector and contribute significantly to the index. Most other sector-specific restrictions are found in the cabotage market and in ports. In road freight transport, the results confirm that the domestic road freight transport regime has been significantly liberalised over the years, and currently commercial establishment in the sector is largely affected by horizontal measures. The overall level of restrictiveness is relatively low with an average of 0.16, but exhibits pretty large variation. With respect to rail freight, the STRI also supports the view that considerable reforms have been undertaken in the sector in the past decades. The average level of restrictiveness is moderate at 0.22, although two countries maintain a s

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for computer services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for computer services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.08 and 0.34, with a sample average of 0.18. Explicit barriers to trade in computer services are rare, but the sector is subject to a number of economy-wide restrictions facing all sectors. Among these, restrictions on movement of people (mode 4 in GATS terminology) make the largest contribution to the index value, followed by regulatory transparency issues. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for telecommunications. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for telecommunications and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.06 and 0.61, with a sample average of 0.22. Barriers to competition, reflecting inadequate regulation of incumbents with significant market power, and state ownership in some countries make the largest contribution to the index value, followed by restrictions on foreign entry. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

Services have been considered non-tradable and therefore outside the scope of trade policy-making until quite recently. A logical consequence is that explicit policy barriers to cross-border trade in services are rare. What segments markets for tradable services is therefore largely in the realm of domestic regulation. Both the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and a number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) aim at developing disciplines on domestic regulation. GATS Article VI states that disciplines on qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements shall be established to ensure that regulation is not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service. Such disciplines are, however, yet to be established, but a reference paper on pro-competitive domestic regulation in telecommunications has been included in a number of World Trade Organization (WTO) members' GATS schedules of commitments, and some RTAs have quite detailed disciplines on domestic regulation in this sector. The region where services market integration runs the deepest is the European Union. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 had already granted full market access for the signatories through cross-border trade as well as the movement of capital and labour, while the Internal Market Act aimed at removing barriers to the implementation of the letter as well as the intention of the Treaty of Rome. Nevertheless, domestic regulation turned out to be a formidable obstacle to the integration of services markets. In the words of the European Commission, 'a decade after the envisaged completion of the internal market, there is still a huge gap between the vision of an integrated European Union economy and the reality as experienced by European citizens and providers'. Hence, a Services Directive aiming at lowering regulatory barriers to trade was introduced in 2006. Against this backdrop, this chapter will focus on empirical work on the European

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for the regulated professions of legal and accounting services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for legal and accounting services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The STRI supports the view that legal and accounting services are subject to a relatively high level of regulation. Restrictiveness for legal services ranges from 0.11 to 0.73, with an average of 0.31. Accounting and auditing services show an average of 0.3 and STRI values ranging from 0.13 to 1. The results provide useful policy insights, particularly in order to identify priorities for reform at the national and international levels. Notably, in the case of legal and accounting services, easing a few prominent restrictions could result in a significantly more liberal and competitive market environment.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for distribution services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for distribution services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.02 and 0.40, with a sample average of 0.13. It is observed that the regulatory profile differs across countries. Restrictions on foreign ownership and other market entry conditions significantly contribute to the results for almost half of the countries covered by the STRI. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for financial services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for commercial banking and insurance services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores in commercial banking range between 0.06 and 0.55, with a sample average of 0.19. The scores in insurance services range between 0.05 and 0.63, with a sample average of 0.20. The results are mainly driven by restrictions on market entry, where significant impediments remain in the form of foreign equity limits, restrictions on legal form, discriminatory licensing criteria and restrictions on cross-border transactions. Barriers to competition, including regulation of products and prices and preferential treatment granted to state-owned financial institutions, also make a substantive contribution to the index values. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for construction, architecture and engineering services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for construction, architecture and engineering services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The results for construction services indicate that the overall level of restrictiveness is relatively low, ranging from 0.05 to 0.32, with an average of 0.16. The more elevated levels of restriction can be largely attributed to general measures affecting all sectors of the economy. The STRI also supports the view that architecture and engineering services are less restrictively regulated than other accredited professional services, notably legal and accounting services. The average value for the STRI among the countries in the sample is 0.22 for architecture services, connoting a relatively low degree of regulatory restrictiveness; the corresponding value is only marginally lower, 0.2, for engineering services. The majority of regulations affecting trade in these sectors concern the movement of people.