This book was conceived on the battlefields of Vietnam, where the term "Vietnam" became more than a geopolitical or cultural designation and came to denote a phenomenon. Vietnam is today a euphemism for getting mired in a war, for getting bogged down, for being drawn into a quagmire. Since that war, the United State has not entered any military engagement without the fear of encountering another Vietnam. Nor are we alone. The Soviets met their Vietnam in Afghanistan; the South Africans experienced theirs in Angola; and the Nigerians encountered theirs in Liberia. In these cases, the problem concerned the usual expectations of a war of brief duration -- the "short, sharp strike" and the realities of subsequent military involvement that came to be measured in terms of years. The authors argue, however, that wars may be long for two reasons, and that these reasons are so antithetical that to call both protracted wars is analytically misleading. Some wars are at the outset planned around a protracted war strategy, usually by an insurgent force that realizes that a quick victory against a superior enemy will not be gained on a conventional battlefield. Hence, protraction is preferred by one of the sides. The other long wars are those in which both protagonists expect quick victory, but for a variety of reasons, they are frustrated in their expectations. These should be termed prolonged wars. Understanding protracted war is easier than arriving at wide acceptance of why wars become prolonged. The 18 contributions to this book analyze the following prolonged wars: the Iran-Iraq War, Lebanese Civil War, Arab-Israeli War, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Chad, Liberia, the Rhodesian Conflict of 1966-1979, Mozambique Civil War, Angola and Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland. Introductory and concluding chapters also are included., The original document contains color images. ISBN 1-58566-056-6.