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BackgroundIn 2022, a nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, but those prevalences decreased in 2023. This study examines changes in those prevalences from 2023 to 2024, an election year in the USA.MethodsParticipants were members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 3 of the survey was conducted May 23-June 14, 2024; invitations to participate were sent to all respondents to prior waves who remained in KnowledgePanel. Outcome measures concern justification for the use of violence to advance any of 17 specified political objectives, personal willingness to engage in political violence at 4 levels of severity and against 9 target populations, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions. Year-to-year change is based on the means of aggregated individual change scores, which have a potential range from 0 (no change) to ± 2.ResultsThe 2024 completion rates were 88.4% (8896 respondents/10,064 invitees) overall, 91.6% (8185 respondents/8932 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2023, and 62.8% (711 respondents/1132 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2022 but not in 2023. After weighting, 50.9% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.5%, 52.3%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (24.9) years. From 2023 to 2024, the prevalence of the view that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective did not change (2024: 26.2%, 95% CI 25.0%, 27.5%; 2023: 25.3%, 95% CI 24.1%, 26.5%). There were no changes from 2023 to 2024 in willingness to damage property, threaten a person, injure a person, or kill a person in an act of political violence, and no changes in expectations of firearm use in situations where respondents considered political violence justifiable. Changes on other measures were infrequent (17 of 58 comparisons in the main analysis) and small where they occurred (with 2 exceptions, change

BACKGROUND: In recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individuals social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group. METHODS: This was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification. RESULTS: The sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9-48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4-52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4-65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47-4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1-4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03-1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13-2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity. CONCLUSIONS: Individuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

OBJECTIVE: This study investigates the association between replacement thinking, status threat perceptions, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white adults in the United States. It explores how perceived threats to social status can drive support for extreme measures aimed at preserving white hegemony, addressing a gap in research on factors contributing to political violence, a public health concern. METHODS: The 2022 Life in America Survey provided data for this cross-sectional study, focusing on status threat and replacement thinking among non-Hispanic white respondents. Status threat was inferred from relative income, education level, and racial segregation in residential census tracts, while replacement thinking was derived through agreement with the statement in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants. The outcome was the endorsement of political violence. Analysis utilized a survey-weighted robust modified Poisson model. RESULTS: Among 5,976 non-Hispanic white respondents, 18.7 % supported political violence in at least one scenario. A U-shaped relationship was observed between racial segregation and political violence endorsement: respondents from more diverse communities were less likely to support political violence. Those endorsing replacement thinking were 233 %-229 % more likely to endorse political violence than those who did not, dependent on income levels. White respondents without a high school degree were 29 % more likely to endorse political violence. CONCLUSION: The study found a positive association between replacement thinking, markers of status threat, and political violence endorsements among non-Hispanic white Americans. These findings emphasize the need for research and interventions to mitigate these perceptions and prevent political violence.

BACKGROUND: Surveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence. METHODS: Findings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18-June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States. About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that the United States needs a civil war to set things right. Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time. CONCLUSIONS: In 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

BACKGROUND: A 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings. METHODS: Wave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores. RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States, a 7.7% decrease. In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, I will be armed with a gun [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and I will shoot someone with a gun [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective. CONCLUSIONS: In this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

Land reform has been employed as a component of counterinsurgency strategies to inoculate peasants against rebel appeals by giving peasants their own land. However, the remedial effects of land reform can be undermined by right wing violence and rebel violence intended to subvert land reform implementation. We used municipio level data on land reform and election results from El Salvador to test propositions on the competing effects of land reform and political violence - right wing and rebel - on the distribution of popular support between the regime versus the rebels versus anti-reform parties in the regime. We find consistent evidence across three elections that "land to the tiller" forms of agrarian reform do increase support for the regime while right wing violence does erode support for reformist parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hate speech found in social media a place to flourish. In the Argentinean context, new right-wing parties have disrupted the political arena, winning the elections of 2023. Many of these new right-wing figures grew in popularity due to their use of social media, on a background of increasing political violence. In this article, we use quantitative and qualitative tools to investigate the prevalence of hate speech targeting women politicians and analyze the role of different political affiliations in promoting such discourse. Furthermore, we propose a model that predicts users' political alignments based on their profile descriptions, allowing us to explore the distribution of hate speech among different political orientations. Our results provide a descriptive account of the relationship between hate speech by politicians and other users and shows that right-wing political figures and supporters are strong emissors of hate speech, while women, especially those from the left-wing are more prone to receive violent content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-2000 period in Zimbabwe is known as the decade of the crisis because of rising poverty, hyperinflation, a collapsed economy, poor service delivery, political violence, and a myriad of problems that made the lives of the majority of Zimbabweans precarious. It was also the period of the land reform programme which the government embarked on to, among many other reasons, galvanise the ruling party’s waning political fortunes. The land reform programme was complemented by an ultra-nationalist imaginary which took the form of the 75% (later upgraded to 100%) local content policy for radio and television. The policy was meant to create cultural support for ZANU – PF’s land exercise by rejecting the cultural products of western countries. These western countries, in ZANU – PF parlance, were enemies of Zimbabwe because of their oppositional stance towards the land reform exercise. Thus, the 100% local content became a way of policing musical production to make it agree with this anti-western stance. The Urban Grooves movement of the post-2000 period emerged from this policy change and dominated Zimbabwe’s airwaves for a decade. This movement was not a musical genre per se but a mish-mash of genres comprising dancehall, soul, Afro-pop, house, hip-hop, among others. Using Zimbabwe’s hip-hop music, with special reference to the late King Pinn’s ‘I Salute You’, this paper explores how youth artists operated in post-2000 ZANUfied and Mugabeist Zimbabwe. Did their musical practices pander to the policing whims of the state? Did they, contrary to the state’s expectations, come up with alternative identities that sought to challenge the ZANUist political hegemony of their time? If youth cultures can act as conveyors of alternative phenomenological forms of social and political reality and as indicators of ideological resistance, how have Zimbabwean hip-hop artists acted as conveyors of ideological resistance? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Social networks and religious identity. From cyberfundamentalism to political violence" analyzes various sociological and anthropological studies on religious identities today, highlighting the influence of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the construction of identities. It addresses the use of social networks by different religious communities, such as Muslims and Christians, and reflects on the relationship between religion, identity, and political violence in a global context. It emphasizes the importance of overcoming racism and building an intercultural society based on respect. [Extracted from the article]

Coup "handbooks" emphasize the capture the incumbent leader as a key objective for plotters to enact successful regime change. However, the literature has yet to empirically assess this relationship. We also lack a robust understanding of how leaders prevent their own capture during coups d'état. Using novel data on leader statuses during coups from 1950 to 2017, I find evidence that incumbent leader capture has a positive and significant relationship with the likelihood of coup success. The findings also suggest that leader capture will be less likely if the regime pre-emptively creates a counterweight presidential guard unit, responsible for providing proximate security for the core leadership. These data and findings provide new insights into the dynamics of in-progress coups, focusing on the operational strategies employed by both sides. It also demonstrates the diversity of independent effects that specific types of counterweight forces have on specific coup outcomes, encouraging further study in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Babylon Center for Humanities Studies is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Background: Understanding health literacy and its predictors is fundamental for adolescents to have healthy lives. This study investigated the association between exposure to violence and other factors with health literacy levels among Palestinian middle school students. Methods: This cross-sectional study included middle school students. We used the validated Arabic version of the Health Literacy Assessment Scale for Adolescents to measure health literacy levels, and asked adolescents 11 questions to assess whether they were exposed to various forms of violence. We used binary logistic regression to identify the factors associated with each health literacy subscale. Results: Among the 816 students, 20.4%, 30.5%, and 50.5% had low functional, confusion, and communication health literacy levels, respectively. Exposure to political violence was significantly associated with lower levels of functional health literacy (OR: 2.65, 95%CI: 1.71–4.08) and low confusion health literacy (OR: 1.96, 95%CI: 1.31–2.94). Domestic and school violence were associated with low levels of confusion health literacy (OR: 1.82, 95%CI: 1.30–2.55). Conclusion: Exposure to different forms of violence predicted low levels of health literacy among Palestinian middle school students. This study identified the need for middle school students to acquire the skills required to analyse and integrate the health information they receive. Therefore, there is a need for regular interventions that target an increase in their critical health literacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on infrastructure studies in Latin America, specifically on the collapse of the Talavera bridge in Lima, Peru, in 2017. The social, political, and cultural implications of infrastructure in the region are discussed, highlighting inequality, failures, and associated violence. It analyzes how infrastructure generates power relations and affects different social groups, as well as its role in the transformation of landscapes and social relationships. The importance of studying infrastructure from an anthropological perspective to understand its complexity and its effects on society is addressed. [Extracted from the article]

This article puts forward a contemporary reflection about violence based on a finalist legal assessment of peace. For that purpose, it both distinguishes and relates these two concepts, particularly regarding their politically motivated expressions, as well as it highlights the functionality of law to achieve negative peace and the ensuing morality of positive peace. In doing so, it considers the works written on this subject by influential contemporary authors as a reference point, after which it projects a legal perspective on violence through the analysis of three dimensions of this phenomenon that rely on categories both of legal theory and legal philosophy. This paper concludes that the final motivations that bring about conflict among States, groups and individuals admit similarities among themselves when they are pushed to the maximum level of incivility and irrationality. Likewise, it states that the distinction between law and morality is used improperly by those who use violence as a method for political action because they pretend to justify their actions therein as a way to ignore or evade their being as subjects ruled by the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen the emergence of critical studies produced by third-generation Displaced Persons (hereafter DPs), questioning ethno-nationalist historical narrations, hegemonic in the community. Yet, in the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, such studies have been absent. Kassandra Luciuk's current study is written by someone raised in the political elite of the Ukrainian ethno-nationalist community, in dialogue with and challenging the historical memory that her parents dedicated their lives to promote. Her study reads like a Bildungsroman of a young person whose eyes were opened to an ostracized rivalling leftist community tradition. In the process, she started to question the Nationalists monopoly of defining what it means to be Ukrainian in Canada. Her still-unpublished 2021 dissertation sheds new light on ultra-nationalist political violence in Canada and the central role of Ukrainian Nationalists in establishing normative multiculturalism in Canada. The Nationalist hegemony in the community was established through the erection of monuments, a politicized folklore, and the development of an elaborate victimization narrative of Soviet genocide abroad, Canadian concentration camps and "linguistic genocide" at home. Through claiming a share for Galician Ukrainians in the settler colonialist project, Ukrainians insisted on a special status as a "founding people" on the Canadian prairies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the Global North is still facing the challenge of traditional forms of violent extremism (e.g. right-wing, left-wing, and militant Islamism), intelligence services and scholars alike have highlighted potential threats from novel extremist orientations that have (re) emerged over the past decade. One such variant is captured by the notion of anti-government extremism, which in its most simple form describes extremist attitudes or actions that oppose government and institutions of authority. In this research note, we offer critical perspectives on anti-government extremism as an analytical construct. Specifically, we raise questions concerning the extent to which the current definition of anti-government extremism always captures attitudes and/or actions that are indeed i) extremist, and ii) anti-governmental. We then discuss the implications and potential negative constitutive effects these unanswered conceptual issues may raise in relation to preventing and countering violent extremism (P/ CVE), and conclude with a call for further debate and research on the theoretical and analytical merits of anti-government extremism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital technologies are rapidly being integrated into the political process and this massive transformation is bringing both opportunities and significant challenges. The research is focused on how the merging of political power and data exploitation has led to a new challenge known as surveillance capitalism -- where personal data is gathered, commodified and used without the data owners' consent--in the privacy and security field. With the guidance of four key research questions, the study makes use of the mixed-methods approach, combining literature review with empirical data collected through surveys. Academic databases including Google Scholar, JSTOR, Scopus, and PubMed, build the arsenal of the literature review, examining the theoretical frameworks of surveillance capitalism and how effective current legal frameworks, such as Ghana's Data Protection Act, 2012. The survey component captures public perceptions of political vigilantism and its exacerbation through data exploitation. The findings highlight the need for stronger enforcement of data protection laws, increased public awareness, and the development of strategies that balance innovation with privacy protection. This study provides critical insights for policymakers, emphasising the urgency of addressing the dual challenges of data exploitation and political violence to safeguard democratic processes in Ghana. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Internacional de Educación para la Justicia Social is the property of Universidad Autonoma de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract Background In 2022, a nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, but those prevalences decreased in 2023. This study examines changes in those prevalences from 2023 to 2024, an election year in the USA. Methods Participants were members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 3 of the survey was conducted May 23-June 14, 2024; invitations to participate were sent to all respondents to prior waves who remained in KnowledgePanel. Outcome measures concern justification for the use of violence to advance any of 17 specified political objectives, personal willingness to engage in political violence at 4 levels of severity and against 9 target populations, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions. Year-to-year change is based on the means of aggregated individual change scores, which have a potential range from 0 (no change) to ± 2. Results The 2024 completion rates were 88.4% (8896 respondents/10,064 invitees) overall, 91.6% (8185 respondents/8932 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2023, and 62.8% (711 respondents/1132 invitees) for invitees in 2024 who had responded in 2022 but not in 2023. After weighting, 50.9% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.5%, 52.3%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (24.9) years. From 2023 to 2024, the prevalence of the view that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective did not change (2024: 26.2%, 95% CI 25.0%, 27.5%; 2023: 25.3%, 95% CI 24.1%, 26.5%). There were no changes from 2023 to 2024 in willingness to damage property, threaten a person, injure a person, or kill a person in an act of political violence, and no changes in expectations of firearm use in situations where respondents considered political violence justifiable. Changes on other measures were infrequent (17 of 58 comparisons in the main analysis) and small where they occurred (with 2 exceptions, change

Abstract Background In recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individual’s social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group. Methods This was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification. Results The sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9–48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4–52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4–65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47–4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03–1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13–2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity. Conclusions Individuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

This article aims to outline a theory of political boredom based on the concept of the liberal temporal dispositive. According to this concept, modern politics is characterized by the reduction of political time consumption to enable the growing temporal autonomy of the individual. However, individuals may experience considerable stress in their pursuit to utilize this free time effectively. Boredom arises when individuals fail to “fill” their available time with meaningful actions. Political crises of boredom occur as attempts by individuals to relieve the pressures accompanying temporal autonomy, sometimes restarting political temporality on a new, massive scale. Furthermore, the article examines modern political philosophy as inherently rooted in the liberal temporal dispositive. Through several historical examples, it is discussed how political philosophy may either contribute to imbuing politics with a desire for meaning or abstain from it in an attitude of serene resignation. It is proposed that liberal democracy requires a temporal ethics based on the latter.

The geopolitical location between Russia and Germany has historically determined Poland’s foreign policy, in which Ukraine has been given a privileged place. Polish policy-makers have perceived Ukrainian independence as the main barrier preventing the restoration of Russian imperial ambitions. Consequently, Poland has been unwavering in its commitment to supporting the Ukrainians in their resistance to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This attitude was visible in Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s 2023 lecture at the University of Heidelberg. Nevertheless, relations between Ukraine and Poland and the current Russia-Ukraine conflict are far more complex than is mainly acknowledged. Behind Poland’s support, there is an unhealed wound of Ukrainian nationalism, which the current government in Ukraine does not want to unknowledge. The Ukrainian nationalist ideas, based on the slogan “Nation above all,” are very different from those of the Poles. Upon proper recognition of the multifaceted causes of war and the situation’s complexity, a cease-fire and a peaceful settlement of the Russia-Ukraine conflict could be achieved.

Abstract Background U.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners. Methods We fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: “Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?” and “Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?” Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities. Results Overall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners’ recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence. Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a “stand-your-ground” policy compared to those who did not report such motivations. Conclusions Racial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners’ support for such policies remains strong.

This study aims to analyze the gender barriers to female participation in Brazilian politics. Data collection was carried out through semi-structured interviews with 22 women from the Southeast and 18 from the Northeast who work in the political arena. The dialogues were analyzed using Gioia's method, and the results show that women face psychosocial, cultural, and party-related barriers, highlighting how gender policies remain insufficient, making it difficult for women to enter, stay, and attract others to a political career. Additionally, this research contributes to the theoretical and practical fields regarding women in politics, helping to understand the challenges faced in the Brazilian context and emphasizing how experiences of violence lead to resistance to political engagement and physical and mental health issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Psicoperspectivas is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, Escuela de Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Psicoperspectivas is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, Escuela de Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Psicoperspectivas is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, Escuela de Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Impossibilia: Revista Internacional de Estudios Literarios is the property of Impossibilia: Revista Internacional de Estudios Literarios and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The text addresses the challenges for democracy and peace, highlighting the global metamorphosis towards post-globalization and exacerbated individualism. It mentions the militarization of thought and the importance of nonviolence as an antidote to political violence. It also analyzes the situation in Latin America, with an emphasis on corruption, inequality, and the lack of a culture of the rule of law. It emphasizes the need to regenerate the future through a new narrative and the comprehensive education of young people. [Extracted from the article]

The emphasis in recent decades on weak state capacity as an explanation of civil war detracts from an important fact: some of the deadliest and most protracted rebellions since WWII arose not where the state was weak, but rather in areas of significant state power. This study challenges the predominance-of-peripheral-conflict paradigm by disentangling rebel formation from civil war onset and emphasizing the urban origins of numerous rebel groups. Quantitative analyses show that three group types—military-, social interest-, and political party-based groups—are far more likely to form in large cities, especially the capital, and far less likely to form in the rural countryside. Case studies then illustrate the constraints and opportunities nascent rebel groups of each type face. This study advances the field's understanding of a surprisingly large number of violent rebellions that current mainstream approaches and the emphasis on weak states and conflict opportunities cannot effectively explain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alleged practices of magical assault and vampirism are a recurrent feature of popular explanations of misfortune in Tuva, South Siberia. Based on a field study of healing practices in an "Association of Shamans", this article analyses rituals of redressing curse afflictions in the context of Russian political domination. A central purpose of this discussion is to foreground the centrality of kinds of parasitical worship and occult threat to structures of political power in—and beyond—the territory of Tuva. Focusing on a "cursescape", which develops from the combative practices of shamans, occult specialists, and office-holders, the article probes a repertoire of shamanic healing symbols. It is argued that healing efficacy is constructed in the process of engaging with hunting symbols and animal spirits, which appear in Indigenous Siberian cosmologies. The analysis shows that ideas of ritual risk underpin the process of symbolic resolution. Whereas shamanic practices provide refuge to spirits evicted from their natural landscapes, Tibetan Buddhism—the unifying religion of Tuva—offers an alternative path of healing the effects of the shamans' propagation of spirits. The article highlights indigenous perceptions of a "cursed" landscape as a space where the agencies of "darkness" and their political sponsors are confronted with an emancipating religious modality emerging from local Buddhist rituals. The analysis displays the unsolved drama of itinerant spirits and shamanic ancestral souls, whose agency is revealed through successive—yet inauspicious—forms of reincarnation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Imagofagia is the property of Imagofagia - AsAECA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Life and a Half is characterised by the story of the people of Katamalanasia, with their many successive guides, governed by repressive power. The narrator takes a critical look at this governance. Using roundabout language, he depicts a society plagued by violence and the victim of political perversity. Based on this premise, the hypothesis is that the narrator adopts an ironic stance to describe the violence. How, then, is irony structured in Life and a Half, so as to emphasise violence? The aim of the study is to show how the ironic mode of expression helps to express the horrors in this novel, and the effect it has on the reader. Using structural stylistics, the study reveals a discourse that blurs meaning by thwarting the reading pact. The processes of false pretence, paradox and enunciative doubling help to denounce the abuses of post-independent states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: This article presents a model of political competition in which political parties, through clientelism strategies, vie for control of legislative seats. Parties exercise political violence to prevent potential rivals from gaining power and threatening their position within the hybrid political regime. The theory suggests that the degree of political violence exerted by parties in hybrid regimes will increase (decrease) as they concentrate more (less) power in the legislature. Methods: Using the methodology of analytical narratives, we examine the narrative on political violence in the Colombian political regime to identify key actors, strategies, information sets, and institutional changes. From these identified elements, we construct a theoretical model of political competition within the mathematical theory of games to explain the institutional changes highlighted in the narrative. Finally, we develop an econometric model to find statistical evidence supporting the predictions of the theoretical model derived from the narrative. Results: The narrative and the analytical narrative indicate that, in a hybrid regime, a higher degree of political power concentration causes a higher rate of political violence. The estimation of the Vector Auto-regression model allows us to analyze the response of the violence rate to a shock in the concentration index. Following an unexpected increase in the concentration of political power, the violence rate shows an initial increase of approximately 0.3 percentage points above its initial value. Subsequently, the effect attenuates slightly and stabilizes at around 0.2 percentage points above the baseline, maintaining this level throughout the period. Discussion/Conclusion: The theoretical model proposed in this paper suggests an explanation of political violence that diverges from the explanations offered by traditional theories. We suggest that the theoretical model proposed here captures the historical logic of the relationship between violence, political clientelism, and exclusion in Colombia, a country with a relatively long tradition as a formal democracy (since 1958), leading us to interesting conclusions that have not been proposed so far in the literature on violence in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: U.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners. Methods: We fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: "Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?" and "Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?" Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities. Results: Overall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners' recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence. Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a "stand-your-ground" policy compared to those who did not report such motivations. Conclusions: Racial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners' support for such policies remains strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Driven by the frayed paradox present in legal feminism, which aims for gender equality and hits on the reproduction of inequalities of other kinds, we propose to bring decolonial lenses to reflect on the crime of Political Violence Against Women, art. 326-B - Electoral Code, created in 2021, 26 years after the first national measure to promote women's participation in politics. The hypothesis, reflected in this text by some of the main decolonial concepts, is that the experience of women's movements and feminist movements has proposed measures for equal rights that do not reduce the solution to criminalization. For this analysis, we have carried out a bibliographical survey, using the classic texts of decolonial theory as our main references. In the conclusion, we present the main contributions of reflection based on the concept of decoloniality, especially by Nelson Maldonado-Torres and María Lugones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the nature and extent of involvement by neo-Nazi and other far-right Ukrainian organisations in the Donbas war (2014-2022) and the Odesa massacre (2014). This issue is highly politicised with contrasting narratives. The Russian and Donbas separatist governments, as well as their media, have contended that Ukraine has been a Nazi or neo-Nazi regime since a fascist coup took place in 2014, while Ukrainian and Western governments and media have maintained that such elements in the Ukrainian far-right were marginal, trivial, even non-existent. The article interrogates the historical record with primary sources in the three most relevant languages-Ukrainian, Russian, and English. The investigation reveals crucial far-right involvement in both the early stages of the war in Donbas and the Odesa massacre. Although the percentage of far-right supporters and fighters in Ukraine was relatively small, they exercised disproportionate influence in the country due to their greater reliance on violence and armed formations. The Russian government, however, exaggerated the role of the neo-Nazis in Ukraine to publicly justify the illegal invasion in February 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Horizons of Politics / Horyzonty Polityki is the property of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

BACKGROUND: Current conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets. METHODS: This cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives. RESULTS: The analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants, and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States. One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, I will be armed with a gun; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that I will shoot someone with a gun. Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income. CONCLUSIONS: Small but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.

The aim of this paper is to show the emotional impact of ETA terrorism on the PSE-EE militancy during the years of the socialisation of suffering, 1995-2011. To do so, we will use the theoretical-methodological tools provided by the history of emotions. It will be seen how emotional suffering greatly shaped the socialist experience in this period, whose experience has been codified with elements such as pressure and social isolation, threats and aggressions, or the lack of freedom of movement (due to the obligation to carry an escort). This emotional suffering was a constitutive part of the culture of resistance that Basque socialism redefined at this time -and linked to the resistance carried out by the socialists in the years of the Franco dictatorship-. In this redefinition, the strategies to overcome fear were the political commitment, anger, and courage, a feeling of pride for fighting against ETA, and strong group solidarity. These elements partly explain why the PSE-EE could survive and why its members continued to carry out their political work.

Forced displacements in the context of civil wars are intimately bound to the violent practices which accompany them. In the case of the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath, this relationship manifested itself in the massive flight of people who feared reprisals but also in displacements imposed by the authorities, or motivated by social exclusion. Studies relating to internal population movements within this context are rare, however. This work deals with the flight of the rail workers of Altsasu-Alsasua in the days following the coup of July 1936. After reviewing the literature on wartime displacements, both internationally and in Spain, the article uses 175 records created during the subsequent dismissal of rail workers in order to trace their wartime experiences. First, we examine the circumstances that produced early flights, which only make sense if we bear in mind the myriad experiences of socio-political conflict which preceded the war and heralded its beginning. Thereafter, the article maps the itineraries of those who abandoned the area. Finally, we examine the difficulties that marked the return home and the displacements many rail workers endured as part of the regime’s repressive policies.