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The 1993 John Gaus Lecture Editor's Note: Francis E. Rourke, the Benjamin H. Griswold III Professor of Public Policy Studies of The Johns Hopkins University, was designated the John Gaus [...]

The author here seeks to answer questions that have much preoccupied students of presidential politics in recent years. In the quadrennial quest for the presidential nomination is there greater disunity [...]

Bureaucracy is seen by many today to be a threat to democracy in this country, an unelected elite out of touch with the values and preferences of the public and [...]

This is a study of the relationship between political parties and the theory and practice of democracy. Like others before him, Gerald M. Pomper believes that 'the growth of political [...]

Comments on the presence of conception of court politics in large corporations and in White House in the United States. Distinction in the functions of the courtier; Arguments of writer Lewis Dexter on the functions of personal staff; Reasons for creating a personal staff aside from the institutional staff.

Examines the presidential management styles in the United States. Attainment of a successful presidency through proper organization; Arrangement of the functions and activities of the executive branch; Secrecy in the conduct of governmental affairs.

Secrecy in public affairs is presumed more important than other public interests. In external affairs the public interest to be protected is usually national security and the effective conduct of diplomatic relations with other countries. In the context of government activities related to domestic affairs, the important public interests to be protected are usually the efficiency of the governing process and the privacy of individuals, groups, and organizations. The article presents an example reported in a British newspaper, which reveals the conflicting elements of the secrecy dilemma. On one hand the police justification for withholding information was based on an important consideration: premature disclosure might encourage disturbances in other places. The article describes the commonly suggested remedies for dealing with government secrecy. Liberal theory regards secrecy as an evil necessity imposed upon free citizens as a result of some imperfection in human affairs. One of the suggested remedies focuses on the legal and formal measures that will support citizens and officials, respectively, in an encounter over access to information. Secrecy then becomes a problem of defendant-claimant relationships to be solved whenever the right to possess information or to gain access is disputed.

The issue of nongovernmental secrecy as a major problem in public policy, has, of late, attracted the attention of politicians and public interest advocates. This article discusses the sources, manifestation, and impact of corporate secrecy. Secrecy by corporations and other private organizations stems from many of the same factors that produce secrecy in public agencies. First of all, corporations are bureaucratic organizations, and as Max Weber argued in his classic essay on bureaucracy, "a preoccupation with secrecy is an inherent characteristic of bureaucracies." Since most private organizations have information that is properly kept confidential and which is of no consequence outside the organization, the task of analysis is to determine which kinds of information are of sufficient public importance to warrant compulsory disclosure. The article presents a list of specific kinds of information that can be classified into two broad categories based on the degree to which information is restricted. First, there is information that is withheld from the public but shared with one or more government agencies. The second category, which is more restrictive, consists of information that is withheld from the government as well as from the public.

Great Britain is one of the countries where the issue of administrative secrecy has recently come to the surface in a variety of ways, and has led to changes in habitual practices and responses. The debate over the condition of the civil service has raised new interest in the appropriateness of secrecy in the operation of British government, and has led to efforts to reformulate criteria for drawing lines between the realms of secrecy and disclosure. This article, in an attempt to look into the recent controversies and changes, recalls the setting of traditional administrative secrecy in Great Britain. It examines how, in the name of the larger constitutional system, a kind of administrative ideology of secrecy had developed, and how it gave rise to certain policies and rules designed to implement that commitment. The institutional and attitudinal setting in which the British administrative process has developed made it possible for habits of secrecy to flourish with relatively few checks and challenges. One of the sharp criticisms of the British approach to official secrecy has been that it not only relies on the criminal law, but also that the law itself was a hastily drafted affair designed to solve the problems of a particular historical interlude.

The Freedom of Information Act is one of the most promising developments in the recent history of democratic government, and it has already had considerable impact in reducing unnecessary bureaucratic secrecy. Yet, there is a great need for better administration, and although the task is extremely complex, this need must be met. Increasing use of the Act, plus the complaints of users about denials or delays, have revealed how difficult it often is, to get good administration of the Act. The causes are much more extensive than bureaucratic possessiveness, or insularity and they stem in large part from certain unique features of the Act. Thus, unlike most other important legislation creating or modifying domestic or international programs, responsibility for the administration of this Act cannot be assigned to just one or a few agencies, because the Act may deeply involve all activities under all programs in all agencies. The article gives a brief overview of the Act; identifies various causes of administrative difficulties; and the how the Act should be executed.

The recent measures pertaining to government information policies and practices in the United States stem from two fundamental principles of American government: popular sovereignty and the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances. In addition to providing a procedure for realizing the right of the public to petition for information, citizens are offend various options to become informed about the activities of the Executive Branch--on their own initiative, through the press, or with the assistance of public officials or organized interests. These new policies have also sought to promote greater Executive accountability to the U.S. Congress regarding the faithful execution of the laws. The information relationship among the Executive, the U.S. Congress, and the public is fraught, however, with a variety of cross-purposes and mixed motives. Cherishing personal privacy, the citizen is not anxious to have the government gather and disseminate material pertaining to his or her individual characteristics, activities, and associations. The article presents a synopsis of some of the achievements of the past decade in making government information more accessible.

Universities and State Governments. This study examines the troubles that arise between state government and institutions of higher education when the state seeks help from its universities in framing public [...]