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The United States Air Force (USAF) is not effectively utilizing the student research ecosystem to contribute toward USAF strategic priorities. This project researched how the USAF can enhance student research to contribute toward senior leaders’ requirements. The USAF needs to align academic research to provide solutions toward strategic competition in a resource-constrained environment. Aligning research to problems can only enhance the resulting innovation. We submitted a survey to 1,175 USAF students at civilian institutions. Of 266 responses, 83% had a deliverable requirement, 81% did not receive information about current USAF research priorities and funding opportunities, 91% would have considered incorporating USAF research priorities into their graduate research if they had received information about them, and 95% would potentially use a mobile application that gives access to prioritized USAF research questions, command sponsorships, and funding. Not aligning USAF-sponsored academic research with strategic priorities is mainly an organizational problem. First, the USAF should improve the talent management process to match students to appropriate research fields. Second, the USAF should improve education about academic resources for aligning research, finding sponsors, and securing funding. Lastly, the USAF should connect existing AFIT/CI students across the research ecosystem via a mobile application endorsed by Air Education and Training Command., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, Major, United States Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This capstone established the SOF-G track, certificate, and course to meet the needs of Army Special Operations Forces, with particular emphasis on Civil Affairs Forces. This curriculum prepares future ARSOF senior leaders with a comprehensive understanding of transitional governance. This includes the theories, methods, and practices to apply governance-based support activities in competition, large-scale combat operations, the consolidation of gains, and in contested, austere, denied, and politically sensitive environments. This course of study combines governance studies with applied sciences, mathematical modeling, visual analytics, and relevant case study. By sharing the coursework and faculty from the Departments of Defense Analysis and National Security Affairs, students experience regionally focused governance-based courses while expanding their professional networks between ARSOF and Foreign Area Officers, academics, and other Unified Action Partners. This path preserves the AOC and JPME coursework that make NPS a premier ILE venue. The SOF-G curriculum integrates advanced academics with Civil Affairs governance competencies outlined in Field Manual 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations and addresses key findings from the 2020 Army Futures Command-led Civil Affairs Force Modernization Assessment., Outstanding Thesis, Major, United States Army, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This thesis focuses on the evolution of the Spetsnaz from 1979-2021 as part of a more extensive examination of how Russia executes its irregular warfare strategy. The author analyzes Spetsnaz operations through six different case studies: the Soviet-Afghan War, the First Chechen War, the Second Chechen War, the Russo-Georgian War, the Annexation of Crimea, and Russia's Intervention in Syria. Significant evolution of the Spetsnaz operations began after Russia's defeat in the First Chechen War. In more recent conflicts, Russia and Spetsnaz units gained a better understanding of executing counter-insurgency operations. The most significant evolution of the Spetsnaz came after the Russo-Georgian War when Russia made improvements to the Spetsnaz command structure and modernized their equipment. These improvements led to successful operations during Russia's annexation of Crimea and Intervention in Syria. These case studies yielded two critical insights. First, while employment of Spetsnaz as a supporting force yielded low level tactical wins, these gains have not been historically consolidated. The second conclusion has more dangerous ramifications for U.S. policy and strategic competition. When Spetsnaz forces have been adequately supported by Russian operational and strategic imperatives, they can and will operate as a near-peer adversary that can challenge the United States., Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The thesis assesses the capabilities of the Ghana Army special operations forces (SOF) and how they can be employed to support counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Ghanaian regions that are threatened by the spread of insurgency in Africa’s Sahel region. The porosity of borders between northern Ghana and Burkina Faso in the Sahel, the similarity of situations between the Sahel and northern Ghana, and the quick spread of the Sahel insurgency to other parts of West Africa have made northern Ghana highly susceptible to the jihadist insurgency. The study analyzes secondary materials and data and finds that, in addition to the latent issues in the Sahel countries, the over-securitization of COIN operations in the Sahel, notably by France, has yielded unimpressive results. From the analysis, the thesis draws useful lessons for Ghana. While best COIN practices require an effective combination of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies, COIN operations in the Sahel have generally been kinetic. This has led to some pundits describing COIN operations in the Sahel as a “security traffic jam.” Based on lessons from the Sahel crisis, assessed capabilities of the Ghana Army SOF, and within a framework of comprehensive COIN operations, the thesis recommends specific tasks for the Ghana Army SOF to support COIN operations in northern Ghana., Lieutenant Colonel, Ghana Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The objective of this capstone is to identify readings that can suggest doctrinal changes to better align U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force concepts of multi-domain operations. Currently, there is no joint consensus on how to conceptualize multi-domain operations, nor how they should support the 2022 National Security Strategy. This capstone identifies readings related to two areas of potential alignment between U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force doctrine: Deterrence Theories, and Multi-Domain Operations. It also suggests designating service leads for long-range fires and command and control, and furthering development of common technological standards. Future research could study the readings identified in this capstone to refine and develop multi-domain operations doctrine., Captain, United States Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) significantly influences the world’s economy and balance of power, and maintaining the IOR’s maritime security is foremost the responsibility of the islands and coastal nations in the region. Sri Lanka, as the second-largest island nation in the IOR, also has a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) threatened by drug trafficking, a problem also faced by other coastal and island nations in the region. The Sri Lanka Navy aims to counter maritime security challenges in the nation’s EEZ and to support such efforts throughout the IOR. Little research has been done to explain how small nations might benefit from maritime security and trade engagement with great power nations. This thesis analyzes case studies of Seychelles, Mexico, and Thailand to determine which variables (such as material and monetary resources, institutions, and regional partnerships) most contribute to maritime security capabilities. System dynamics modeling then demonstrates potential behavioral outcomes for Sri Lanka’s maritime security system to determine which approaches could effectively disrupt drug trafficking. This thesis documents that achieving enhanced maritime security by disrupting drug trafficking in Sri Lanka’s EEZ and IOR is difficult without expanded capabilities and resources such as additional platforms, intelligence sharing, technology, and regional and international agreements.

Vulnerable small countries may choose a Comprehensive Defense strategy with an Asymmetric Defense Component (ADC) to deter or repel a more powerful invading force by becoming an “indigestible” nation. Analyzing the most recent case studies of Russia waging war on all fronts, this thesis attempts to discover what specific role Romanian Special Operations Forces (ROU SOF) should play in operationalizing a national resistance force. It identifies five factors that most significantly influenced the outcome of the analyzed conflicts. Furthermore, it emphasizes four implications for Romanian political and military decision makers in order to increase ROU SOF’s performance in operationalizing a capable ADC during peacetime. The three main recommendations for ROU SOFs are to change its previous fighting mindset, properly educate all the other organizations that comprise the national defense layer, and constantly exercise and evaluate the performance of all components, especially that of the ADC., Major, Romanian Land Forces, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

With the U.S. military’s shift in focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in a multi-domain operations (MDO) environment, special forces (SF) must adapt and develop new strategies to operate and succeed in a new technologically enabled combat environment. MDO warfare has evolved and now includes the 4th dimension of information, electronic, and cyber warfare. The prevalence of information through open-source internet, radio, and television as well as a high reliance on electronic communications equipment has enhanced the offense opportunities for both the United States and its adversaries alike. Designed and assembled in an era prior to the MDO environment, the SF force structure currently lacks some of the capabilities to effectively operate and thrive on modern battlefields. Capabilities such as electronic warfare or employment and exploitation of cyber space hold significant influence on the battlespace, which SF units are ill prepared to employ or exploit. As a result, SF units should reconsider their capabilities when it comes to penetrating and disabling the anti-access area denial (A2/AD) bubbles established by our enemies. SF should also consider the tools required to destroy or disable A2/AD. Ultimately, SF must reanalyze how they are positioned and employed within LSCO. A look at modern-era case studies show that SF must adapt its capabilities and force structure if it is to remain relevant and effective in future conflicts., Major, United States Army, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

This thesis provides military commands, leaders, and medical professionals an in-depth description of a present-day mustang horse therapy program tailored to service members. Little is known of the efficacy of mustang therapy for military members nor is there an established baseline description of what mustang therapy for service members entails. By describing the design and objectives of the American Mustang School in Aberdeen, North Carolina, military commands, leaders, and medical professionals are informed of an innovative means to invest in its greatest commodity: its people. This thesis also discusses possible avenues of future research for mustang therapy.

In the past three decades, The Netherlands’ Special Operations Forces (NLD SOF) operated in various geographical regions and executed the three principal tasks of SOF: (1) Military Assistance, (2) Special Reconnaissance, and (3) Direct Action. In the execution of these operations that focused on fighting terrorism, no consideration was given for Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations. Therefore, this study seeks to address the following research question: “To what extent can NLD SOF conduct UW operations given the NLD political-strategic setting?” To answer the research question, this study uses a qualitative approach. Besides information from existing literature, government documents, and media reports, interviews with key subject matter experts provide first-hand assessments on UW operations. It turns out that NLD SOF are not adequately educated, trained, and equipped to conduct UW operations, because UW is not currently a doctrinal task for NLD SOF and, therefore, is not taught during NLD SOF qualification courses. The Netherlands’ policy documents such as the Integrated International Security Strategy, the Defence Notes and The Netherlands’ Defence Doctrine provide interpretation for the NLD government to consider UW as a viable option for ensuring stability and security on NATO and EU territories. These documents and the Dutch Constitution also provide a legal basis for the NLD government to deploy its armed forces for these missions.

Operations in the information environment (OIE) are increasingly central to military operations across the competition continuum. Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) faces this reality when realigning capabilities for missions and tasks in the future security environment. This research aims to answer the question, “What gaps, challenges, and opportunities does NORSOF face to effectively integrate and develop information-related capabilities to increase its operational utility in the information environment?” To do so, this thesis offers a study of policy and DOTmLPF-F capability elements (e.g., doctrine, organization, training) that contrasted with data from a survey administered by the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment. The research finds a defensive and reactive policy and a doctrinal focus on effects in the physical domain. Further, NORSOF faces internal and external resource constraints, knowledge gaps, and limited OIE-related leadership priorities. This thesis suggests NORSOF increase operational utility in the information environment by focusing on education, leadership development, organizational responsibilities, joint targeting process involvement, and dedicated engagement in ongoing strategic level and Norwegian Army strategic communication and information projects. Furthermore, it recommends long-term approaches to enhance training and exercises, influence PME curriculum, and foster an active dialog with military strategic and political leadership.

Mysterious attacks on the human brain have begun plaguing U.S. diplomats and officials with increasing frequency, ranging from overseas diplomatic outposts to right here in the United States. Known in the media as Havana Syndrome, these attacks appear to be signaling a new form of warfare—one that is focused on enhancing, targeting, and weaponizing the human brain—neurowarfare. Indeed, the human brain is at the center of a biotechnological revolution currently underway. At the same time, great power competition has returned to the forefront of international relations, as China and Russia seek to contest America’s global leadership. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this contest is ultimately a battle of ideas and influence, with more value placed on information and non-lethal means to manipulate and control both adversaries and domestic populations alike. The battle for influence begins and ends in the human mind, where reality is perceived. The implications of these developments point to both a new form and domain of warfare centering on the human brain. By highlighting recent attacks targeting the brain and revealing research from the United States and its two main competitors—China and Russia—this thesis seeks to argue that neurowar is not just coming, but rather is already here and is likely to fundamentally alter conflict and warfare., Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, Major, United States Air Force, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Although the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) has deployed worldwide to combat violent extremism and counter strategic competitors since 2006, it does not have a clear process to measure the effectiveness of tactical-level Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). A lack of measures of effectiveness (MOE) for CAO is due to several basic challenges: 1) Lack of a Civil Affairs doctrinal foundation for MOEs; 2) lack of clear mission statements for deploying teams to help formulate MOEs; 3) lack of effective internal and external Civil Affairs communications to standardize MOEs; and 4) lack of adequate personnel, training, funding, and analytic tools for Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) to monitor and evaluate MOEs. Based on 18 interviews with Civil Affairs practitioners—from senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to field grade officers—this thesis examines the barriers that CATs face in developing and implementing MOEs during mission planning and execution. This thesis also provides recommendations for CATs and the Civil Affairs leadership to address and overcome these barriers by developing MOEs to evaluate tactical and operational mission progress. Furthermore, the authors identify deficiencies in doctrine and recommend the creation of doctrine-specific to SOF Civil Affairs., Major, United States Army, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, U.S. policymakers and military professionals have dedicated significant attention to countering Russian offensive irregular warfare and political warfare threats. However, just as Russia has modernized its offensive irregular capabilities, it has also made significant strides in combatting asymmetric threats. Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria demonstrated this advancement, as Russian-led Syrian forces successfully battled U.S.-backed groups and the Islamic State. If U.S. Special Forces (U.S. SF) and their allies intend to challenge near-peer adversaries abroad, then it is time to study the threat posed by a modern counter-irregular warfare (CIW) campaign. This study seeks to address the transformation of Russian CIW doctrine and methods from the Russian Federation’s invasion of Chechnya in 1994 up through its current activities in the North Caucasus, the Middle East, and beyond. By identifying key principles and capabilities from across these case studies, this project aims to develop an improved understanding of the threat U.S. SF and their partners would face executing unconventional warfare (UW) against Russia or its proxies. Such an understanding would inform threat-based training scenarios and enhance the Special Forces regiment’s understanding of how Green Berets might execute UW against a peer adversary., Major, United States Army, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

For more than thirty years, Pakistan has conducted an irregular warfare campaign in Kashmir to wrest control of the disputed region from India while also leveraging its nuclear weapons capability. This approach has frustrated a decisive Indian response, precipitated multiple crises, and risked nuclear exchange. This thesis analyzes Pakistan's irregular warfare-nuclear deterrence strategy by evaluating Kashmir crises nested within three distinct periods of Pakistan's nuclear capability: de facto, overt, and advanced technology. The results suggest Pakistan has successfully employed irregular warfare under the nuclear umbrella within Kashmir, but has also incurred great cost by risking nuclear exchange, alienating the international community, and destabilizing itself through empowerment of violent jihadist groups. As one looks forward to the implications of Great Power Competition upon the Indian subcontinent, the dynamics have dramatically shifted as the U.S. and China compete for influence. While the U.S. moves closer to India, and China to Pakistan, potential polarization of the Kashmir problem presents additional nuclear escalation risks. However, emerging opportunities to leverage the global powers' common interest in preventing terrorism could prove a catalyst for South Asian stabilization. Pakistan's Kashmir strategy can also provide insights regarding how current or future nuclear-armed regional powers may choose to employ irregular warfare to optimize their influence., http://archive.org/details/amostdangerouspl1094566649, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This thesis sought to present the manning challenges that affect the Hungarian Special Operations Forces development, especially in the case of its main combative element—the 2nd SOF Group—using the recruitment, assessment, selection, training, and retention (RAST-R) framework. It also aspired to identify ways and means to revise and improve this framework, with the view of increasing the number of members, and then finding, training, and retaining the right SOF operator talent. To that end, this thesis conducted a comparative research of the Hungarian and six international countries’ SOF-related RAST-R strategies. The analysis revealed that SOF recruits members effectively through the use of media, but decisive success is gained when active SOF members conduct face-to-face meetings. The assessment, as part of the pre-selection procedure, brings more possible recruits if it is conducted offsite, where potential talent could be found. The standards and requirements for joining and selecting are not—and cannot be—decreased to boost the number of candidates to maintain quality above quantity. The organizational culture is a key part of the employer brand that eventuates the sustainable RAST-R cycle. The thesis recommends feasible approaches to improve the 2nd SOF Group’s RAST-R processes in terms of the SOF organizational culture development, the research-based targeted recruitment, and the necessity of pre-selection., http://archive.org/details/developingthehun1094566635, Captain, Hungarian Ground Forces, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Knowledge withholding may co-occur with knowledge sharing, but current research has a negative connotation and focuses on quantitatively investigated antecedents. However, the social context seems to play a crucial role in this phenomenon. We therefore investigated knowledge withholding and leader behavior. In doing so, we applied a qualitative methodology and analyzed five memoirs of U.S. general and flag officers. The 1,853 memoir pages revealed 247 knowledge-withholding instances and eight different actors. We developed a framework of interdependence theory and social identity theory to order and explain the data. We found that the general and flag officers, as well as the other actors, withheld knowledge. Also, knowledge is withheld to (a) gain an advantage over another actor (negative interdependence), (b) yield a benefit for oneself and a trusted actor or to gain an edge over an untrusted actor (positive interdependence), (c) adhere to predetermined processes (neutral interdependence), and (d) create an advantage for the group with which a person socially identifies (social identity). Most importantly, the general and flag officers use knowledge withholding as a tool to achieve their goals. These findings indicate that this phenomenon in leader behavior may have been overlooked and should undergo further research., http://archive.org/details/knowledgewithhol1094566726, Major, Netherlands Marine Corps, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

The United States is in an era of renewed great power competition. This competition spans a multi-domain environment with a renewed focus on the maritime domain as China seeks to expand its global maritime influence. America’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been involved in primarily land-based counterinsurgency for the last twenty years, and maritime and underwater operations capability has atrophied. This study examines the organizational structure and underwater operations record of the Italian Decima MAS frogmen during World War II. Utilizing Benjamin Jensen’s theories on innovative organizations, and a statistical analysis, recommendations for U.S. SOF underwater operations potential within great power competition are provided, based on the characteristics of Decima MAS's successful organizational and operational examples., http://archive.org/details/strikefromthesea1094566731, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

This research project explores causes and effects of the events that led to the repeated failed efforts to develop a Strategic Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Capability. Multiple efforts to materialize the proposed capability development failed as they were initially outlined in the 1985 PSYOP Master Plan, in the 1990 revised PSYOP Master Plan, and in numerous subsequent research findings. Government officials recognized challenges from the changing geopolitical conditions and the importance of dominating the information domain but failed to promptly develop the capability needed to meet the new challenges. The renewed national security policies, which focused on the near-peer competition followed by countering violent extremist organizations, demanded the need to fill the missing capability gap, but the efforts to develop a strategic PSYOP capability stalled, which this thesis addresses., Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Mysterious attacks on the human brain have begun plaguing U.S. diplomats and officials with increasing frequency, ranging from overseas diplomatic outposts to right here in the United States. Known in the media as Havana Syndrome, these attacks appear to be signaling a new form of warfare—one that is focused on enhancing, targeting, and weaponizing the human brain—neurowarfare. Indeed, the human brain is at the center of a biotechnological revolution currently underway. At the same time, great power competition has returned to the forefront of international relations, as China and Russia seek to contest America’s global leadership. In an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, this contest is ultimately a battle of ideas and influence, with more value placed on information and non-lethal means to manipulate and control both adversaries and domestic populations alike. The battle for influence begins and ends in the human mind, where reality is perceived. The implications of these developments point to both a new form and domain of warfare centering on the human brain. By highlighting recent attacks targeting the brain and revealing research from the United States and its two main competitors—China and Russia—this thesis seeks to argue that neurowar is not just coming, but rather is already here and is likely to fundamentally alter conflict and warfare.

With the U.S. military’s shift in focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO) in a multi-domain operations (MDO) environment, special forces (SF) must adapt and develop new strategies to operate and succeed in a new technologically enabled combat environment. MDO warfare has evolved and now includes the 4th dimension of information, electronic, and cyber warfare. The prevalence of information through open-source internet, radio, and television as well as a high reliance on electronic communications equipment has enhanced the offense opportunities for both the United States and its adversaries alike. Designed and assembled in an era prior to the MDO environment, the SF force structure currently lacks some of the capabilities to effectively operate and thrive on modern battlefields. Capabilities such as electronic warfare or employment and exploitation of cyber space hold significant influence on the battlespace, which SF units are ill prepared to employ or exploit. As a result, SF units should reconsider their capabilities when it comes to penetrating and disabling the anti-access area denial (A2/AD) bubbles established by our enemies. SF should also consider the tools required to destroy or disable A2/AD. Ultimately, SF must reanalyze how they are positioned and employed within LSCO. A look at modern-era case studies show that SF must adapt its capabilities and force structure if it is to remain relevant and effective in future conflicts.

Although the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) has deployed worldwide to combat violent extremism and counter strategic competitors since 2006, it does not have a clear process to measure the effectiveness of tactical-level Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). A lack of measures of effectiveness (MOE) for CAO is due to several basic challenges: 1) Lack of a Civil Affairs doctrinal foundation for MOEs; 2) lack of clear mission statements for deploying teams to help formulate MOEs; 3) lack of effective internal and external Civil Affairs communications to standardize MOEs; and 4) lack of adequate personnel, training, funding, and analytic tools for Civil Affairs Teams (CAT) to monitor and evaluate MOEs. Based on 18 interviews with Civil Affairs practitioners—from senior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) to field grade officers—this thesis examines the barriers that CATs face in developing and implementing MOEs during mission planning and execution. This thesis also provides recommendations for CATs and the Civil Affairs leadership to address and overcome these barriers by developing MOEs to evaluate tactical and operational mission progress. Furthermore, the authors identify deficiencies in doctrine and recommend the creation of doctrine-specific to SOF Civil Affairs.

The publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy generated renewed focus on great power competition (GPC). This research sought to determine if and how irregular warfare could shape the current competitive environment by analyzing historical case studies and applying lessons from successes and failures to the contemporary era. The research determined that irregular warfare can shape the competitive environment in two primary ways: by disrupting America’s competitors in the achievement of their national objectives, and in strengthening a partner’s capacity for resilience and resistance to a great power’s aggression. Additionally, the research uncovered the importance of preparing irregular options ahead of a crisis for use in the event of escalation to traditional conflict. In light of these forms of irregular warfare and of the ever-increasing complexity in the competitive space, it was determined that small, agile, and purpose-built teams with broad irregular warfare capabilities should be created to execute irregular warfare campaigns, not missions, that consider the overall intent, the trajectory of the environment, and the place in the national irregular warfare strategy for GPC. Ultimately, this research has determined that the United States must embrace competition and the objectives of irregular warfare parallel with the goals of GPC; therefore, irregular warfare should be a central component of the American GPC strategy., http://archive.org/details/theutilityofirre1094566647, Chief Warrant Officer Three, United States Army, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Since the 2014 invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, U.S. policymakers and military professionals have dedicated significant attention to countering Russian offensive irregular warfare and political warfare threats. However, just as Russia has modernized its offensive irregular capabilities, it has also made significant strides in combatting asymmetric threats. Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria demonstrated this advancement, as Russian-led Syrian forces successfully battled U.S.-backed groups and the Islamic State. If U.S. Special Forces (U.S. SF) and their allies intend to challenge near-peer adversaries abroad, then it is time to study the threat posed by a modern counter-irregular warfare (CIW) campaign. This study seeks to address the transformation of Russian CIW doctrine and methods from the Russian Federation’s invasion of Chechnya in 1994 up through its current activities in the North Caucasus, the Middle East, and beyond. By identifying key principles and capabilities from across these case studies, this project aims to develop an improved understanding of the threat U.S. SF and their partners would face executing unconventional warfare (UW) against Russia or its proxies. Such an understanding would inform threat-based training scenarios and enhance the Special Forces regiment’s understanding of how Green Berets might execute UW against a peer adversary.

After more than five decades and despite several successes, the Philippines is still fighting a communist insurgency within its country. This study compared and analyzed four counterinsurgency campaign plans implemented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: Oplan Lambat Bitag during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya during the Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan during the Benigno Aquino III administration, and the current Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan led by the Duterte administration. This study found that inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership constitute the primary factors that have hindered the AFP campaigns. The current government recognizes these problems and has instituted several initiatives to overcome them, including a Community Support Program implemented by the AFP that increases intra-governmental collaboration, an enhanced partnership with civil society, and the creation of a national task force to help consolidate the diverse efforts of multiple national agencies, local government units, and civil society to improve security, good governance, and economic conditions and opportunities. Building on these, this thesis recommends further improvements to strengthen support for the current campaign and areas for future study., Major, Philippine Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.