Search

This paper presents an approach to integrate intellectual properties (IPs) based systems on chip (SoCs). The aim is to synthesize communication units using co-simulation environment and a stochastic process. The proposed approach allows to bound communication memories for different loading rates of the master processor. According to the chosen communication unit while interconnecting IPs components, this approach also allows to refine communication structures in order to lead to a model easily mappable onto the target architecture. The approach has been experimented and validated through a detailed case study concerning the verification and the integration of the discrete and direct wavelet transform (DDWT) IP in a mixed hardware/software architecture. Software partitions are executed on the ARM7 processor and hardware partitions are executed on the ModelSim simulator. The used co-simulation tool is Seamless CVETM of Mentor Graphics. A library of adaptation protocols of IP blocs to the environment as well as a set of standard communication units (RAM, DPRAM, FIFOs) have been also developed and used. Keywords: IPs; Verification; Integration; Co-simulation; SoCs; Communication synthesis

The increasing complexity of cryptographic devices requires fast simulation environment in order to test their security against fault attacks. SystemC is one promising candidate in Electronic System Level that allows models to reach higher simulation speed. However in order to enable both fault injection and detection inside a SystemC cryptographic models, its code modification is mandatory. Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP), which is a new programming paradigm, can be used to test the robustness of the cryptographic models without any code modifications. This may replace real cryptanalysis schemes. In this paper, we present a new methodology to simulate the security fault attacks of cryptographic systems at the Electronic System Level. A fault injection/detection environment is proposed to test the resistance of cryptographic SystemC models against fault injection attacks. The fault injection technique into cryptographic SystemC models is performed using weaving faults by AspectCþþ as an AOP programming language. We validate our methodology with two scenarios applied to a SystemC Advanced Encryption Standard case study: the first is related to the impact of the AOP on fault detection capabilities, while the second refers to the impact of the AOP on simulation time and size of the executable files. Simulation results show that this methodology can evaluate perfectly the robustness of a cryptographic design against fault injection attacks. They show that the impact of AOP on simulation time is not significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]