Search

After decades of rapid urban expansion, China's urban development has transitioned to focus on the quality improvement of existing spaces. Urban renewal is now a strategic measure crucial for advancing high-level territorial spatial planning and intensive land use. In coastal regions that have experienced rapid urbanization, redeveloping underutilized collective construction land is essential for achieving high-quality urban development. China has experienced a path-dependent institutional change in collective land property rights, typically village-based institutions created by rural collectives. When the government aims to grant legal status to collective construction land by redefining property rights and promoting redevelopment, these informal institutions inevitably pose constraints. This study conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the roles, behaviors, and outcomes of local governments in constructing a collective land redevelopment market. First, it explores the relationship between the government and the market under gradual institutional change and how this relationship manifests in the redevelopment of collective construction land. Then, it empirically examines the case of Nanhai District in Foshan City, using data from the "Three Olds Reconstruction" database and a redevelopment project with which the authors are deeply involved. The study investigates the formation mechanisms of collective construction land, changes in land development institutions, constraints on redevelopment, and measures taken by local governments to construct the land redevelopment market. Despite the government's efforts to legitimize collective construction land through titling and market initiation, issues such as land fragmentation, involution of collective land management, and ambiguity in property rights persist, constraining further redevelopment. Local governments play an entrepreneurial role characterized by a negotiated relationship of both cooperation and competition with village collectives, the property rights holders. Cooperation involves the government acting as a 'transaction broker' between village collectives and investors, reducing institutional constraints and transaction costs. Competition arises as village collectives seek to capture land rents. The appreciation in land value, mainly generated by public investment, should benefit the general public. However, village collectives leverage their possession of land rights to "hold-up" the government, forcing compromises in profit-sharing. This capture of public value by village collectives jeopardizes social equity. To enhance collective land redevelopment and balance development efficiency with social justice, the following policy recommendations are proposed: 1) formalizing the government's informal role as a "transaction broker" to lower transaction costs and mitigate negative impacts; and 2) establishing clear standards for profit-sharing among stakeholders and a system for transferring land development rights to ensure equitable profit distribution.

Cities defined mainly from the administrative aspect can create impact and problems especially in the case of China. However, only a few researchers from China have attempted to identify urban areas from the morphology dimension. In addition, previous studies have been mostly based on the national and regional scales or a single prefecture city and have completely ignored cross-boundary cities. Defining urban areas on the basis of a single data type also has limitations. To address these problems, this study integrates point of interest and nighttime light data, applies the breaking point analysis method to determine the physical geographic scope of the Guangzhou–Foshan cross-border city, and then compares this city with Beijing and Shanghai. Results show that Guangzhou–Foshan comprises one core urban area and six suburban counties, among which the core urban area extends across the administrative boundaries of Guangzhou and Foshan. The urban area and average urban radius of Guangzhou–Foshan are larger than those of Beijing and Shanghai, and this finding contradicts the city size measurements based on the administrative division system of China and those published on traditional official statistical yearbooks. In terms of urban density value, Shanghai has the steepest profile followed by Guangzhou–Foshan and Beijing, and the profile line of Guangzhou–Foshan has a bimodal shape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]