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Oblikovanje koalicij in koalicijski vzorci postajajo vse bolj pomemben raziskovalni problem v evropskih študijah, saj se je v zadnjih desetletjih članstvo v Evropski uniji podvojilo, poglobilo pa se je tudi sodelovanje med državami članicami, ki obsega vse več političnih področij. Razmerja med državami članicami v odločevalskih procesih je dodatno zaznamoval brexit, zaradi katerega v pogajanjih ni več Velike Britanije, ki je veljala za ostro pogajalko. V magistrskem delu prek sekundarne literature, zgodovinskega pregleda proračunskih pogajanj in študije primera zadnjih proračunskih pogajanj o svežnju večletnega finančnega okvira 2021– 2027 ugotavljam, na kakšen način je brexit vlival na razmerja v odločevalskih procesih med preostalimi državami članicami in kako je vplival na proces oblikovanja koalicij in koalicijske vzorce na ravni EU. Med državami so po brexitu najbolj izpostavljene Nemčija, Francija in Nizozemska, veliko pozornosti pa sta v zadnjih pogajanjih pritegnili tudi Madžarska in Poljska. Poleg tega se je po brexitu spremenil tudi stalni koalicijski vzorec, vzpostavljen vse od drugih proračunskih pogajanj, kjer sta se dve veliki koaliciji neto plačnic in neto prejemnic razdrobili na več manjših koalicij, ki vsaka zase niso bile tako močne kot v predhodni skupni formaciji. Pri tem ne gre zanemariti vpliva, ki ga je na dane spremembe imel tudi izbruh epidemije covida-19. Coalition building and coalition patterns are becoming an increasingly important research problem in European studies, as membership of the European Union has doubled in recent decades, and cooperation between Member States has deepened and now covers even more policy areas. Relations between Member States in decision-making processes have been further marked by Brexit, which has left the UK, who was considered a tough negotiator, out of negotiations. In my master's thesis, through analysis of secondary literature, a historical overview of the budget negotiations and a case study of the last budget negotiations on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework package, I identify how Brexit has affected decision-making coalitions and coalition patterns at EU level. After Brexit, Germany, France and the Netherlands are the most exposed countries, while Hungary and Poland have also attracted a lot of attention in recent negotiations. In addition, after Brexit, the constant coalition pattern, established since the second budget negotiations, has changed, with two major coalitions of net contributors and net recipients split into several smaller coalitions, each not as strong as previously, when acting in a joint formation. The impact of the outbreak of the covid-19 epidemic on the changes given should not be overlooked.

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. This flexibility is provided by an endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs in increasingly complex environments.

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. An endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs can provide this flexibility in increasingly complex environments.

Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an infinite horizon. We compare two institutions that differ in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory. We model mandatory spending as an endogenous status quo since it is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed. Mandatory programs result in higher public good spending; furthermore, they ex ante Pareto dominate discretionary programs when parties are patient, persistence of power is low, and polarization is low.