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Copyright of Folklor / Edebiyat is the property of Cyprus International University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A conceptualisation of the COVID-19 pandemic through the analytic lens of a 'necropolitics as evil' brings to the fore Hannah Arendt's theorisation that evil is both an expression of, and a threat to, humanity and its plurality as an intersectional assemblage, and by extension as freedom in political action. Arendt accepts that while evil—as an expression of our humanity—can never be eradicated, it must—as a threat to our common humanity—be confronted. From this perspective, the functioning of race, gender, and wider structural inequalities as operational hinges of COVID-19 capitalism required spaces for resistance and change within the political economy of global inequalities during the recent pandemic. This (concept) paper explores such a conceptualisation through stories of the pandemic and with a particular focus on Indigenous people, marginalised groups such as migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the homeless. It is through the viral logics of cytopathic COVID-19 capitalisms that we confront and resist theoretical pathologies by re-theorising evil as conceptual currency to confront this conjuncture, critique limitations, and meaningfully translate the current societal landscape through this lens. This allows for engaging in a particular kind of reading of Arendt that is contextualised in terms of the stakes of the paper: the importance of thinking about convivialising solidarities in the ongoing pandemic that has been perpetuated by 'evil political formations/evil governance' under capitalism, and as such, the structural pathologies that exacerbate COVID-19's deathly effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence of evil in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil. Moreover, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. These facts about evil seem to conflict with the Islamic theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in Islamic thought. Ibn al-Arabi’s thought on evil goes as far as to say that what is seen as evil is actually illusory and has no reality. According to Ibn al-Arabi, existence is all good. Evil has no existence and belongs only to non-existence. The thoughts of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari can also be said to have caused a kind of moral conventionalism. Ash‘arism, unlike Mu‘tazilite thought, claims that the task of revelation is not only to explain moral statements but to impose and determine them. We encounter Neoplatonist point of view in Islamic thought. Avicenna says that evil has no positive existence or reality of its own. Evil is the incomplete realization of a good or existence. As maintained by him, evil arises when something does not show the full characteristics of its nature or type. There is no pure evil in the absolute sense. Solutions to the problem of evil do not always resort to the idea that evil is an illusion or an accidental element. According to Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, evil actually exists in this world; for conceptions of evil as an illusion or an accidental element do not adequately meet the conditions of being a free agent. According to this understanding, in order for an agent to have free will, it must not have been caused by external factors, e.g. God or the laws of nature.

Copyright of Burdur Theology Journal / Burdur İlahiyat Dergisi is the property of Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy Universitesi lahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Literature has numerous dimensions, among which novels and short stories are worth the mention. Stories from the past have been including disabled male and female characters in their plots, but the question of how these characters have been depicted is still debatable. When it comes to writers of the disability study, it has been noticed that they have been trying to establish the present state of people with impairments with the help of their deformed or disabled characters. It has been witnessed that novels and short stories concentrate on bringing out the darker side of a disabled person by focusing on his/her issues and sufferings. The objective of this paper is to expose that literary works rarely focus on the brighter facet of a disabled character, especially a woman. It projects the differences that are endured by fictional individuals. The analysis undertakes the theory of Intersectionality to support its arguments of projecting the discrepancies in the picturisations of disabled female dramatic personas in novels and short stories. Hence, the research with the aid of select prose narratives brings out the conventional sketches of fictional impaired women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cumhuriyet Ilahiyat Dergisi / Cumhuriyet Theology Journal is the property of Cumhuriyet Universitesi, Ilahiyat Fakultesi / Cumhuriyet University, Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Kant’s philosophy directly addresses theological issues, one of which is the question of love for one’s neighbour. Its philosophical interpretation makes it possible not only to soften the rigorism of Kantian ethics, but also to resolve some of its characteristic paradoxes and to clarify the question of the concrete application of the categorical imperative. The article considers, in particular, the “paradox of method” used by Kant to define good and evil: evil is defined as reason’s abuse of its own freedom. It is precisely because of this understanding of evil that confidence in the moral quality of one’s own judgment becomes impossible. Kant even strengthens this point by introducing the notion of conscience as a self-judging reason, the latter being the strictest judge, whose verdict will always be accusatory. In order to avoid such undesirable conclusions, which leave no hope of justification in the face of the moral law, Kant introduces the concept of love for one’s neighbour as “a necessary addition to the imperfection of human nature”. True, such love, according to Kant, is impossible in respect to all people. But it is its presence in relation to some that allows us to overcome our own imperfection. Love for one’s neighbor precisely means voluntary recognition of the objective imperfection of one’s own subjective judgment about the morality and reasonableness of other people. And this recognition itself allows a person to rise to a moral height that would otherwise be inaccessible. In interpreting Kant’s ethics and, in particular, his concepts of reason and judgment, the author of the article relies on the concept of Joseph Simon, one of the leading modern German scholars of Kant studies in recent decades.

Categorizing things into good and evil is as old as the creation of man, and it is the way people face each other that determines whether phenomena are good or bad. Evil includes a wide range of concepts, and one of the most important and controversial concepts is political evil, whose most important indicators are the friend-enemy duality and the preoccupation with gaining power. Religion, with the aim of permanence, and to defend its legitimacy, uses the defensive function of speech in line with political purposes; As a result, religions and creeds are defined in opposition to each other, they are called evil and they try to destroy the other. The Ismailiyeh, from the path of Ismaili language and in confrontation and hostility with the Abbasid government, attribute the Abbasids and their followers to all kinds of evil and introduce them as a cruel government and clear examples of evil. Nasser Khosrow, as a high-level Ismaili thinker, using the structure of Ismaili thinking, while explaining what evil is and categorizing and describing its types, considers it necessary to avoid evil and destroy the enemy (which is the main cause of human misery). In this article, we intend to analyze the discussion of evil and enmity in Nasser Khosrow's intellectual system with the descriptive-analytical method and rely on the theory of "hostility" by Carl Schmitt.

Most Pentecostals, at least in the global South, believe that Satan and his demonic forces are responsible for much of the carnage and suffering that characterise life on earth. The broader context of the discourse is the challenge theodicy poses to Christian believers: if God is almighty and good, why do believers, just like unbelievers, suffer while living on earth? This paper aims to discuss Pentecostals' response: they blame evil as Satan's strategy to oppose God. They reason that his main goal is to handicap and double-cross creation because God threw him and his followers from heaven following his rebellion against the divine order. Thus, Satan is portrayed as the instigator of the first human couple, tempting them to sin, with all future generations implied by their choice and cursing human beings with a sinful nature at birth. Demonic forces employ human sinful nature to realise their ultimate goal, to separate humankind from the Creator by tempting them to sin while also threatening the rest of creation. This article investigates the Pentecostal theology of demonic forces in explaining the challenges posed by theodicy by comparing it to biblical data, using grammatical-historical exegesis and a comparative literature survey to evaluate their biblical grounding. It concludes that Pentecostals' belief in such forces are justified if the the New Testament narratives are accepted as divine revelation. However, some Pentecostal speculations about demons' origins, scope and reach are not biblically justified and complicates the response to theodicy, such as the origin of evil and its relation to human beings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Church in the World / Crkva u Svijetu is the property of University of Split, Catholic Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sad [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the notion of memory in the philosophy of religion. The area of this problematic is defined by Descartes, who, in a thought experiment, postulates an all-powerful, evil demon capable of falsifying human perception. The problem of solipsism raised here also implies doubt about claims based on memory. Descartes' assumptions are taken up constructively by Alvin Plantinga in his attempt to solve problems in the epistemology of religion by raising the following new question: is belief in God rational, and, if so, is it justified? Peter van Inwagen, for his part, uses memory analysis to construct arguments in support of theodicy. In considering these issues, other key topics within the philosophy of religion, such as the afterlife and the existence of the soul, which are closely related to the analysis of personal identity, inevitably arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evil both is and is not a central part of the Christian theological vision. There is no equal and opposite to God, and no necessary or appropriate place for evil in God’s good creation. Nevertheless, creation is afflicted by evil: the divine response to evil is a central part of Christian faith and hope, and the human response to evil is a central part of Christian life and love. In modern thought, the ‘why’ of evil has come to particular prominence, with widespread attention to ‘the’ problem of evil and the question of theodicy. In the context of Christian theology, however, it is more helpful to think not of a single problem of evil but of a number of interlinking problems and questions. This article will first consider questions around the ‘what’ of evil: what kind of things count as evil, and what evil fundamentally is, i.e. the ontology of evil. It will then turn to a ‘how’ question: how God is understood to defeat evil, which from a theological point of view is the most significant question about evil, before finally taking up the more familiar ‘why’ question.

This article examines approaches to the problem of evil in historical and contemporary Jewish theology. The material is structured conceptually rather than as a chronological survey. The introduction contrasts classical Jewish formulations of the problem of evil with the standard formulations of the problem in Christian and Western philosophical thought. The former tend to focus on evil’s distribution rather than its existence, while the latter ask how evil can exist in the world God created if God possesses the traditional attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection. The Introduction then turns to Jewish conceptions of attributes of God which are particularly germane to the problem of evil and notes the important distinction between natural and moral evil. The second section turns to theodicies and defences, mainly utilizing categories familiar from contemporary philosophical discussion of the problem of evil, and analysing relevant Jewish theological material under these headings. The discussion includes Talmudic theodicies and theodicies considered by medieval Jewish thinkers such as Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, Joseph Albo, and others. The final two subsections deal with theodical approaches in Kabbalah and with the post-Holocaust theodicies of Eliezer Berkovits and Ignaz Maybaum. The third section introduces the approach to the problem of evil termed in the contemporary philosophical literature ‘sceptical theism’. Classical Jewish texts that appear to anticipate sceptical theism are noted in this context. The fourth section focuses on antitheodicy and its treatment in the thought of Jewish theologians such as Richard Rubenstein, Emil Fackenheim, Joseph Soloveitchik, Emmanuel Levinas, and Irving Greenberg. The Jewish theological significance of treatments of the Holocaust in literature, for example in the work of Primo Levi and Elie Wiesel, is briefly considered. The fifth section explores, from a Jewish theological perspective, some strengths and weaknesses of the different general approaches to the problem of evil that have been discussed in this article – theodicy/defence, sceptical theism, and antitheodicy. Finally, the conclusion emphasizes the great variety of approaches to the problem of evil in the history of Jewish theology and argues that Jewish theological approaches to the problem can often both enrich and be enriched by contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion.

The Shoah (Holocaust) has raised a number of questions to which Jewish philosophers, theologians, and historians have given different answers. This article offers a survey of how Jewish thinkers have shaped the memory of the Shoah and how they reimagined Judaism after the catastrophe. In the post-Auschwitz period, Jews reflected anew on God, on the divine (non-)intervention in history, on the relation between God and evil, and on the role of Christianity in the history of antisemitism that culminated in the Shoah. They pondered what made the Shoah possible. In view of the vast range of reflections on the Shoah, it is not this article’s intention to treat all these questions exhaustively. It rather endeavours to point out the main directions in which these questions were answered by well-known Jewish thinkers (Meir 2006b).

Contemporary American author Bret Easton Ellis has written seven novels, one collection of interrelated short stories, multiple screenplays, one long work of non-fiction, and a number of essays throughout the better part of the past four decades. In addition, in recent years, he has cultivated a significant online presence through social media, as well as a popular podcast. From the time of his debut novel, published while he was still an undergraduate student, until the present day, his works have been the subject of much scrutiny in terms of subject matter and style. Particularly in the case of the release of his best-known novel, American Psycho (1991), a good deal of the criticism of Ellis has shifted between the text and the public persona of the author himself. In typical postmodern style, this blurring of boundaries was not only welcomed, but frequently precipitated by Ellis, his publishers, and the public relations machinery at work on his behalf. The focus of the majority of this attention, self-perpetuated and otherwise, has been on the apparent element of evil at work in terms of the amorality of his characters and a corresponding lack of moral certitude. Firmly rooted in theoretical tradition established by Georges Bataille, as well as the work of numerous recent scholars, this project examines the squandering of youth and its damaging impact upon contemporary society as a consistent thread running through Bret Easton Ellis’s oeuvre, particularly in his characters’ pervasive drug use and conspicuous expression of sexuality. The trajectory of narrator-protagonist Clay, from isolated college student in Less Than Zero (1985) and The Rules of Attraction (1987) into savage narcissist in Imperial Bedrooms (2010) is a prime illustration of evil, as inherent in the familiar, throughout Ellis’s postmodern landscape. As opposed to presenting an external perpetrator of evil as a threat to an existing moral order, Ellis’s narrator reports on the evil at work in these young people’s daily lives. The reader, therefore, as this project contends, is placed in the uncomfortable, but imperative and at times voyeuristic, position of determining the extent of culpability for an entire society—one that is all too familiar.

The object of the research is the socio-philosophical discussions of Russian philosophers of the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, the subject of our research is the anthropodicy of I.A. Ilyin. The author examines the categories of good, good and evil, the meaning of life, asceticism in the context of the concept of active resistance to evil and the teachings about the heart of I. Ilyin. These concepts were considered as a reflection of reality, as the foundation for building a state and society. Ilyin cites three qualities necessary for an active struggle against evil: spiritual character, willpower and a living conscience. According to the presence of these qualities, Ilyin accordingly divides people into three categories. Only a strong and conscientious person is able to fulfill “God’s work” on earth. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that I. Ilyin’s concept of the imposition of will on the internal or external composition of a person contains axiological and didactic potential. Russian Russian philosophical thought at the beginning of the 20th century came to realize the Russian idea, that is, to comprehend the self-existence of the Russian, Russian people. Ilyin’s ontology and axiology, despite negative criticism, enriched Russian philosophical thought, his ethical views allowed us to approach the understanding of the philosophical awareness of the meaning of human existence and set the vector of development of society and the state. Concepts and. Ilyina in our time, serious external existential challenges for Russia look more relevant than ever and require a comprehensive study. For the first time it was revealed that the teachings of I. Ilyin trace the intentions of asceticism characteristic of Russian spiritual culture. The practical value of the work is determined by the fact that the results of the research can be used in the development of courses “Philosophy”, “History of Philosophy”, “Ethics”, “Cultural Studies”, “Fundamentals of Russian statehood”.

In 2022, the Department for the Public Register of the Government of Brčko District of BiH, Section for Archive, and the Jewish Community of BiH, published the monograph Tracing Brcko's Jews (Monograph), authored by Tamara Vijoglavin Mančić. It is, in Brcko's circumstances, a valuable and rare publication which, in a concise, graphic, well-documented, and methodical way, brings back from oblivion the tragic fate of the Jews, who made a significant contribution to the economic and cultural development of the city, and who were, at one historical moment, most brutally exterminated from the area of Brcko. Today, there are no traces of their habitation in Brčko, nor a "place of memory" of their tragic fate. As such, the Monograph Tracing Brcko's Jews is a historiographical miniature of snatching from oblivion the presence of Evil in these parts. And much more than that. Because in her "places of silence" we can read off the lack of our freedom to face the Evil in ourselves and around us. And you can't escape from Evil, because it is always potentially within us. We must confront Evil, both within us and around us. Therefore, these "places of silence" ask for a change one's existential positioning. Otherwise, a new Evil is at the door, with whose arrival we will again be either victims or criminals. Or both.

A conceptualisation of the COVID-19 pandemic through the analytic lens of a ‘necropolitics as evil’ brings to the fore Hannah Arendt’s theorisation that evil is both an expression of, and a threat to, humanity and its plurality as an intersectional assemblage, and by extension as freedom in political action. Arendt accepts that while evil—as an expression of our humanity—can never be eradicated, it must—as a threat to our common humanity—be confronted. From this perspective, the functioning of race, gender, and wider structural inequalities as operational hinges of COVID-19 capitalism required spaces for resistance and change within the political economy of global inequalities during the recent pandemic. This (concept) paper explores such a conceptualisation through stories of the pandemic and with a particular focus on Indigenous people, marginalised groups such as migrants and asylum seekers, as well as the homeless. It is through the viral logics of cytopathic COVID-19 capitalisms that we confront and resist theoretical pathologies by re-theorising evil as conceptual currency to confront this conjuncture, critique limitations, and meaningfully translate the current societal landscape through this lens. This allows for engaging in a particular kind of reading of Arendt that is contextualised in terms of the stakes of the paper: the importance of thinking about convivialising solidarities in the ongoing pandemic that has been perpetuated by ‘evil political formations/evil governance’ under capitalism, and as such, the structural pathologies that exacerbate COVID-19’s deathly effects.

Open theism argues that traditional responses to the problem of evil fail to provide comfort amidst suffering because of their notion of metaphysical determinism and over-dependence on Greek philosophy. Open theists argue that the best solution to the problem of evil lies in our understanding of the nature of God’s power, which has been relinquished due to his love, the open nature of creation, and the creatures’ inherent powers. This study argues that the open-theistic notion of divine power is reductionistic because it does not consider coercive power as part of divine power. Further, the open theistic logic-of-love defence propagates a loveless God who respects his covenant with the beloved more than the beloved. Finally, the study argues that the open theists’ notions of divine omniscience and divine power are not viable; they raised many questions and objections and, therefore, created room for despair rather than comfort in adversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the possibility of an alternative reading Kant's first text from Die Religion Innerhalb Der Grenzen Der Bloßen Vernunft (1793 Über Das Radicale Böse In Der Menschliche Natur. We argue that an approach is possible which centres the 'radical' term in Kant's argument, rather than treating the text within established ethical boundaries. We show how the assumption that Kant 'meant nothing' with the term Radical is grounded in a 'common sense' which is, at least partly, due to the history of the text's reception in the 20th century, spearheaded by Hannah Arendt. However, through the lens of Hardt and Negri's 'minor Kant' dictum, the space opens up for a hypothetical, rather than deductive construction of the text instead; meaning that, rather than defending a particular thesis, Über Das Radical Böse is tracing the consequences of a particular conceptual construction. This reading presents us with a potential Kantian account of radicality itself. As a result, we argue that perhaps, rather than continuing to treat the radicality of evil as something commonly understood, an external demand which Kant must account for, Die Religion could be deployed as a way to challenge our contemporary understanding of radicality itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0034-8244) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The existence of evil in our world seems to pose a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a perfect God. If God were all-knowing, it seems that God would know about all of the horrible things that happen in our world. If God were all-powerful, God would be able to do something about all of the evil. Moreover, if God were morally perfect, then surely God would want to do something about it. These facts about evil seem to conflict with the Islamic theist claim that there exists a perfectly good God. Several solutions to this problem have been proposed in Islamic thought. Ibn al-Arabi’s thought on evil goes as far as to say that what is seen as evil is actually illusory and has no reality. According to Ibn al-Arabi, existence is all good. Evil has no existence and belongs only to non-existence. The thoughts of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘ari can also be said to have caused a kind of moral conventionalism. Ash‘arism, unlike Mu‘tazilite thought, claims that the task of revelation is not only to explain moral statements but to impose and determine them. We encounter Neoplatonist point of view in Islamic thought. Avicenna says that evil has no positive existence or reality of its own. Evil is the incomplete realization of a good or existence. As maintained by him, evil arises when something does not show the full characteristics of its nature or type. There is no pure evil in the absolute sense. Solutions to the problem of evil do not always resort to the idea that evil is an illusion or an accidental element. According to Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, evil actually exists in this world; for conceptions of evil as an illusion or an accidental element do not adequately meet the conditions of being a free agent. According to this understanding, in order for an agent to have free will, it must not have been caused by external factors, e.g. God or the laws of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tábano is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) represents a captivating domain within technological advancement, bearing the potential for profound societal transformations. While ANI holds the promise of enhancing various facets of human existence, it concurrently engenders inquiries into its “darker aspects.” This study delves into the challenges associated with ANI’s conceivable manifestation of harm and injustice, a phenomenon devoid of consciousness, intention, or responsibility akin to that of human entities. A pivotal dimension of ANI’s “dark side” pertains to its susceptibility to malevolent utilization. Despite its lack of awareness, ANI serves as a tool for malicious endeavors, encompassing the propagation of disinformation, compromise of security systems, and consequential decision-making. This prompts contemplation on strategies to mitigate these “precise manifestations of malevolence” arising from ANI’s technological progression. Additionally, ANI’s development introduces profound ethical quandaries. Ensuring ANI’s alignment with moral principles while averting scenarios in which it generates decisions conflicting with human morality becomes a pressing concern. This research underscores the imperative for rigorous regulatory frameworks and ethical directives to curtail potential hazards and unscrupulous utilization of ANI. The fundamental objective of this investigation is to advocate for the responsible deployment of ANI in society. A comprehensive understanding of potential risks, complemented by meticulous consideration of ethical dimensions, emerges as an indispensable prerequisite to harmonizing technological advancement with safeguarding societal and individual interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper revisits one of the most difficult theological issues, namely God's infinite goodness and the presence of pain and suffering in the natural world. We deepen the understanding of this problem by referring to the philosophical notion of the intelligibility of the world. We argue that pain and suffering are present in biological evolution as a "structural necessity" for the development of more complex structures from simpler ones. The struggle for existence works as a necessary condition for the development of a sophisticated order of nature at the expense of an increase in pain and suffering. If this is so, arguments justifying the ways of a good, omniscient, and omnipotent God in a world where evil and suffering are widespread seem to be undercut. Therefore, we argue that the astonishing intelligibility of nature may help to open our understanding of whatever nature may reveal of itself. This notion—analyzed from ontic and epistemic perspectives—seems to be crucial in reflecting the evolving world, not only from the scientific point of view but also from the theological one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Namaa Magazine is the property of Namaa for Research & Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

‘Participation’ or ‘partaking’ has featured in Christian theology since the New Testament, describing a relation of derivation, likeness, or communion. Theologians including Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, and Thomas Aquinas made this theme an important aspect of their work. In marked but more limited ways, participation was also important for Martin Luther, John Calvin, and later Protestant writers. With themes of sharing and reception from a transcendent source, Christian theologians have found common ground with Platonism. A wide range of topics in Christian theology have been explored in these terms. While each can be set out in relative isolation, participation lends itself to an integrative view. As the backbone for a scheme of theological metaphysics, participation has come to renewed prominence in the second half of the twentieth century. Today it offers an area of considerable shared interest, across ecclesial traditions.

Farkında olunsun ya da olunmasın, insan düşüncesinin tamamına yakını ahlaki yargı içinde gerçekleşir. Çünkü insan ahlaki bir varlıktır. Seçimlerini kendisi aracılığı ile gerçekleştirdiği iyi-kötükavram çiftinin, bu yargılamanın merkezi yapısını oluşturduğu söylenebilir. İyi kavramının önemi ve değerini anlamakta zorlanmayan insan bilincinin, kötülük kavramını anlamlandırma çabası devametmektedir. Bu çalışmada felsefe tarihinde önemli bir konu olan kötülük probleminin sinema tarihindeki işlenişi üzerinde durulmuştur. İsveçli yönetmen Ingmar Bergman’ın yönetmenliğini yaptığı 1962 yapımı “Kış Işığı” isimli sinema filmi, kötülük problemi açısından ele alınmıştır. Nitel analiz yönteminin kullanıldığı bu çalışmada, öncelikle felsefe tarihi içinde kötülük probleminin nasıl tanımlandığı üzerinde durulmuş, sonrasında yönetmen ve film hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Son olarak kötülük probleminin, filmin temasıyla ilişkisine değinilmiştir. Bergman, Kış Işığı filminde Tanrı’nın suskunluğuna ve umutsuzluğa çare olarak sevgiyi, insanların birbirini sevmesini göstermektedir.

Bu çalışmada James Cameron’un Avatar: Suyun Yolu (2022) filmi ekolojizm ideolojisinin temel kavramları ve unsurları açısından nitel betimsel içerik analiziyle, filmde yer bulan yeni tematik yönelimler ve motifler çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Ekolojizm çok farklı ekollere bölünse de bu mikro ideolojiye yön veren çekirdek fikirleri ve anahtar kavramları ekoloji, bütüncülük, sürdürülebilirlik, çevre ahlakı, kendini gerçekleştirme, insan ve doğa arasındaki ilişkiyi yeniden tanımlama ve tasarlama, doğanın ve yaşam biçimlerinin bütünlüğünün korunması, bütünlüğe dair çeşitlemelerin teşvik edilmesi ve kalitatif yaşam biçimlerinin somut ve derhâl uygulanması olarak tanımlanmaktadır. 2000 sonrası Amerikan bilimkurgu sinemasında çekilen gişe rekoru kıran filmlerde güçlü bir ekolojist vurguyla dikkat çeken Avatar serisinin ikinci filmi Avatar: Suyun Yolu filmi inceleme için amaçlı örneklem olarak seçilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, Suyun Yolu’nda ekolojizme yön veren fikirlerin işlendiği, “sığ ekolojizm” olarak ifade edilen ekolojist perspektifin daha güçlü bir şekilde yer bulduğu, doğa, insan ve türler arasındaki ilişkinin yeniden, görece insanın hiyerarşik yerini sorgulayan, dengeli bir perspektifle yorumlandığı görülmüştür. Topluluktan dışlanmışların durumu, kültürel aktarım sürecinde yeni ve eski nesil arasındaki karşıtlık, düşmanca saldırganlık ve anlatı yapısında süreğen mücadeleye karşı tavrın ne olacağı konusunda filmdeki tematik yoğunlaşma ve motif çeşitlemeleri, klasik Hollywood ve anaakım sinemanın sınırlarını ele alma konusunda tartışma sağlamaktadır.

The starting point of this article lies in the idea, defended by Hannah Arendt, according to which only goodness can be radical, while evil is merely banal. The idea of a banality of evil is present in Arendt’s work Eichmann in Jerusalem, although it is explicitly not presented as a general theory on evil as such – it is more particularly in her correspondence with Gershom Scholem that one can find this specific distinction between evil and goodness mentioned. How is this distinction to be understood? This article proposes the idea that such a distinction has to be construed on an ontological level: evil is ontologically deficient, since it does not take hold in a specific capacity of human beings, which would be what Hannah Arendt calls the demonic evil, but in the absence of thinking, i.e. in the absence of a specific human faculty. Conversely, only goodness expresses a creative human faculty, which is precisely thinking, and which, following Hannah Arendt, can be fully realized only through a political, collective dimension.

This paper aims to present the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred from the point of view of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of emotions. This perspective is particularly relevant to the issue at hand because of its holistic and integral view of understanding human beings, including their emotional functions. In this paper, I consider the issue of the emotion of hatred in relation to other emotions against the backdrop of the structure of human action. When analyzing how hatred functions, I consider the notion of good and evil, which are linked to emotions and acts of will that play a vital role in the sphere of emotions. By correctly channeling one’s will towards the good, one is able to notice hatred arising within, and thus reflect upon it. Understanding how the emotion of hatred functions is essential for further research into how it is expressed.

The Metaverse is a world created with virtual reality technologies, providing an unlimited freedom space where people can perform all the actions they can imagine. In our study, the Metaverse is scientifically explained within the framework of how the human brain works. Considering that the human brain perceives both virtual and real-world experiences and emotions, emphasis is placed on the lack of a sharp distinction between the virtual and real worlds in the Metaverse. Additionally, the disappearance of the boundary between the virtual and real worlds demonstrates that human actions and behaviors have an ontological value from the perspective of human nature. Our study also draws attention to the important role that the Metaverse will play in religion, morality, and humanity. With the influence of advancing technological developments, the Metaverse will have an even more significant and dynamic place in human life. Therefore, the importance of establishing a moral and meaningful structure in the Metaverse is emphasized. The study emphasizes the crucial role that religion should play in this field, arguing that a virtual world devoid of religion and ethical rules could become a chaotic place full of pain for people.

This paper aims to study the historical experience of evil in Venezuela. From the history of the present time and the regimes of historicity, we inquire about the pernicious nature of the political and ideological mechanisms that, instituted by Chavismo, seek the subordination of the other, especially of those who oppose and resist it. Memory, testimonies and documentation thus allow us to show the institutionalization of violence and the use of evil as a political instrument.

The letter is a communication tool used by many thinkers and scientists. It is generally written to disseminate ideas, criticize, and open discussion. The tradition of philosophizing with letters is a method and a form of philosophical discourse widely used by Muslim and Western philosophers. It is known that the letters written by philosophers in previous periods are public documents that are read and discussed not only by their correspondents but also by those concerned. The reason why this is so is the widespread use of ideas at that time. In particular, it can be said that letters written in the 17th century serve the function of scientific-academic articles today. The 'Letters on Evil' is the name given to the eight letters Spinoza exchanged between 1664 and 1665, containing discussions with Willem van Blyenbergh on the issue of evil. This name was given by Gilles Deleuze. The most fundamental discussion in these letters is the problem of evil. These letters are texts in which Spinoza deals with the problem of evil and other related issues and evaluates different solutions. In these letters, Spinoza and Blyenbergh discuss major issues in relation to the issue of evil, such as God's creation and contribution, the nature of will and actions, the nature and source of evil, the structure of the Bible, lack, and perfection. Offering a different perspective, Spinoza used the concepts used by theism while evaluating these issues but attributed new meanings to them. In the face of Spinoza's new and different explanations, Blyenbergh repeatedly asked the subjects he had difficulty in understanding in each of his letters. Although the first letters started with very good wishes, the expressions in the following letters became harsh, and in the last letter, Spinoza firmly declared that he would end his letters, believing that they could not come to an agreement. Although Blyenbergh was described as ignorant and bigoted by Spinozists, some researchers claimed that he was not ignorant, on the contrary, he asked very important questions to Spinoza, even unanswered. Although these letters written about evil gave Spinoza's thoughts on the subject in a limited way, it can be said that the only text in which his discussions on the problem of evil are together is the "Letters on Evil". For Spinoza, evil is an illusion and a product of the human mind, and it is neither a situation in which God's will can be spoken of nor an act for which man is morally responsible. Although the fact that evil is unreal or an illusion has an attractive side, it can be said that this claim does not offer a solution when the moral responsibility of human beings and their efforts to make sense of life is considered. As a matter of fact, it can be claimed that it is against our intuition to say that there are many evils we witness, and pain and sorrow as a result, even in the universe or in our environment. It can be argued that characterizing and ignoring evil as a rational being provides an explanation rather than a solution to the problem of evil, which is the main problem of the philosophy of religion. His views on God's will and human freedom in particular offer a new and different approach for that period. It can be seen that this approach is against theological traditions and is open to discussion. In Spinoza's thought, everything necessarily occurs in the order of God or Nature.

In 1961, the Eichmann trial opened in Jerusalem, and its worldwide resonance through media coverage questioned the collective conscience about responsibility for Nazi crimes. German philosopher Hannah Arendt attended the process as a special correspondent for the U.S. magazine The New Yorker. Her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) caused a great scandal: the author advanced the brazen idea of collective co-responsibility for Nazi crimes, reporting the identikit of a standard bureaucrat, a seemingly ordinary man, just like any one of us. Almost sixty years after its publication, this study adopts a primarily psycho(patho)logical perspective to reflect once again on the considerations Arendt shared in the Banality of Evil. In showing the multiple facets of banality, the research investigates recent results in the analysis of the criminal mind in order to shed light on the etiology of evil.

Writer, poet and translator Liliana Cora Foşalău is Professor of Literature at the «Alexandru Ioan Cuza» University in Iaşi, Romania. She writes and publishes texts in Romanian and French. Her poetic works include: Déshistoires (2014), Poeme de vreme şi vin. Le Vin. Le Temps (2015), Les Épreuves nécessaires (2019), and Pandelirice (2021). This interview, initiated by Armel Jovensel Ngamaleu, focuses on the latter collection of poems and is structured in four parts: « Écrire dans la crise… », « Au seuil du recueil, des paratextes », « Structure et réseaux thématiques », and « Esthétique et traduction ». Résumé Écrivaine, poétesse et traductrice, Liliana Cora Foşalău est professeure de littérature à l’Université « Alexandru Ioan Cuza » de Iaşi, en Roumanie. Elle écrit et publie des textes en roumain et en français. Parmi ses œuvres poétiques figurent : Déshistoires (2014), Poeme de vreme şi vin. Le Vin. Le Temps (2015), Les Épreuves nécessaires (2019) et Pandelirice (2021). Cet entretien, réalisé à l’initiative d’Armel Jovensel Ngamaleu, porte sur ce dernier recueil de poèmes et est structuré en quatre parties : « Écrire dans la crise… », « Au seuil du recueil, des paratextes », « Structure et réseaux thématiques » et « Esthétique et traduction ». Mots-Clés: Baudelaire; Camus; mal; pandémie; poésie; temps

Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) represents a captivating domain within technological advancement, bearing the potential for profound societal transformations. While ANI holds the promise of enhancing various facets of human existence, it concurrently engenders inquiries into its “darker aspects.” This study delves into the challenges associated with ANI’s conceivable manifestation of harm and injustice, a phenomenon devoid of consciousness, intention, or responsibility akin to that of human entities. A pivotal dimension of ANI’s “dark side” pertains to its susceptibility to malevolent utilization. Despite its lack of awareness, ANI serves as a tool for malicious endeavors, encompassing the propagation of disinformation, compromise of security systems, and consequential decision-making. This prompts contemplation on strategies to mitigate these “precise manifestations of malevolence” arising from ANI’s technological progression. Additionally, ANI’s development introduces profound ethical quandaries. Ensuring ANI’s alignment with moral principles while averting scenarios in which it generates decisions conflicting with human morality becomes a pressing concern. This research underscores the imperative for rigorous regulatory frameworks and ethical directives to curtail potential hazards and unscrupulous utilization of ANI. The fundamental objective of this investigation is to advocate for the responsible deployment of ANI in society. A comprehensive understanding of potential risks, complemented by meticulous consideration of ethical dimensions, emerges as an indispensable prerequisite to harmonizing technological advancement with safeguarding societal and individual interests.

The research stems from the importance of taking care of the Qur'anic terminology, because it helps to reflect on the Qur'an and benefit from it, as well as to ward off any problems that occur. Among the terminology in this: the term imams, and it means: everyone who is followed and advanced in matters is right or wrong, and when it passes through the listener This term is thought - often - that it refers to the imams of goodness only, and I have made it clear that it enters into the call to good as well as evil, The research dealt with the Quranic expressions that share the meaning of imams or leadership and presidency and what is going on in their meaning, and who are the imams of good in the Qur'an, and who are the imams of evil, and what are their purposes and the consequence of their call. And I concluded that the term imams means the Prophet sent, as well as his follower, and the leaders of disbelief may be called their masters and followers. Places, and I recommended in the conclusion of the research to warn young people from the leaders of evil and their imams, because this era and what was widespread in it of following falsehood, one of its effects was the concealment of the advocates of evil and their imams under the names of an accident and attractive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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One of the reasons that make animals deserving of violence is the idea of a lack of rationality and subjectivity in them, but if it is possible to recognize some kind of subjectivity for an animal, we can hope for a future where the animal will no longer be under the control of any human abuse. In this regard, this research considers the problem and risk of interaction between humans and animals with a new and practical approach. The general approach and method in this research is "phenomenology" and specifically "ethical phenomenology", which results in adopting four questions regarding animal pain and suffering, animal love, animal rights, and animal subjectivity. Therefore, we put the order and sequence of these four things in a continuum, one end of which is sense and experience, and the other end is concept and generality so that we can finally reach "specific general" rules. Finally, in order to reduce the suffering, evil and malice in the phenomenological subjectivity, we depict the subject of the animal in a way that does not make us fall from life and the result is a reduction of cruelty among the subjects-of-a-life. In this way, in this type of argument, neither human becomes animal nor does animal become human. It is a human convention versus a natural and theological convention that takes a step toward avoiding the "residues of unmodern human behavior that treat animals as instruments." Therefore, the way to reduce evil for humans is to accept the type and level of rights for animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Gamer’s Dilemma refers to the philosophical challenge of justifying the intuitive difference people seem to see between the moral permissibility of enacting virtual murder and the moral impermissibility of enacting virtual child molestation in video games (Luck Ethics and Information Technology, 1:31, 2009). Recently, Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 has argued that the Gamer’s Dilemma is actually an instance of a more general “paradox”, which he calls the “paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly”, and he proposes a graveness resolution to this paradox. In response, we argue for four key claims. First, we accept Luck’s expansion of the Gamer’s Dilemma to be applicable to a wider set of media, but give a novel recasting of this in terms of the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far. Second, we develop a novel criticism of Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 graveness resolution to this broader paradox. Third, we argue that the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far helps to expose an implicit moralism in the Gamer’s Dilemma literature when compared to relevant nearby literatures about other forms of media. Fourth, we consider a range of non-moral, cultural and media conventions that plausibly help to dissolve the intuitive moral gap between non-sexual and sexual violence that is central to this paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God's implementation of such evil prevention requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Communicata is the property of Ataturk University Coordinatorship of Scientific Journals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Among the most difficult questions leaders must address are why must so many suffer?! Why do humans kill, maim, abuse, and destroy one another . . . and, even more importantly, what can be done to stop this onslaught of evil? This article asserts that the answer to that question can be found by understanding the spiritual aspect of human existence, which involves connectedness. Spirituality and connectedness are defined and discussed, evidence of spiritual decay is proffered and explained, and a proposal for leadership based on embracing the humanity of others through forgiveness and restorative justice is outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]