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The COVID-19 pandemic did not eliminate existing social tensions; rather, it at times intensified them. Thus, it is unsurprising that the tension between the liberal state and illiberal religious communities likewise intensified, as those communities were late to comply with COVID-19 public health regulations issued by state authorities. This Article suggests that alongside the behavioral and psychological explanations for individual non-compliance, illiberal religious communities' late response to the COVID-19 threats stems out of these communities' unique characteristics and deeply held norms. It provides five explanations supporting this argument and argues that all result from the interventionist liberal-centric policies embraced by most Western states for dealing with illiberal religious communities. Since COVID-19 is not expected to be the last health-related crisis, and as other environmental, economic, or security emergencies may still require social adherence to government regulations, liberal states should rethink their policies toward illiberal religious communities. The ability to harness those communities to comply with life-saving regulations may not only save lives within these communities but also reduce threats to areas and neighborhoods adjacent to those communities. This Article suggests that the isolation and fortification processes that illiberal religious communities engage in may be mitigated if states embrace pluralistic-centric policies regarding illiberal religious communities., TABLE OF CONTENTS I. 872 II. THE TRAGEDY OF BEING LATE: ILLIBERAL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES' LATE RESPONSE TO COVID-19'S THREATS 878 III. WHY DO ILLIBERAL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES DISOBEY COVID-19 SAFETY REGULATIONS? [...]

Algorithms are often tainted with bias that could negatively affect subjects' lives in many aspects. But while policymakers and scholars tend to focus their attention on methods to Jix the bias within the algorithm or its output, they neglect a crucial piece of the puzzle: when companies discover bias and fix it in the algorithmic output, they do so behind the scenes. While such a move might debias the output, society remains in the dark about its existence or how it might have affected the outcome. Sociely thus misses a unique opportunity to study social and cognitive biases that shape our civil rights and liberties today-and might become more important in the future with the rise of automation. We thus propose a new mechanism to aid in the study of bias and its elimination, not only in algorithms but also in society. We call it Bias Notification Duty (BND). This article lays the groundwork for this new social-legal responsibility by offering a dilfevent viewpoint on bias, algorithms, and society. We propose that the state imposes a duty (BND) on companies and their employees to, when bias is found, provide a notice to a selected governing body that will further study it and, upon evaluation of its source and impact, will notify those who are both directly and indirectly affected by it accordingly. Affected parties may include other companies that could be subjected to similar bias, individuals that were potentially harmed by it, researchers in relevant fields, and society as a whole. Upon setting the proposal, we examine the rationales behind it and discuss its hurdles. With such acknowledgment, we argue that BNDs are an important legal tool that should be used to aid in de-biasing our society, especially if the world will eventually be algorithmically driven and bias will be even more obscured by technological companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three concerns are inherent to the power of eminent domain--when a government forcibly takes away private property to provide a social good: abuse of this power, unfair distribution of burdens among members of society, and inefficient implementation of the government project. To protect against these undesirable outcomes, expropriation laws in most Western jurisdictions incorporate three safeguards: due process, a public use requirement, and mandatory compensation. While jurisdictions implement these safeguards in different ways, most demand their implementation as a prerequisite for legitimate expropriation. Arguably, the purpose of allowing governments to expropriate private property is to provide for important societal needs. But this conflicts with the idea that the government ought to perfectly adhere to the three aforementioned safeguards at all times. Imperfect circumstances, such as times of crisis, likely require governments to provide for the needs of their citizens, but afford insufficient time for standard due process. Imperfect implementation of the three safeguards may also be necessary when authorities struggle with budgetary limitations that prevent full compensation, or when they are unable to meet a social need without the involvement of private entities. In all these imperfect circumstances, at least one of the safeguards might be compromised if the government is to provide required social needs through expropriation. This Article proposes a novel model to conceptualize eminent domain, which identifies an interplay among expropriation laws' three safeguards. It further recognizes that each of these safeguards protects, to some extent, against all three of the potential dangers inherent in government's expropriation power. This innovative interplay model legitimizes compromise, such that it is appropriate for there to be only partial implementation of one safeguard as long as the other two are strictly applied. The interplay model proposed in this Article, therefore, allows the government to exercise its expropriation power properly even in imperfect circumstances, while still sufficiently protecting property owners and society from abuse of that power., Introduction 131 I. The Power to Take Private Property: Importance and Inherent Concerns 135 II. The Triangular Safeguard Mechanism of Takings Law 138 III. Imperfect Takings: A Non-Utopian Model for [...]

There is a clear tension in the law between exercises of state police power in land-use regulation including zoning laws, on the one hand, and takings under the Fifth Amendment, on the other. Courts have struggled to find a dividing line between the two, but for their efforts what we are left only with is a disjointed array of legal tests, each one as flawed as the next. Legal theorists, for their part, must shoulder some of the blame--no single theory can identify the point at which community need outweighs private property rights. Even well-developed theories thus fail to translate into practical application. But this Article is resolved to bridge that gap. This Article presents a novel theory that provides a unified normative framework for evaluating government interference with private property. It seeks to identify the tipping point at which private property rights must give way to the needs of the community at large. This approach, which I refer to as Property's Tipping Point, is a burden-shifting framework that accommodates competing theories of property. It builds on landmark Supreme Court cases to provide a unified standard for courts to apply in resolving cases of regulatory takings and exactions. The approach presented in this Article has both a substantive and a procedural component. It develops two tests that work dynamically to identify the point where community need trumps owner autonomy: the indispensability of needs and the generality of action. The former requires that any government interference with private property is designed to promote community prosperity. The latter test--the generality of action--confines the government to the boundaries of the rule of law. It is only by passing these two tests that a government authority may reach Property's Tipping Point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the laws governing the same-sex marriages in the U.S. focusing on Obergefell v. Hodges court case. Topics discussed include analysis of Obergefell case in which the court held that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; tension between the liberal state and illiberal communities; and Bob Jones University v. United States court case on same.

This Article argues that individuals who live in highly cooperative common interest communities should, in certain instances, be entitled to additional compensation or other remedies when their property is taken through eminent domain. The exclusive takings remedy of monetary compensation equal to the fair market value of the property cannot always account for loss of communality. This Article offers guidelines for allocation of additional remedies (monetary and in-kind) that recognize such loss. This proposal is grounded in a pluralistic conception of property, which holds that the state should support individuals' use of property as a social instrument to fulfill diverse values and beliefs. To that end, the state should balance several factors to determine whether a member of a community, or a community as a whole, should be entitled to remedies for communal loss: (1) the size and scope of the taking with in the comm unity ; (2) the role, if any, of the community's cooperation in its members ' realization of a shared conception of the good; (3) the community's social legitimacy as determined primarily by its structural openness, that is, its members ' ability to simultaneously belong to other communities; and (4) the community's ability to self-rehabilitate as determined by its political and economic strength. The state should also consider these factors in determining which of several types of remedies for communality loss would be most appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]