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In “Diversionary Dragons, or ‘Talking Tough in Taipei’” (Journal of East Asian Studies 9, 3: 369-398), Yitan Li, Patrick James, and A. Cooper Drury presented a newly created data set to show that Chen Shui-bian used independence rhetoric and confrontation with the mainland as a diversionary tactic in the face of domestic political difficulties. In the present exchange, Jonathan Sullivan challenges the authors’ understanding of how the Democratic Progressive Party used the Taiwan independence issue-and the authors’ interpretation of independence- and raises questions about the coding of press coverage as a means of identifying underlying preferences. The authors respond, concluding that the future use of such diversionary tactics is by no means foreclosed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chen Shui-bian achieved an international reputation for his promotion of Taiwan independence. Whilst that reputation may have been well earned, the analyses on which this conclusion is based are frequently flawed in two ways. First, by using an undifferentiated notion of independence, they tend to conflate sovereignty with less threatening expressions of Taiwanese identity and pro-democracy discourse. Second, by failing to take into account the impact of immediate strategic context, analysts ignore a fundamental element of democratic political communication. In our empirical analysis of more than 2,000 of Chen's speeches, we seek to avoid both flaws by unpacking the concept of independence and taking into account Chen's strategic relationship with his primary audiences. Our findings challenge popular portrayals of Chen, but more importantly they have strong implications for policy makers and students of political rhetoric with regard to current and future ROC presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the presidency of Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian from 2000, when he was elected the first non-Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) president to the present. Chen enjoyed broad support at home and abroad, but that soon changed. Three criteria are used to assess his presidency: governance (including political reform), the economy, and his handling of foreign and defense policy. The article concludes that while Chen faced a difficult situation, including having a weak mandate and a legislature controlled by a hostile opposition, he failed to show leadership and resorted to exploiting ethnic tensions. Gridlock resulted. Chen meanwhile saw economic decline and deteriorating relations with the United States and China. Finally, Chen succumbed to corruption. In short, Chen's presidency was a failed one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's China policy and the impact this has on the cross-strait relationship. Chen is unlikely to deviate from the pro-independence stand of the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). For the short-term, Beijing has good reason not to use force, but resorts to both well-calculated pressure (on the DPP) and concessions (to the opposition), in the hope that this may eventually weaken the DPP This "neiwai jiaokun" (internal trouble and external pressure) may emasculate Chen's will and ability to push for independence. Even a declaration of independence by Taiwan, if without U.S. support, will be manageable to Beijing, which has been psychologically, politically, and militarily prepared for such a contingency. The declaration can only pose a threat if it is used by a major foreign power for other objectives. Therefore, the Chinese reading of U.S. strategic intentions is crucial in deciding what action China will take on Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]