Search

This article focuses on the reaction of Asean economies to international financial shocks. The crises in emerging markets at the end of the last century underlined the vulnerability of emerging Asean economies to international financial fluctuations and a lack of sustainability in their exchange rate regime. A Structural VAR model is used to analyze the efficiency of the measures adopted by these countries, after this crisis episode, to protect their economies against speculative attacks. The results reveal that the impact of the current subprime crisis on emerging Asean countries is less significant than that observed in industrialized ones.

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202916; We show that banker bonuses cannot be understood exclusively as incentive contracts, but also incorporate a significant risk sharing dimension between bank shareholders and bank employees. This contrasts with the conventional view whereby diversified shareholders fully insure risk averse employees. However, financial frictions imply that shareholder value is concave in a bank's cash reserves---making shareholders effectively risk averse. The optimal contract between shareholders and employees then involves some degree of risk sharing. Using extensive payroll data on 1.26 million bank employee years in the Austrian, German, and Swiss banking sectors, we show that the structure of bonus pay within and across banks is compatible with an economically significant risk sharing motive, but difficult to rationalize based on incentive theories of bonus pay only.

How precise should accounting measurements be, if management has discretion to strategically withhold? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, which controls what measurements are conducted, within a voluntary disclosure framework a la Dye (85) and Jung and Kwon (1988). In our setting, information has real effects because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision, increasing in the market's belief. Absent frictions other than uncertainty about information endowment, we show that imprecision can reduce strategic withholding but always decreases firm value. We then examine plausible environments under which, by contrast, there is an optimal level of imprecision featuring coarseness at the marginal discloser. We offer additional implications in the contexts of enforcement against strategic withholding and financing with collateralized assets.

Organizational adaptation is a ubiquitous concept in management and organization research. Discussed in many theories, sometimes under different labels, the notion of adaptation is related to organizations being congruent to the environments within which they operate. Research traditions including behavioral theory (see A Behavioral Theory of the Firm), contingency theory as explained in Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations, population ecology (see The Population Ecology of Organizations), institutional theory elaborated upon in both Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony and The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, resource dependence (see The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective), and evolutionary economics (see An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change) all address organizational adaptation—though they emphasize different mechanisms. Adaptation, regarded as the strategic choice that organizations make, is often contrasted with the notion of selection driven by the determinism imposed by environments (see Organizational Adaptation: Strategic Choice and Environmental Determinism). Adaptive organizations are those able to obtain congruence both within organizations, reflected as congruence in internal functions and strategies, and across organizations, reflected as congruence with the needs of the external environment. The form of adaptation is also particularly relevant. Organizational theory has viewed adaptation as a state, an ability, and as a process. States of adaptation discuss stability and adaptation at points in time. From states of adaptation, adaptive abilities determine the impetus of adaptation and the locus of adaptation within organizations. Finally, the adaptation processes describe the means by which organizations adapt the challenges they face in negotiating new positions within environments. Research has covered each of these areas and this bibliography is organized primarily around forms of adaptation to elaborate on the ways in which it has been viewed by organizational theory and strategy scholars. The variety of research traditions examining organizational adaptation have not always aligned, however. Each research tradition seeks to explain different outcomes, from survival to performance to change. Thus, across theoretical traditions, the adaptation construct has been measured in many different ways—and often not as congruence with the external environment. In fact, this represents one of the challenges that recent research has identified as holding back progression of the adaptation research agenda. As such, this bibliography concludes with a section on issues in adaptation research in order to assist researchers in pursuing research in this area.

This paper estimates trade barriers in government procurement, a market that accounts for 12 percent of world GDP. Using data from inter-country input-output tables in a gravity model, the paper finds that home bias in government procurement is significantly higher than in trade between firms. However, this difference has been shrinking over time. Results also show that trade agreements with provisions on government procurement increase cross-border flows of services, whereas the effect on goods is small and not different from that in private markets. Provisions containing transparency and procedural requirements drive the liberalizing effect of trade agreements.

Real and private-value assets—defined here as the sum of real estate, infrastructure, collectibles, and noncorporate business equity—compose an investment class worth an estimated $84 trillion in the U.S. alone. Furthermore, private values can affect pricing in many other financial markets, such as that for sustainable investments. This paper introduces the research on real assets and private values that can be found in this special issue. It also reviews recent advances and highlights new research directions on a number of topics in the real assets space that we believe to be particularly important and exciting.

Political activism positively affects firm innovation. Firms that support more politicians, politicians on Congressional committees with jurisdictional authority over the firms’ industries and politicians who join those committees innovate more. We employ instrumental variables estimation and a natural experiment to show a causal effect of political activism on innovation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that political activism is valuable because it helps reduce political uncertainty, which, in turn, fosters firm innovation. Also consistent with this hypothesis, we show that politically active firms successfully time future legislation and set their innovation strategies in expectation of future legislative changes.Keywords: political contributions, innovation, investment policy, policy uncertainty

International audience; In this article, we tackle the problem of a market maker in charge of a book of options on a single liquid underlying asset. By using an approximation of the portfolio in terms of its vega, we show that the seemingly high-dimensional stochastic optimal control problem of an option market maker is in fact tractable. More precisely, when volatility is modeled using a classical stochastic volatility model—e.g. the Heston model—the problem faced by an option market maker is characterized by a low-dimensional functional equation that can be solved numerically using a Euler scheme along with interpolation techniques, even for large portfolios. In order to illustrate our findings, numerical examples are provided.

Consistent with salience theories of choice, we find that managers overreact to salient risks. We study how managers respond to the occurrence of a hurricane event when their firms are located in the neighborhood of the disaster area. We find that the sudden shock to the perceived liquidity risk leads managers to increase the amount of corporate cash holdings, even though the real liquidity risk remains unchanged. Such an increase in cash holdings is only temporary. Over time, the perceived risk decreases, and the bias disappears. This bias is costly for shareholders because it leads to higher retained earnings and negatively impacts firm value by reducing the value of cash. We examine alternative explanations for our findings. In particular, we find only weak evidence that the possibility of risk learning or regional spillover effects may influence our results.

This paper investigates the determinants of value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents over the 1999-2007 period. We document strong relationships between a household's portfolio tilt and the household's financial and demographic characteristics. Value investors have higher financial and real estate wealth, lower leverage, lower income risk, lower human capital, and are more likely to be female than the average growth investor. Households actively migrate to value stocks over the life-cycle and, at higher frequencies, dynamically offset the passive variations in the value tilt induced by market movements. We verify that these results are not driven by cohort effects, financial sophistication, biases toward popular or professionally close stocks, or unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We relate these household-level results to some of the leading explanations of the value premium.

We study retirement incentives with an augmented reduced form option value model à la Stock and Wise (1990). We propose methodological extensions to better reflect the respective incentives faced by singles and couples. Our results show that a more comprehensive modeling of couples’ incentives leads to very different patterns of retirement incentives – particularly for women. We apply the new indicators to data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and retirement in Europe in Belgium and find two key results. First, contrary to several previous studies, we obtain a positive signed income effects. Second, we find very different retirement incentives for men and women, with little flexibility in the retirement decision for men and substantially more flexibility for women as a function of financial incentive and household composition.

Real estate—housing in particular—is a less profitable investment in the long run than previously thought. We hand-collect property-level financial data for the institutional real estate portfolios of four large Oxbridge colleges over the period 1901–1983. Gross income yields initially fluctuate around 5%, but then trend downward (upward) for agricultural and residential (commercial) real estate. Long-term real income growth rates are close to zero for all property types. Our findings imply annualized real total returns, net of costs, ranging from approximately 2.3% for residential to 4.5% for agricultural real estate.

Stock prices occasionally move in response to unverified rumors. I propose a cheap talk model in which a rumormonger’s incentives to tell the truth depend on the interaction between her investment horizon and the information acquisition decisions of message-receiving investors. The model’s key prediction is that short investment horizons can facilitate credible information sharing between investors, thereby accelerating the information capitalization into market prices. Analyzing a data set of takeover rumors covered by U.S. newspapers, I find suggestive evidence in support of this prediction. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

© 2020 The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM in capital budgeting - as recommended in textbooks - should thus have real effects. For instance, low beta projects should be valued more by CAPM users than by the market. We test this hypothesis using M&A data and show that bids for low-beta private targets entail lower bidder returns. We provide further support by testing several ancillary predictions. Our analyses suggest that using the CAPM when valuing targets leads to valuation errors (relative to the market's view) corresponding on average to 12% to 33% of the deal values.

Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities. The model predicts that centralised supervision endogenously increases market integration and cross-border externalities, further strengthening the need for centralised supervision. This complementarity implies that, for some parameterizations of the model, the economy can be trapped in a local supervision equilibrium with low supervision and integration. In such a case, the forward-looking introduction of a centralized supervisory architecture achieves a superior equilibrium. JEL Classification: D53, G21, G28, G33, G38, L51

We examine the relation between the presence of U.S. government as a major customer and a supplier firm’s loan contract terms, using major corporate customers as a benchmark. We find that firms with major government customers are associated with fewer covenants and a lower likelihood of having performance pricing provisions in their loan contracts. In contrast, we do not find such associations for firms with major corporate customers. Further, we find no evidence that the existence of major government customers is related to the supplier firm’s loan spread, security, or maturity. We conjecture that lenders benefit from the stricter monitoring of the government as a major customer and thus use fewer covenants and performance pricing provisions when lending to firms with major government customers than when lending to those with major corporate customers. We provide evidence consistent with this conjecture.

International audience; We review the extensive literature on systemic risk and connect it to the current regulatory debate. While we take stock of the achievements of this rapidly growing field, we identify a gap between two main approaches. The first one studies different sources of systemic risk in isolation, uses confidential data, and inspires targeted but complex regulatory tools. The second approach uses market data to produce global measures which are not directly connected to any particular theory, but could support a more efficient regulation. Bridging this gap will require encompassing theoretical models and improved data disclosure.

We study the dynamics of fund manager ownership for a sample of U.S. equity mutual funds from 2005 to 2011. We find that ownership changes positively predict changes in future risk-adjusted fund performance. A one-standard-deviation increase in ownership predicts a 1.6 percent increase in alpha in the following year. Fund managers who are required to increase their ownership by fund family policy show the strongest increase in alpha. They do so by increasing their trading activity in line with the view that higher ownership aligns interests of managers with those of shareholders and induces higher effort.

We test the trade finance channel of exports by controlling for the bank credit channel. Using Turkey’s July 2012 adoption of Basel II as a quasi-natural experiment, we examine whether shocks to trade financing costs affect exports. With data for 16,662 Turkish exporters shipping 2,888 different products to 158 countries, we find that the share of letters-of-credit-based exports decreases (increases) when the associated risk weights for counterparty exposure increase (decrease) after the adoption of Basel II. However, growth of firm-product-country-level exports remains unaffected. Trade financing might have a lesser role in exports than previously suggested by the previous literature. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved.

High frequency arbitrage opportunities sometimes arise when the price of one asset follows, with a lag, changes in the value of another related asset due to information arrival. These opportunities are toxic because they expose liquidity suppliers to the risk of being picked off by arbitrageurs. Hence, more frequent toxic arbitrage opportunities and a faster arbitrageurs' response to these opportunities impair liquidity. We find support for these predictions using high frequency triangular arbitrage opportunities in the FX market. In our sample, a 1% increase in the likelihood that a toxic arbitrage terminates with an arbitrageur's trade (rather than a quote update) raises bid-ask spreads by about 4%.

This paper shows that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and post-entry growth, even in the long-run. We use French administrative data and exploit cross-sectional variation in local house-price appreciation as shocks to the value of collateral available to homeowners. We control for local demand shocks by comparing homeowners to two control groups that live in the same region but do not experience collateral shocks: (i) renters and (ii) homeowners with a mortgage outstanding, who - in France - cannot take out a second mortgage on their house. In both comparisons, we find that an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, entrepreneurs with access to more valuable collateral use more debt, start larger firms, and remain significantly larger even six years after creation.

We study a large-scale French reform that provided generous downside insurance for unemployed individuals starting a business. We study whether this reform affects the composition of people who are drawn into entrepreneurship. New firms started in response to the reform are, on average, smaller, but have similar growth expectations and education levels compared to start-ups before the reform. They are also as likely to survive or to hire. In aggregate, the effect of the reform on employment is largely offset by large crowd-out effects. However, because new firms are more productive, the reform has the impact of raising aggregate productivity. These results suggest that the dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities is small in the data, so that the facilitation of entry leads to sizable Schumpeterian dynamics at the firm-level.

It is commonly argued that dynamic consistency, consequentialism and non-expected utility are incompatible. The first aim of this paper is to rebut such arguments, by targeting the implicit assumption that the relevant contingencies correspond to objective resolutions of uncertainty (that is, events in a state space). These are not necessarily the same as the contingencies that the decision maker envisages, and we argue that any reasonable notion of dynamic consistency involves the latter, rather than the former, sort of contingency. We formulate such a version of dynamic consistency and show it to be compatible with consequentialism and non-expected utility. We then analyze the economic consequences of this new perspective. On the one hand, it provides a principled justification for restrictions on non-expected utility models (such as that proposed by Epstein and Schneider (2003)) in applications to dynamic choice problems. On the other hand, it provides a new analysis of the issue of attitude to information; contra standard arguments, the value of information under non-expected utility is non-negative as long as the information offered does not compromise information that the decision maker had otherwise expected to receive. Finally, we give a representation theorem for the contingencies the decision maker envisages, in the case where he uses the maxmin expected utility rule.

International audience; Notwithstanding their many environmental, economic and social advantages, renewable energy technologies (RE) account for a small fraction of the world's primary energy supply. One possible cause for this limited diffusion is that private investments in the RE sector, although potentially appealing, remain insufficient. The lack of adequate financing is also a clear indication that our understanding of the process by which investors fund RE ventures is still incomplete. This paper aims to fill in this gap and to shed new light on RE investment decisions. Building upon behavioral finance and institutional theory, we posit that, in addition to a rational evaluation of the economics of the investment opportunities, various non-financial factors affect the decision to invest in renewables. We analyze the investment decisions of a large sample of investors, with the objective to identify the main determinants of their choices. Our results shed new light on the role of institutional and behavioral factors in determining the share of renewable energy technologies in energy portfolios, and have important implications for both investors and policy makers: they suggest that RE technologies still suffer from a series of biased perceptions and preconceptions that favor status quo energy production models over innovative alternatives.