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China is often portrayed as benign and peaceful. Yet, its assertive disposition on the South China Sea territorial disputes appears to contradict the "peaceful rise" narrative. China's relentless quest in strengthening features under its control and turning them into artificial islands equipped with military facilities have stoke fear of expansionism among the Southeast Asian claimant states and threatened the maritime influence and interests of the US in the region. This paper focuses on China's strategic culture to explain its policy considerations and Malaysia's approach in responding to changing developments following the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal ruling. The paper argues that firstly, China's strategic stance is two-fold - to neutralize US's regional dominance and to dissuade Southeast Asian states from their reliance on the US; and secondly, Malaysia's preference for a nonconfrontational approach that gives precedence to dialogues and consultations are insufficient in defending its sovereign interests and must therefore be aptly backed up by a more emphatic strategic posture both on the ground and in its diplomatic language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the decision of the internal arbitral tribunal in the case brought against China by the Philippines. He cites several arbitration cases including that of Argentina and Uruguay relating to a pulp and paper mill, the Rainbow Warrior case between France and New Zealand, and the Russian Federation and China's dispute settlement. Other topics discussed include China's reasons for not honoring the tribunal's claim for jurisdiction and opposing interests in the South China Sea.

A reprint of the document "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of Philippines," which appeared on the Website of the Foreign MInistry of China on July 12, 2016, is presented. Topics discussed include events leading to the awarding to the arbitration, and the reasons for the non-acceptance and non-recognition by China.

Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—"killing the chicken to scare the monkey." These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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China and most Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) memberstates share a common bond in the South China Sea due to their geographical designation and contiguity as maritime nations and littoral states to this strategic waterway. Indeed, the significance of this semi-enclosed sea to their respective as well as mutual geo-strategic and geo-economic interests has made maritime cooperation a critical, if not compulsory agenda in the overall vision and framework of China-ASEAN engagements. Such importance has been underlined by the Chinese-sponsored Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century (MSR) agenda and its related programmes, which serve as the blueprint for enhanced China-ASEAN maritime cooperation especially in the South China Sea. However, sceptics/critics have pinpointed that these Chinese-driven agendas are not new, and that the maritime ASEAN states' responses have been somewhat lukewarm. Undeniably, Beijing's efforts have been largely hampered by its longstanding maritime-territorial disputes in the South China Sea vis-à-vis several ASEAN member-states, and perhaps even more so, by its growing assertiveness in handling the imbroglio. Not only has it created a "trust deficit", China's South China Sea policy has also encouraged the affected ASEAN claimant-states to "balance" or "hedge" against unpredictable Chinese strategic behaviour by rekindling security relations with and soliciting intervention from non-resident powers in the region. Such apparent "contradictions" pose political and even military challenges to maritime cooperation between China and ASEAN countries. This article addresses the South China Sea "problematique" by firstly providing an overview of China-ASEAN maritime cooperation, and by extension, China-ASEAN relations, as well as the South China Sea maritimeterritorial debacle, from both past and present vantage points. It then examines the mutual motivation and drivers behind the aforesaid initiatives to propel maritime cooperation, before deliberating on the contending issues and challenges in the disputed waters that could derail such an ambitious strategic vision. Lastly, it explores the way forward and prospects for the South China Sea to become a "sea of cooperation" that could facilitate the MSR agenda, and ultimately the realization of greater China-ASEAN maritime cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article utilizes the elements of leadership, political performance and national interests to understand China's foreign policy decision-making process. In contrast to a state-centred analysis, this article assumes that the supreme leadership's view of political performance is the most important factor when it comes to foreign policy decisionmaking. It contends that so-called national interests are often manipulated to serve particular political agendas. Specifically, this article explores whether the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative or advancing China's interests in the South China Sea can be better utilized to improve Chinese President Xi Jinping's political performance. The comparison between the two issues incorporates the dimensions of feasibility, significance and morality. In the final analysis, this article finds that the OBOR is likely to be better utilized to enhance Xi's political performance, which yields some salient implications for future trends in China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a possible revision to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in light of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to disputes over rocks and islands in the South China Sea, dispute resolution provisions under the UNCLOS in light of competing territorial claims by China and the Philippines, and UNCLOS treatment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in relation to artificial islands.

This article critically analyses an intuitive and influential conceptual framework by which to understand state strategy in territorial conflicts. According to this framework, a state in a territorial dispute can pursue one of three general strategies: threaten or use force; offer territorial concessions; or delay. This article argues that it is problematic to regard these three candidate strategies as mutually exclusive. It is argued that not only can a strategy of escalation be compatible with one of delay, but many uses of force can be employed instrumentally in service of delaying. The framework, this article contends, does not so much capture "strategy" as it does certain aspects--or outcomes--of strategy, which while appropriate for certain analytical tasks is less so for others. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident is examined and China's strategy during the event is scrutinized with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework to an analysis of narrower scope. Lastly, it is argued that a framework for conceptualizing state strategy in territorial disputes should not be confined to three alternatives; it should be more broadly constructed, allowing for more nuance and taking seriously all the domains of statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea has been recently challenged in the international community and this challenge reached its climax when the Philippines presented China with a Notification and Statement of Claim under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (LOSConvention) on 22 January 2013. In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines requests the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to adjudge and declare that China's maritime claims based on the U-shaped line are contrary to the LOS Convention and invalid. Against this background, this article will analyze the issues concerning the related submissions of the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition and conflict in the South China Sea involves many nations due to its resources and vital sea lanes. However, it is China which increasingly serves as a common denominator of intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours due to the aggressive scope of its claims to the sea and its islands. Among those states, Vietnam is most affected as it is first in the path of Chinese ambitions -- ambitions which authorities fear would give China significant tactical military and economic advantage. For China, there are similar fears over threats to the sea lanes and sea bed resources. Leaders of both states also perceive their diplomatic and martial actions in the sea in historical terms as well. However, enforcement actions taken by either state may lead to a worsening security dilemma in which reactive security strategies could dangerously destabilise relations. This article discusses the motivations and strategies of both states as well as the consequences of such and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism to examine their security concerns and perceptions. The article further proposes that the most valuable insights can be provided by defensive realism and neoliberalism, which together can encourage security, cooperation and conciliation in order to best promote the improvement of relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses conflict in the South China Sea and its Islands, focusing on a lack of resolution of disputes over sovereignty and control involving China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The author highlights international, regional, and bilateral strategies for resolving conflict in the South China Sea, including discussions of a lack of involvement by the United Nations (U.N.), Track-2 (nongovernmental) diplomacy efforts, and foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. It is suggested that balancing strategies involving outside countries such as the U.S. may preserve the status quo in the South China Sea region.

The South China Sea, and the Spratly Islands in particular, have become the focus of tension between the uncertain limits of China's rise and the discomfort of its Southeast Asian neighbours at the prospect of becoming China's backyard. The regional concerns of Southeast Asia overlap with the global concerns of the United States. The tension has been reframed by the global crisis of economic uncertainty that began in 2008 and sharpened by rhetorical confrontations in 2010. Because of the limited utility and adverse consequences of decisive unilateral action by any party, the dispute is likely to continue as a symbol of discord until it is defused by multilateral guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unresolved maritime claims to all, or parts, of the South China Sea involve Vietnam, Malaysia. the Philippines. Brunei, Taiwan, and China, and have hindered the development of the hydrocarbon resources there. Rising oil prices and China's voracious appetite for energy have stimulated greater interest in the exploitation of the area's oil reserves. Despite the uncertainty, ASEAN countries have involved energy companies in exploration and drilling in their respective claims. Cooperation arrangements between national oil companies including Chinese have been negotiated which hold out the prospect of greater security, even in the absence of a settlement of the maritime claims. Energy cooperation may stabilize the South China Sea providing a secure operating environment for oil exploitation. In time, the way could be prepared for further steps which would involve the claimants in negotiations over a resolution of the maritime claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of Sino-Philippine territorial disputes in the South China Sea during 1995-98. Emerging trends; Security and stability issues arising from the dispute; Basis of the claims made by China in the South China Sea; Dispute over the Mischief Reef; Personalities behind China's South China Sea policy making; Post-independence security environment in the Philippines.