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Se presenta una introducción en la que el autor comenta sobre los artículos en este número, incluyendo uno sobre la responsabilidad del propietario del buque en el derecho peruano, uno sobre la licencia de la operación de plantas de procesamiento de pesca y uno sobre la dignidad humana.

The charterer failed to pay hire in accordance with the terms of the time-charterparty. The shipowner has terminated the charter and demanded damages in the amounts due for the remaining period of the charter. In arbitration the arbitrators decided that pursuant to English law a single failure to pay hire should not entitle the shipowner to terminate the charter and claim damages. However, since there were several defaults by the charterer which all contributed towards a repudiatory breach of the charter, the shipowner was entitled to terminate the charter and claim damages. The judge, acting upon appeal, has agreed with the arbitrators on the repudiatory breach, however he has also decided that one failure in payment of charterhire does entitle the shipowner to terminate the charter and demand damages. This decision creates a new approach in English law, especially if confirmed by the higher courts on appeal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It was established that the plaintiff fell and injured himself while descending the stairs on the ship deck in the ordinary course of his professional duties, for which he had been formally educated and additionally trained. In respect of this loss event, the court concluded that there was no fault on the part of the ship owner, because the ship owner had provided safe working conditions and adequate protective equipment to the plaintiff as a crewmember. Hence, accidental loss is the solely risk of the injured party in this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 allowed the owner of a vessel to limit his liability in the case of an accident to the value of the vessel and its cargo if he could show he had no knowledge of or participation in the negligent act that resulted in the loss. In 1911, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. Harmon, a case which was interpreted for several decades to hold that the Limitation Act formed an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. In a 1990 case, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that it would not reach the question of whether the Limitation Act was an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction--which several Courts of Appeal took to mean that the Act's continued vitality as a jurisdictional basis was an open question. Since that time, many Courts of Appeal have held that the Limitation Act is not, for a variety of reasons, an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. This Note argues that the Limitation Act continues to form an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction. It examines the history of admiralty jurisdiction and the Limitation Act and explains why the Limitation Act should form an independent basis for admiralty jurisdiction even for cases in which the facts of the underlying tort claim might not otherwise come within the boundaries of admiralty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]